THE RISE OF Euroskepticism

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EUROPE AND ITS CRITICS IN SPANISH CULTURE

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To Emi, without skepticism

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The Rise of Euroskepticism

INTRODUCTION

A Cultural Poetics of Spanish Euroskepticism

Undreaming Europe

Artists and intellectuals' sustained scrutiny of the ever-evolving idea of Europe helped pave the way for the widespread protests against the European Union (EU) and its policies that have surged since the beginning of the so-called Great Recession in 2008. Consciously or not, they took part in a tradition of Euroskepticism, a term coined in the mid-1980s as a result of British debates regarding the United Kingdom's involvement in the process of European market integration, which at the time was encountering significant resistance from the left-wing Labour Party.[1] When the word began to be adopted on the continent shortly thereafter, its meaning expanded. As Cécile Leconte points out, it became "a 'catch-all' synonym for any form of opposition or reluctance toward the EU" (4). Currently, the term refers to an intricate phenomenon that plays a role in the public life of dozens of nations. Nevertheless, because Euroskepticism is still mostly associated with the discourse of organized politics, its literary and artistic expressions have gone largely unnoticed. If, following Jacques Rancière, we understand aesthetic acts as "configurations of experience that create new modes of sense perception and induce novel forms of political subjectivity" (*Politics* 9), it is clear that these works deserve our close attention, as they can offer nuanced and engaging perspectives on the emotions generated by a unified Europe. Their authors are important "in-between figures"— men and women who, as Jan-Werner Müller contends, are not political thinkers or leaders yet have a significant part in the creation, discussion, and destruction of political entities.[2]

Some of the fundamentals of that criticism can be traced back to the period of the conflicts that shattered the continent in the first half of the twentieth century. It was in the aftermath of World War II that the creators of

the entity currently known as the European Union found the definitive momentum to realize what had been an essentially utopian project for a number of thinkers at least since Jean-Jacques Rousseau's and Immanuel Kant's federalist proposals: a new social and political arrangement that would bring lasting peace and welfare to the region.[3] Their ideas were the basis of the organization that Robert Schuman, one of the founders of what would later become the Union, announced in 1949 as "the fulfillment of a dream that has haunted the people of Europe for ten centuries."[4] In the decades to follow, that dream was progressively made a reality that fostered a peaceful and productive relationship among an increasing number of nations, which as a consequence experienced unprecedented stability and growth.[5]

At the same time, that bold vision generated a plurality of intriguing counterpoints, most of which have been eclipsed. Their proponents struggled to articulate the deeper causes and consequences of the conflicts that produced the definite push for "an ever closer union" of the European nations, as well as to question the principles that guided this process (including its economic orientation or the self-perception of the EU as the moral compass of the world) and the effects of its policies within and beyond European territory. As the Union grew larger in number of member nations and institutional architecture, its allure waned for a vast portion of the citizenry. The optimism generated in the project's first decades had turned into indifference for most by the turn of the century. With the onset of the post-2007 Great Recession, authorized voices in countries that were seen as the experiment's most solid defenders began to claim that Schuman's dream had become a nightmare, especially in "peripheral" Europe (a telling term). The "dream-turned-nightmare" metaphor is used, for instance, by Italian economist and essayist Luigi Zingales and by Spanish author and filmmaker Vicente Molina Foix. While they work from different ends of the political spectrum, both lament the role that "Europe" has had, either by action or by omission, in the social and economic havoc wreaked in their respective countries.[6]

Zingales and Molina Foix are just two of the numerous public intellectuals who have contributed recently to the discourse of Euroskepticism, an array of critical attitudes and arguments that have developed within the region in reaction to integrative pan-European or pro-Europeanization initiatives. Understanding it calls for a close look at its roots and demands analyses that go beyond the activities of traditional political actors and institutions. The history of Euroskepticism precedes that of the EU, which is but the latest institutional embodiment of those enterprises. As I see

it, Euroskepticism encompasses more than mere resistance to the actions (and omissions) of "Brussels, the gentle monster," as the celebrated German author Hans Magnus Enzensberger calls the bureaucracy-prone EU. If one examines how the label has been used and which positions it has designated, one soon realizes that Euroskepticism is a comprehensive phenomenon that includes a broad variety of emotions and ideas. The majority of the authors whose work I examine in this book would probably identify with Pablo Sánchez and Antonio Masip's self-characterization as "Europeos pero incorrectos" [Europeans—yet improper ones]: they support the idea of European integration, but disagree with how it has been implemented.[7]

I am reluctant to formulate one more "Euro-" label to refer to those who criticize the EU in a constructive manner. Notwithstanding the important differences among them, I continue to refer to their ideas with the umbrella term "Euroskepticism" due to the word's widespread usage. As it has lost most of the specific denotative power it may have once had, I seize on its semantic ambiguity to address critiques of several notions of "Europe" generated within that region, positions whose aims range from the desecration of the integration project to its enhancement. So, while the word in question remains convenient for identifying an amalgam of related works, it is of little value as an analytic tool, since it obliterates all differences within the array of positions that it is commonly used to designate. Euroskepticism is not a cohesive project. Thus, only a critical close reading of texts that are (or could be) labeled Euroskeptic can determine what is actually meant when they are thus characterized.

Since the 1980s, the views of Euroskeptics have ranged from ultranationalists' fierce hostility toward the very existence of the EU to constructive criticism by other actors whose goal is not to dismantle the Union but to reform it.[8] Those interventions, ultimately aimed at the bureaucratic elite in Brussels though usually channeled through national media or institutions, often demand more open and inclusive procedures of governance, plead for a change in economic priorities, or expose the growing inconsistencies between the Union's impeccable human rights rhetoric and the policies it actually applies (for instance, in the areas of immigration and border management). In the current moment of societal crisis in Europe, these voices are no longer heard exclusively on the margins of the debate—they are entertained in the mainstream media and invoked by civil society and leaders across the political spectrum. But the history of these developments would be incomplete if we did not acknowledge the discourse of those who have been critical of it, especially when they have raised their objections

from outside the political establishment. Sofia Vasilopoulou is right when she claims that, "to acquire a more rounded understanding of opposition voices and their impact," we need "a holistic approach that would examine Euroskepticism beyond the study of political parties and public opinion" (153). But the comprehensive study she calls for cannot be tackled exclusively from the social sciences—the usual platform for inquiry into this phenomenon—or by taking into account only the latest reactions to the region's developments. The engagement of many artists and intellectuals concerned with this fundamental process in the history of contemporary Europe has had at least as much influence on the public sphere as that of political leaders has. Analyzing the "cultural poetics" generated in relation to the issue of Europe requires recognizing their work as "the product of a negotiation between a creator or a class of creators, equipped with a complex, communally shared repertoire of conventions, and the institutions and practices of society" (Greenblatt 12)—that is, considering the fundamental role of literature and the arts in the construction of collective imaginaries as much as their own non-autonomous nature and specificities.

Euroskepticism is conditioned by culture and formed in discourse. It is also important to notice that it involves more than rational arguments; to a great extent, it is shaped by emotions. Artists and intellectuals mediate and deal with affects that must be considered for an adequate comprehension of the phenomenon, something that has often escaped scholarly attention. That "emotions have been ever-present in politics despite the longstanding neglect by academic researchers," as Nicolas Demertzis points out (264), poses an additional challenge when engaging the significance of these authors and the past or potential impact of their projects. While a number of these authors may have had a limited readership or audience in mind, others could claim that their contributions affected millions of people's views of Europe. María Zambrano, who was an emerging philosopher in her early forties writing from exile in Latin America when she published *La agonía de Europa* [The agony of Europe] in 1945, surely had a very different outlook on the immediate effect of her work than did playwright Albert Boadella when his mockumentary series *Ya semos* [*sic*] *europeos* [Europeans at last] was broadcast by one of Spain's two existing nationwide television channels in 1989. Zambrano's work continues to inspire an active minority of thinkers today, while Boadella's satires are available for global consumption via the web. (They are studied respectively in Chapters 1 and 3 of this book). As the EU struggles to find a vision for the future and bolster its legitimacy among its constituents, these and other authors' discordant

voices should be carefully considered. While they seldom propose actual alternatives to the status quo, they have the power to unsettle it and to fuel deliberation. The rich textual tradition they sustain must be unearthed and analyzed, partly as a way to appreciate more fully the affects the Union's policies and symbols produce. This task requires a qualitative focus that inspects contributions to the debates at stake with an awareness of their cultural specificities, something that in most cases involves examining the significance they hold within a national framework.

Criticism of the projects for a united Europe and their political embodiments can be found throughout the continent. One shared trait of Euroskeptic discourse wherever it appears is that it tends to combine two levels of argumentation: its proponents observe the supranational actions of the EU but react to their effects—be they actual or imagined—within a specific national sphere and rarely beyond those confines. Similarly, studies dealing with contemporary Europe engage transnational issues by limiting their approach to institutional matters (usually very technical policy reviews), attempting broad historical accounts that inevitably fail to adequately address the dozens of different countries involved, or prioritizing a national scope. This challenging division has been recognized by Perry Anderson, who decided that the best option for carrying out his seminal study *The New Old World* was to focus on what he calls "the core" (France, Germany, and Italy), framing it within a general approach to the history of the Union and an excursion into the "Eastern Question" (exemplified by Cyprus and Turkey). I agree with Anderson that the enduring relevance of the national dimension means that we still need to deal with Europe-wide matters by paying close attention to specific countries. At the same time, while we must recognize that no single one can be representative of the whole Union, some cases are more representative than others.

Anderson himself notes that he "would have liked to have written of Spain, whose modernization, though relatively placid, has been a significant feature of the period" (xiii). Indeed, notwithstanding some interpreters' view of Spain as an anomaly in the continent's history, its situation is quite illustrative of the type of conflictive engagement that a nation's culture can develop vis-à-vis Europe. For generations of Spaniards growing up in the aftermath of the twentieth-century wars—as well as for citizens of other nations in southern and eastern Europe—"becoming European" was more a dream than a plan, and few had even an inkling of Schuman and his associates' own dreams and plans. For many of those who lived under Franco's dictatorship (or in exile because of it), overcoming the regime's

provincialism and dogmatism seemed the greatest collective achievement on the horizon. From the 1950s onward, the evolving European Communities (EC) gave programmatic form to Spanish citizens' hopes. Meanwhile, starting in the late 1950s, as new, better-prepared and less politicized government officials prioritized economic development over isolationism, an increasingly unified Western Europe came to be perceived as the locus with which Spain needed to be closely associated to maximize its productive potential. The Franco regime first asked to become associated with the EC in 1962.[9]

The most pervasive official narrative consisted of something resembling an Odyssean voyage: a heroic nation that left its cradle—the family of Western nations—to advance its calling beyond the seas, followed by a secular and quite pitiful wandering in search of its true spiritual homeland and a victorious return to, and acknowledgement by, the European palace of virtue and prosperity, where it could contribute its valuable connections to the Americas and Northern Africa. When, after little public debate (analyzed in Chapter 3), Spain was accepted as a member in 1985, many felt that Europeanness had become a reality. It is not an exaggeration to affirm that Europeanization—a process whose meaning and implications were rarely stated with any clarity—was perceived as the greatest collective achievement imaginable, although also one that produced some anxiety about its potential effects on national identity.[10] Once their nation was accepted as a full-right member of that exclusive club, no one—not even Spaniards themselves—could deny their privileged status. During the subsequent years, a series of tangible measures continued to reinforce that sense of belonging, such as the abolition of border checks with other European countries and the adoption of the euro as common currency.

During this process, little attention was paid to those who raised their voices to criticize an idealized Europe, to contest EU policies, or to question the developments that had apparently transformed a "backward" nation into an example worthy of imitation in just a few years of so-called institutional "transition" from an authoritarian regime into a democratic, parliamentary monarchy.[11] And yet, some artists and intellectuals claimed that Spain's economic growth and Spaniards' renewed self-image had not been accompanied by a parallel, deep development of civic and cultural attitudes in the country or by an appropriate reflection on the process of Europeanization. Writer Juan Goytisolo, for instance, repeatedly denounced the racism and arrogance of what he saw as "una sociedad de *nuevos ricos, nuevos libres, y nuevos europeos*" ("Nuevos ricos" 1193; his emphasis) [a so-

ciety of *nouveaux riches, new free, and new Europeans*], putting a critical accent on both the novelty and the insecurity Spaniards felt upon their nation's entry into the European Economic Community. Along the same lines, but with a very different approach, painter Patricia Gadea (1960–2006) denounced with corrosive irony the sexism, racism, and economic exploitation that exist under the more positive aspects of the European ideal. In an untitled work that is one of the most celebrated pieces of her *Circo* series, produced in 1992 using materials taken from ephemeral circus advertisements, Gadea satirized the darker side of Spain's flashy embrace of the EU.[12] Such Spanish manifestations of Euroskepticism are both typical of "peripheral" Europe and rich in particularities.

In this book, I highlight three issues that are central to the topology of Spanish Euroskepticism: modernity, gender, and location. The identification of an ideal of Europe with a certain notion of modernity related to a tradition of arrogant rationalism and exclusion of the other is regarded as suspect by authors such as Miguel de Unamuno, María Zambrano, José Ferrater Mora, Max Aub, Jorge Semprún, and Juan Mayorga, who engage the topic in their essays and dramas. The intricate relationship between gender and nationalism is further complicated as the latter is affected by Europeanization. The Spanish manifestations of this equation are problematized here, especially in connection with the work of the fascist catalyst and author Enrique Giménez Caballero, the poets Pere Gimferrer and Antonio Colinas, the novelists Rafael Azcona and Francisco Umbral, and the satirist Albert Boadella and the company he directed for over forty years, Els Joglars. Finally, I examine how artists such as Valeriano López, Carlos Spottorno, and Santiago Sierra and writers such as Mercedes Cebrián and Jordi Puntí challenge the politics of location and mobility that are instilled in Europe's self-definitions. It should also be noted that these issues overlap continuously. Moreover, in the oeuvre of these and other authors analyzed throughout the book, the abovementioned topics appear in conjunction with a few additional ones: memory, heritage, affect, power, and so on. This variety of recurring themes could be summed up as that of identity, a powerful term, yet also one which can be reductive of the complexities it brings together. Because of this constant intersection, this book is organized following a chronological structure rather than a thematic one, allowing for a clearer view of the continuities and ruptures that have existed in the development of Spanish Euroskepticism since the regional unification process started to gain momentum in the postwar period. But it is not a history of the phenomenon in a strict sense, as I favor

in-depth interpretation of a selection of works. Their significance can be comprehended better against the background of long-standing discussions about the place (or lack thereof) of Spain in the diffuse construction known as "Europe."

Roots of Spanish Euroskepticism

The understanding of Europe developed by artists and intellectuals is at the crux of Spain's relationship with modernity. Nevertheless, the existing approaches to the issue rarely cast light on specific cultural products, tending instead to focus on a number of social and political problems.[13] Explanations at the macro level for Spanish "belatedness" or "failure" in a series of key European developments (the nation's fiascos regarding rationalism, the Enlightenment, the industrial revolution, the bourgeois revolution, and so on) dominated the discourse of historians and less specialized interpreters for most of the last century. They referred to a long chain of frustrated attempts at regeneration or to different obstacles that continuously alienated Spain from the European core and thus from the prevalent narrative of modernity. Given these gross generalizations, it should come as no surprise that the rhetoric of weakness and failure has shifted dramatically in the last decades toward a perception of Spain's "normality." Though this view was better grounded in comparative histories, it offered little analysis of specific works that could sustain the renewed assessment regarding the cultural realm. Even a scholar as sharp and wordy as Fredric Jameson seems satisfied by addressing the problem in one sentence: "Spain has not been part of Europe for a very long time, and has only now, after Franco, and with the European Union, again conquered the right to be considered fully European" (299). Reading Jameson's remark, which captures the standard approach to the topic, one wonders about the span of "a very long time," whether being part of Europe should be considered a "right" (and how a nation would manage to "conquer" it), what a willing individual (or a country) must do to become "fully" European, and, above all, what the proper way to measure varying degrees of Europeanness might be. Statements like Jameson's point to the transformation of an "exceptional," "abnormal," or simply "different" Spain into a "normal" and "assimilated" one, or vice versa. Thus, denying a long tradition of reflection that declares Spain's exceptionality, the established knowledge currently presents the country's trajectory as mostly "normal" within an unquestionably European framework. This view has consequences that reach far beyond historiographical debates, as it is

often invoked in policy-making regarding issues as varied as migration and school curricula. According to the construction of an imagined context of Europeanness, the vicissitudes of, say, Sweden (which is as undisputedly European as it is removed from Spain's location and history) could seem more relevant in the day-to-day lives of the Spanish people than do those of Morocco. This construction, along with the uncritical and complacent concept of "normality" that has become currency,[14] signal a shared desire among most politicians and academics to end the disputes about Spain's relationship with Europe with a narrative of success.

Many of the contradictions that I have pointed out become apparent even in a brisk survey of the origins of modern Spain's debate over Europe.[15] Proposals for European unification already abounded before the issue of Europeanization gained prominence in Spain at the end of the nineteenth century. The list of post-Napoleonic projects for diverse forms of continental integration is extensive, and some of them had a receptive public there. Just to mention one significant example, Karl Christian Krause, a secondary Kantian philosopher whose work became the main inspiration for what would later be known as *Krausismo* (the most influential branch of Spanish liberalism among nineteenth-century intellectuals), had joined the advocates for pan-European association in 1814 with his *Entwurf eines europäischen Staatenbundes* [Draft of a European Confederation]. Krause's Spanish followers therefore had solid Europeanist ground on which to stand. But it was not until the late 1890s that the most salient episodes of the idealization of Europe in Spanish culture began to take shape, not coincidentally at the same time that the "intellectuals" were first recognized as such. It was then that the jurist, sociologist, and republican activist Joaquín Costa (1846–1911) first proposed Europeanization as the solution to Spain's predicaments, primary among which was its 1898 defeat in the Spanish–American War, a wake-up call for the nation. The "New Moses," as Costa was dubbed, set Europe as the mythical goal to be achieved through a series of reforms that included everything from the construction of new dams to the diversification of crops. His "Reconstitución y europeización de España" [Reconstitution and Europeanization of Spain], also in 1898, was a program for national modernization and overall "regeneration" that—regardless of the urgency of its enunciation—had a lasting impact. Costa's proposal had the goal of

> suministrar al cerebro español una educación sólida y una nutrición abundante, apuntalando la despensa y la escuela; combatir las fatali-

> dades de la geografía y las de la raza, tendiendo a redimir por obra del arte nuestra inferioridad en ambos respectos, a aproximar en lo posible las condiciones de una y otra a las de la Europa central, aumentando la potencia productiva del territorio y elevando la potencia intelectual y el tono moral de la sociedad. (39)
>
> [providing solid education and abundant nourishment to the Spanish brain by strengthening the school and the pantry; fighting the fatalities of [our] geography and race by progressively and artfully redeeming our inferiority in both aspects, making them resemble as much as possible those in central Europe, increasing the productive power of the territory and elevating the intellectual power and moral tone of the society].

Given the prevalent conceptualization of geopolitical difference that defines the relationship between Spanish intellectuals and the notion of Europe, it is unsurprising that, as Costa saw the development of the country lagging behind that of its neighbors to the north, he argued that the danger to be averted was the definitive "Africanization" of the homeland. "Queremos respirar aire de Europa; que España transforme rápidamente su medio africano en medio europeo" (160) [we want to breathe Europe's air; we want Spain to quickly transform its African milieu into a European one], he demanded. A range of followers, from the philosopher José Ortega y Gasset and the dictator Miguel Primo de Rivera to the leaders of the Second Republic, Francisco Franco, and the 1980s socialists led by Felipe González, have carried on his legacy—although in ways that varied depending on their own political goals (Beneyto 29).

Shortly after Costa made his commanding call for the Europeanization of Spain, a comparable line of thought produced a counter-discourse that has been largely underplayed because of the political preeminence and pragmatic nature of his views. For some, it was not so obvious that a nebulous notion of "Europe" was the solution to the country's dismal situation. Towering among these was Miguel de Unamuno (1864–1936), who may be considered the founder of Spain's own modern tradition of Euroskepticism. Although it was certainly not the earliest, arguably the most relevant inaugural episode of the debate was the clash between Unamuno and Ortega y Gasset (1883–1955). The Europeanization disagreement between the two men regarded as Spain's most prominent twentieth-century intellectuals sparked a discussion that has haunted Spanish authors for decades. Unamuno was still securing his position as the leading Spanish "intellectual"

(he had been the first to publicly use this word as a noun) with an unrelenting stream of letters to colleagues and polemical essays published in newspapers throughout the country and abroad when the rookie Ortega y Gasset, almost twenty years his younger, dared to quarrel with him over the issue of Europeanization. As a result of that confrontation, Unamuno has often been identified with solid anti-Europeanism and Ortega as an enthusiastic Europhile. Indeed, Unamuno claimed more than once to be a "Berber" and described feeling "íntima repugnancia" [intimate repugnance] toward the "espíritu europeo moderno" ("Sobre la europeización" 1000) [modern European spirit], which he contrasted with "nuestra vieja sabiduría africana" (1004) [our old African wisdom]. Meanwhile, Ortega was proud to declare himself "fascinated" by Europe, a word with which he believed "comienzan y acaban para mí todos los dolores de España" ("Unamuno" 256) [all of Spain's sorrows begin and end]. Yet a closer look into the development of this issue, considered within a Euroskeptic tradition, reveals two facts that must be taken into account for a better understanding of the tradition of Spanish Euroskepticism, especially its origins. On the one hand, the debates were much richer and nuanced than has usually been acknowledged; on the other, these intellectual encounters were only some of the highlights of a complex and longer continuum that has had an enormous influence on key aspects of Spain's culture over the last century.

The cliché casts Ortega, the only challenger to Unamuno's intellectual leadership on the national arena in the first third of the twentieth century, as a solid devotee to the European ideal, while Unamuno has customarily been thought of as a staunch and isolated defender of Spain's exceptionality. But the issue is not so simple, as their respective positions were far from monolithic, especially for Unamuno, given as he was to thinking in paradoxical and often mutable terms. When we take into account their whole oeuvre and not just their early and often most influential texts, it becomes clear that, contrary to the conventional wisdom, neither was Ortega ever so fervently pro-Europe nor Unamuno such a Europhobe. In different ways, their writings were instrumental in founding a relevant tradition of intellectual and artistic work on Europe in which their ideas still reverberate. Since the early twentieth century, the list of Spanish authors who have dealt with the issue of Europe from positions that accord with the dominant, more positive ideal promoted by Ortega has initially been longer. Nevertheless, their views, like those of their predecessors, have been far from monolithic. In fact, a direct disciple of Ortega (if a rather rebellious one), María Zambrano, is among those who have enriched the criticism

of Europe much in Unamuno's mode. While writers such as Salvador de Madariaga and Jorge Semprún (to name just two of those with an international reputation) were passionate defenders of the school of thought initiated by Costa and epitomized by Ortega, a significant portion of this complex tradition encompasses works and authors whose nuances and ambiguities make it very difficult to assign them to one side of the debate. What is clear is that for an important number of artists and intellectuals, Europe has not been the solid ideal often presented in political discourse. Its implications and significance depend mostly on the context in which it is invoked and its reception.

In the second decade of the twenty-first century, the crises that again underscored Spain's undesirable differences from its northern neighbors (with record unemployment and economic inequality rates, among others) meant that, in retrospect, the success of the Europeanization process touted a few years prior increasingly came to be seen as a mirage, or even as a nightmare, as I noted earlier. This new reconsideration has been so extensive that even the modernization tied to Europeanization is seen as reversible or incomplete.[16] At the height of the Great Recession, commentators again questioned the proper Europeanness of corrupt, impoverished Spain. As the recent backlash produced by the post-2007 crisis shows—with close connections to policies perceived (often rightly so) as mandated by the German government or technocrats in Brussels—the question of the nation's identity and historical position vis-à-vis Europe appears far from settled. As L. Elena Delgado suggests, "we are faced with the paradox of a supposedly by-gone problem that is nevertheless re-examined over and over, in the midst of invocations to the present Europeanized and 'normalized' status of Spain" ("Settled" 119).

The difficulties posed by engaging the issue of Spain's (un-)European condition have to do in part with the malleable meaning of the main concepts involved. This problem is aggravated because what has been written on the matter seldom derives from the analysis of specific cultural products. Those who make use of these notions rarely address what is meant by "Europe" or what integration and normalization entail. The implications of such processes and the identities of its actors are also avoided. When politicians employ these terms, they often leave the citizenry to deal with a codification of "Europe" as an entity that undoubtedly exists and influences reality but is ultimately intangible, rendering it opaque in its specific social presence. One is seldom sure whether "Europe" is meant to invoke the European Commission, the European Parliament, the European Coun-

cil, the European Central Bank, some other institution or agency, or that lofty ideal that so many have dreamed of in one form or another—a "moral utopia," as Josep M. Esquirol calls it (22). Once mystified, the term serves as a handy discursive tool with which to justify almost any action imposed on the social body, since the principles it represents are positioned beyond good and evil. Following Joseph H. H. Weiler, Stefan Auer has argued that the post-2007 crisis forced European political leaders to "rely too much" on "political messianism" (or, in Weiler's words, "the justification for action and its mobilizing force derive not from process, as in classical democracy, or from result and success, but from the ideal pursued, the destiny to be achieved, the promised land waiting at the end of the road" [683]). The process of European integration would be the "political messianic venture par excellence. . . . The mobilizing force and principal legitimating feature was the vision offered, the dream dreamt, the promise of a better future" (Weiler 683).

In the case of Spain's political class, however, that messianic discourse on Europe was not prompted by the post-2007 crisis; it has been the rule, rather than the exception, at least since the so-called "transition" to democracy that started in the 1970s. With policies to address everything from security to workers' rights, public health, immigration, and the national debt, the justification for many unpopular decisions often boiled down to seeking a way to converge with, or be accepted by, "Europe." But when reading the works of Spanish supporters of that "Europe"—and, to a lesser degree, those of its critics—one is usually uncertain of the exact meaning of their argument's central notion, which nonetheless does not seem to subtract from its great rhetorical power. The allure of what has become such a commanding brand has played an effective, often decisive, role in the persuasiveness of their discourse. Many of the works analyzed in this book denounce this usage of the term. By means of critique, parody, allegory, or irony, these Euroskeptic approaches challenge us to think differently about a notion that has become as naturalized as it is ductile.

Nevertheless, on both sides of the debate there exists a consensus that "Europe" means much more than a place. In Spain, as in other so-called peripheral countries, Europe is seen as a measuring rod against which the overall performance of the nation can be evaluated, or as a finish line to be reached. In this latter sense, the geographical meaning of Europe is in a way preserved, although reaching such a loosely defined location does seem like a daunting task. Paradoxically, Europe is a utopia present in every map—indeed, at the center of most, as cartography illuminates entities'

locations in terms of their relative power. More consequential than the controversy over the region's cartographical boundaries, but still connected to it (as I will explain below), is the fact that "Europe" has been a code word for modernity, a notion with which thinkers and artists in Spain have had a very complex relationship for the last couple of centuries.[17] As such, it seems undeniable that Euroskepticism in Spain connects with the centuries-old anxiety concerning modernity bought at the price of national identity. It also entails questions about the very nature of modernity, insofar as the liberal concept is itself a product of Europe's self-interrogation (debates about "other modernities" notwithstanding). From some Euroskeptics' viewpoint, the new, expansive, and overtly cosmopolitan Europe is not without its own self-absorption and provincialism. I also detect a boomerang quality to the debate: to be a Euroskeptic leaves room for questioning the construct known as Europe, yet the controversy itself tends to keep Europe as an ideal in the limelight.

Spain and the Paradoxes of Eurocentrism

The substitution of the intricate historical processes and political agendas that are the basis of Eurocentric discourse with an apparently simple geographic denomination has served to simplify and mystify at both the global and intra-European levels. Thus, the process of "integration" in Europe, customarily presented by the Spanish ruling class as the appropriate and long-desired reinstitution of a lost order, tends to hide the deeper meanings and consequences of a set of political options at the service of specific interests: joining the EU was not a neutral process, just as the Union itself is not. At the same time, voices critical of certain uses of "Europe" and of the unification process have been muted, ignored, or disregarded as extremist or idealistic. Paying attention to them will bring to light an un-self-aware tradition of Euroskepticism, which may also have something to add to the critique of Eurocentrism that ought to be part—whether implicitly or explicitly—of scholarship focusing on Europe.

Spain's role in the discourse of Eurocentrism is a complex, even contradictory one. On the one hand, as a national project historically determined by the triumph of an especially dogmatic branch of Christianity and its accompanying colonizing fervor, it seems clear that Spaniards were active agents in constructing the West's hegemony. For much of the global South, then, Spain figures indisputably as an active part of the North, and for much of the Orient, it must be included in the Occident. But Eurocen-

trism itself has a center, and Spain has been placed far from it in multiple ways from its beginnings. As Roberto M. Dainotto has argued, the configuration of modern Eurocentrism required a new arrangement of the logic of borders defining a Europe that had become totally self-sufficient, even in terms of the element of otherness required to sustain its project of universal hegemony. In contrast with the classical West-versus-East opposition prevalent before then, the eighteenth century saw the advent of an internal North–South divide. Dainotto points to Montesquieu's *The Spirit of the Laws* (1748) as the work in which that "theoretical event" was consummated; from that point on, "Asia is no longer an other of Europe—in fact, there is no other. In the totality that is Europe, even Asia, or its simile or equivalent value, can be found in Europe: in the South, that is, which is an Asia of sorts, a south that is itself Europe—but only a bad, defective, and pathological one" (47). Montesquieu laid the groundwork for considering the southern European countries as PIGS, the unfortunate acronym used to stress commonalities among Portugal, Italy, Greece, and Spain that differentiate them from their more prosperous, modern, and of course, as a consequence, allegedly morally superior northern neighbors.

Obviously, this does not mean that Spain, a part of that "porcine" region of Europe (a conception that is further explored in Chapter 5), had no role in the formation of a Eurocentric understanding of geopolitics and culture. But it does imply that the strain of Eurocentrism configured in Spain inevitably has peculiarities that create dissonances within that larger discourse, as is also the case with Spanish Euroskepticism. Spanish intellectuals' positions regarding their nation's role in Eurocentrism and the constructions derived from it can be summarized in two views: they have seen it either as a major player in the imperialist endeavors that are said to inaugurate and define modernity, or as a marginal, eccentric contender isolated from the continent's most important affairs, barely mimicking northern initiatives.

It is obvious that because of its American, African, and Asian conquests, Iberia was a fundamental agent in the early stages of European expansionism. But the Eurocentric model would later deny Spain and Portugal a place among the group of nations that embodied Hegel's "absolute spirit" of reason because of their decreased participation in the subsequent events and debates that defined the prevailing notion of modernity. The implications of Hegel's influential view are still much at work today, looming behind the work of some of the most respected thinkers of our time, such as Jürgen Habermas, as Enrique Dussel explains:

> This people (Germany and England especially for Hegel) possesses an absolute right because it is the "bearer" (*Träger*) of the Spirit in this moment of its development (*Entwicklungsstufe*). Before this people every other people have no rights (*rechtlos*). This is the best definition not only of Eurocentrism, but of the sacralization of the imperial power of the North and of the center over the South, the periphery, the old colonial, dependent world. . . . [I]t is evident that Hegel as well as Habermas exclude Spain and with it Latin America from the originary definition of modernity. (24–26)

Spain was relegated—or relegated itself, depending on who is telling the story—to a marginal political and intellectual position, which paralleled its cartographical placement on the edge of the continent. Along these lines, it is worth noting that in his *Lectures on the Philosophy of World History*, Hegel regarded Northern Africa as forming "a single unit with Spain, for both are part of one and the same basin" and concluded that, "in Spain, one is already in Africa" (173–74). By excluding Spain from Europe in geophysical terms, he also negated Spain's contribution to the project of modernity, conceived around the realization of freedom, which in his doctrine was a northern and central European development—"Germanic," as he termed it. According to Hegel, "Africa, generally speaking, is the continent in which the upland principle, the principle of cultural backwardness, predominates. . . . Europe [is] the continent in which the spirit is united with itself, and which, while retaining its own substance, has embarked upon that infinite process whereby culture is realized in practice" (172). As Walter Mignolo points out, Hegel's view implied that "the planet was all of a sudden living in different temporalities, with Europe in the present and the rest in the past" (151). Excluded from Hegel's "Germanic world," spatially estranged from Europe, Spain was also set back chronologically—hence its "lagging behind" or backwardness.

These notions found echoes both inside and outside Spain. Until not too long ago, for instance, the established English-language historiography largely followed what has been called "Prescott's paradigm." Roughly during the same years as Hegel, the maverick American historian William Hickling Prescott explained Spain's decline based on an idea of backwardness caused by generalized repression, political despotism, and religious intolerance. Prescott's arguments decisively influenced the work of Hispanists and others who were to shape the image of Spain abroad for more than a century. The exceptionalist model he established served

as the perfect excuse to neglect Spain or ignore its complexities in most English-language accounts of European history until well into the 1960s.[18] The difference thus articulated dominated the discussion on the relationship between Europe and Spain and the cultural production that it has generated. European intellectuals used this discourse to explain or excuse their ignorance of Spain in their arguments (historical and philosophical alike) or their passionate and often reductive engagements with all matters Spanish. Their counterparts in Spain were complicit, using a discourse of eccentricity that placed Spanish history and culture in a separate category from that of the rest of Europe. While some were offended by this particularization and its mention was usually followed by an enumeration of the qualities that made Spaniards superior to those who pointed to their "monstrosity," others assumed its historical reality as an opportunity for aesthetic exploration (in his famous 1924 play *Luces de bohemia* [Bohemian lights], Ramón M. del Valle-Inclán would have his character Max Estrella state that "España es una deformación grotesca de la civilización europea" [Spain is a grotesque deformation of the European civilization]) or, more frequently, as a challenge to be overcome and thus nullified: difference had to become assimilation.

That eccentricity was a source of both anxiety and pride for the Spanish intelligentsia. On the one hand, the idealization of Europe, first as the model site of progress and material prosperity and later as the apex of moral goodness, made it an elusive paradise that Spain must access once and for all. Spanish cultural and political elites conforming to the Eurocentric model would consider it their gain (in symbolic capital) to have their nation included in that project. At the same time, certain historical particularities were cast as a valuable selling point to the richer northern nations: if it were accepted into the exclusive club, Spain would serve Europe as a privileged contact point with Africa and Latin America, thanks to its long-standing connections with those regions (conveniently leaving aside the problematic history of those relationships). Meanwhile, ideologues and intellectuals of different political stripes adhered to the equally artificial paradigm of exceptionality as a productive source of nationalist projects.

One of the ways to achieve this pivotal role would be to emphasize the points of contact with the center, via the restoration (or invention) of a native tradition that could be assimilated into the prevailing European models, or even presented as an antecedent to them. Paradoxically, this approach was not employed exclusively in an effort to create a positive narrative, one that would emphasize Spain's ties to the best Europe has to

offer. Indeed, one can easily find instances of symbolic attempts to highlight Spain's acquiescence to and participation in the multifaceted horrors begotten by Europe throughout its history. A case in point is World War II, widely seen as a foundational event for contemporary Europe, "quite comparable with the impact of the Reformation or the French Revolution," as Dan Diner argues (9). As was the case in these earlier momentous events, Spain's involvement in the Second World War was marginal, as the Franco regime's official position in the conflict switched from neutrality to non-belligerence back to neutrality. That peripheral participation would reinforce the centuries-old view of Spain as a nation operating on the European fringes. Interestingly enough, however, in recent years Spanish authors have paid an exceptional amount of attention to that war, tracing or imagining the country's role in some of the war's darkest episodes and connecting them to Spain's own history of hatred and intolerance, as is discussed in Chapter 3. The renewed interest in World War II in Spain can be explained as symptomatic of Spanish authors' desire to reinscribe their country in the mainstream of European affairs, even tragedies, and to question the nature of the European ideal that the elites sell to the citizenry. In any case, one outcome of reexamining Spain's ties to the conflict and its aftermath could be a deeper sense of belonging to "a common European canon of remembrance" (Diner 17), which may constitute the grounds for a shared sense of continental identity and, on a national scale, for a framework within which to debate the country's own issues with historical memory.[19]

Another strategy for relating Spain to the European core was to exalt Spain's differences with Africa, an effort codified, not surprisingly, in terms of Spain's superiority over its southern neighbors. Yet the symbolic value of Africa for Spaniards was not limited to a territory to be colonized according to the principles of European imperialism, nor was it exclusively posed in terms of superiority or negativity, as Susan Martin-Márquez has examined in detail. The proximity of Spain to Northern Africa was incorporated as an element of Spanish identity when it was ideologically useful to emphasize difference vis-à-vis Europe. This new twist was imagined by those who wanted to claim alterity from either side of the Pyrenees, both as a criticism of Spain for its supposed opposition to modernity and as a defense of its idiosyncrasies. The position of those who saw Spain as Europe's backwater was summarized in an oft-quoted phrase of uncertain authorship, "Africa begins at the Pyrenees," emphasizing Spain's marginality from European affairs and trends of thought. This stance was actually welcomed by

staunch defenders of the nationalism advocated by the Franco regime, at least during its first few years. As a way of signaling difference from the defeated Republic (whose policies were designed following liberal European models and ideals), the victors of the 1936–1939 civil war went out of their way to stress Spain's links to Africa and obliterate those to a progressive Europe, often reduced to France, which the Spanish nationalist–Catholic ideologues saw as the locus of many of their nation's inner evils at least since the collapse of the ancien régime. Marxism, Judaism, and Freemasonry, which occupied a conspicuous place in the Francoist imaginary of nemeses, were also considered part of the liberal European tradition that local fascists held responsible for corrupting Spain's essence. José Pérez de Barradas, an archeologist who served as head of several official scientific institutions during Franco's dictatorship, wrote at the onset of the regime: "Ni racial ni culturalmente son europeas las más viejas raíces de España. Lo propiamente europeo ha sido aquí extranjero; ha entrado por los Pirineos con más o menos fuerza y ha sido siempre rechazado o absorbido y transformado. . . . Los españoles no somos étnicamente europeos. A Dios gracias, África empieza en los Pirineos; nosotros no somos ni alpinos, ni indogermanos, sino bereberes y camitas" (qtd. in Hernández Díaz 373) [Spain's oldest roots are not racially nor culturally European. What is properly European was alien here; it entered via the Pyrenees with more or less strength and it has always been rejected, or absorbed and transformed. . . . We Spaniards are not ethnically Europeans. Thank God, Africa starts at the Pyrenees; we are not Alpine nor Indogermanic, but Berber and Camite]. Notwithstanding this instrumental exaltation of Africa, Francoist culture also had a use for a particular conception of Europe that needs to be carefully reexamined. As Chapter 2 shows, in its early years the Spanish totalitarian state entertained an imperialist vision of Europe in harmony with that of Nazi Germany and Fascist Italy until it was clear that they would be defeated. While that discourse was officially dismissed as the regime adapted itself to the changing geopolitical scenario after 1945, die-hard Spanish fascists maintained it throughout the dictatorship.[20]

Although it grew progressively less prevalent, the Africanist view survived until the end of Franco's rule; after all, the dictator himself admitted that "sin África apenas puedo explicarme a mí mismo" (qtd. in Casals, "Franco" 207) [without Africa, I can barely explain myself], owing to his leading military role during the colonial conflicts in Morocco. Africa was also the place where, in his words, "nació la posibilidad de rescate de la España grande. Allí se fundó el ideal que hoy nos redime" (207) [the possi-

bility of rescuing glorious Spain was born. The ideal that redeems us now was founded there]. Thus, Franco participated, in his own terms, in an ideology "in which the European subject—anxious about its future geopolitical and economic viability—turns to its African object as a source of rejuvenation" (Hansen and Jonsson 12), a view that outlasts the colonial period and is inseparable from the founding of what today is the EU.[21]

Throughout the dictatorship, Africa was also used to justify the regime's ongoing imperialist discourse. It should be mentioned that although Spain maintained its hold over Equatorial Guinea until 1968, the central African colonies were rarely taken into consideration in the metropolis.[22] It was the Maghreb, and particularly Morocco, that constituted historically—and still does—the main embodiment of southern alterity in Spain: as Brad Epps notices, "the conflation of Morocco and Africa have a long history" in Spanish culture; but Morocco has also been at the core of an anxiety about non-differentiation, since it "is repeatedly taken as a 'natural' expansion of Spain and as a gateway to the rest of Africa," a part of the world often much less appreciated, as it is considered "further from the dubious accouterments of 'civilization'" ("No todo" 161–62). While Epps refers mostly to authors writing between the late eighteenth and the early twentieth centuries, this is an enduring view that nowadays is also noticeable beyond intellectual circles. As Daniela Flesler points out, addressing the symbolic weight of Moroccan immigrants in contemporary Spain, they "embody the non-European, African and oriental aspects of Spanish national identity. Moroccans turn into a 'problem,' then, not because of their cultural differences, as many argue, but because, like the *Moriscos*, they are not different enough. . . . Spanish responses are permeated with the effort of differentiating and separating, in an attempt to trace clear frontiers between the 'Moors' and themselves" (9).

Along these lines, it is interesting to notice how the Muslim other has had a particularly relevant place in narratives about the Spanish role in the construction of a European identity since the restoration of democracy following Franco's death. Its presence in the debates is twofold. On the one hand, references highlight the centuries of Islamic rule in the Iberian Peninsula (711–1492). The Andalusi legacy was for some time the object of an intense positive resignification, with a celebration of both its artistic production and an idealized context of cultural and religious tolerance that could serve as a model for current social practices in a country that, like other wealthy European nations, had started to receive a large number of Muslim immigrants. The intellectual contributions of al-Andalus to

the European tradition were vindicated, for instance, in an already classic study by Juan Vernet with the telling title *Lo que Europa debe al Islam de España* [What Europe owes to Spain's Islam] (1999) or in several of Juan Goytisolo's and Eduardo Subirats's works. This process of positive reevaluation faced growing impediments under the conservative government of José María Aznar (1996–2004), which minimized it in favor of a more traditional, Christian, and Castilian-centered nationalist project.[23] Andalusi heritage was again seen as the product of an invasion that had posed a threat to Spain's historical continuity, essentially determined by Christian faith. Moreover, the conflict was far from over, as Aznar reminded Spaniards, echoing al-Qaeda's threats.[24]

These views are also conspicuous among leading intellectuals and academics. One does not have to refer to the polemical books of prolific revisionist far-right essayists such as Pío Moa or César Vidal to find remarkable anxiety over the issue of the allegedly un-European Muslim influence. When Spain joined the EEC, someone as well respected as José Luis Abellán, then professor and chair of the history of Spanish philosophy at the nation's largest research institution, the Universidad Complutense in Madrid, referred to the century-long Islamic presence in Iberia in terms of Christian "resistance" to Muslim "intrusion" and "harassment."[25] In Abellán's view, the historical function of an entity called "Spain"—anachronistically portrayed as a functioning political unity—was to guard the borders of a nascent Europe from the barbarians coming from the south, so as to allow the center to develop. The latter's culture, moreover, could not have been established without the decisive contributions of the abnegated peripheral nation, which not only was the military guardian of civilization but also became the site of its intellectual ferment. For Abellán, Europe's debt toward Spain is double: he points out that, although "Spain" set the conditions for Europe's philosophical revitalization, "la necesidad de resistir a la absorción islamizante potenció . . . líneas anti-intelectualistas o, al menos, filosóficamente pauperizantes" ("El significado" 32) [the need to resist Islamizing absorption powered . . . currents that were anti-intellectual, or at least philosophically impoverishing]. The notable level of exchanges between Christian and non-Christian cultures would have only benefited the rest of Europe, as "Spaniards" (whom Abellán identifies exclusively with those who challenged Islam's expansion in the Iberian Peninsula) were too busy "resisting" the other to safeguard the continent's pure essences. Abellán's schema of Spain as a periphery that repeatedly sacrificed itself for the stability of the center goes beyond the Middle Ages. He interprets

both the Renaissance and the (Counter-)Reformation as moments when Spain had to put aside its own advancement in order to fight to preserve European unity. The triumphant European model of a nation-state based on Machiavellian political principles went against Spain's "fundamentos universalistas" [universalist principles], and as a consequence the country isolated itself from the rest of the continent (35). Because of these historical sacrifices, it follows that Spain deserves an honorable place among Europe's nations and that it has a stake in the protection of their common borders. As I demonstrate in Chapter 4, the subtext notion of "Fortress Europe" in Abellán's account is very much alive today. Largely in agreement with EU policies, the Spanish state plays a fundamental role in maintaining the exclusionary mechanisms of the "fortress," which Abellán would probably regard as a coherent continuation of the historical logic he constructs.

A few Spanish artists and thinkers have approached this issue differently in the twenty-first century, in part as a reevaluation of the European ideal that has followed the multifaceted crisis that has shaken the EU since 2008. The title of a 2015 essay by Marina Garcés, "Europa es indefendible" [Europe is indefensible], echoes the polemics on "Fortress Europe" by quoting one of the most salient claims of Martinican author Aimé Césaire's *Discourse on Colonialism* of 1950. Césaire, one of the founders of the Negritude movement, argued that Europe had been manifestly unable to solve the problems it created (most importantly, the exploitation of workers and colonialism). Garcés redirects this critical look to the continent to stress that the dominant notion of Europe

> es una construcción histórica que resulta violenta también hacia los propios habitantes . . . Lo europeo ha sido impuesto a los propios europeos, no nos podemos olvidar. Desmontar la singularidad de lo europeo y su triple origen greco-cristiano-capitalista es fundamental para la emancipación no sólo de las poblaciones colonizadas sino también de las realidades concretas de Europa. ¿Quiénes son, en Europa, los excluidos, los explotados y las maltratadas por su historia triunfal? (50)
>
> [is a historical construct that is violent also toward its own inhabitants. . . . We cannot forget that Europe has been imposed on the Europeans themselves. Deconstructing the singularity of Europe and its triple origin (Greek, Christian, and capitalist) is fundamental for the emancipation not only of the colonized peoples, but also of Europe's concrete realities.

In Europe, who are those (particularly those women) left out, exploited, and mistreated by its triumphant history?]

Answering this question in a way that goes beyond the necessary recognition of suffering requires unearthing a critical tradition of creative Euroskepticism that originates within Europe itself, often in dialogue with non-European forms of thinking that have pioneered questioning European realizations. Once that tradition has been uncovered, it is necessary to engage it with an eye toward a critique of the current embodiment of that prevalent notion of "Europe": the Union.

At a time when the EU's viability is being seriously questioned and Europe's power is perceived to be in fast decline because of demographic, political, and economic pressures from both within the continent and outside it, one may wonder if it is still relevant to examine the matter of European integration. Nevertheless, it seems hard to dispute that different versions of the European ideal and of the discourses of Eurocentrism and Euroskepticism are still at work in many arenas. They undoubtedly play a vital role in the region—which is yet again seeing its nations embroiled in strong disagreements that pull them apart—and have implications beyond its borders. There are many Europes within Europe, and myriad contradictory views on each. The effort to "provincialize" Europe, to use Dipesh Chakrabarty's term, or to look at it "da fuori" [from the outside], as Roberto Esposito urges us to do, requires changing our perspective as well as analyzing the tensions at work in a reality that is not at all homogeneous. Thus, an understanding of Euroskepticism and its cultural poetics entails that they not be equated with a total rejection of European worldviews and their institutional incarnations; Euroskeptic texts negotiate different emotions, perspectives, ideas, and degrees of criticism—all are necessary at the current juncture. As Slavoj Žižek writes, "What we need is a retrieval-through-repetition (*Wieder-Holung*): through a critical confrontation with the entire European tradition, one should repeat the question 'What is Europe?' or rather, 'What does it mean for us to be Europeans?', and thus formulate a new inception" (75). Euroskeptic texts are essential within that portion of the "European tradition" that has been largely marginalized. Yet the margins may be where the richest materials for a continued questioning of "Europe" are forged.

PART ONE

Europe on the Horizon

1

The Location of Dissent

Spanish Exiles and the European Cataclysm

Spanish Exiles, the European Question, and Unamuno as Precursor

Progressives saw the Second Republic, established in 1931, as a real opportunity to renew Spain and attain the social and political conditions of Western Europe. An idealized Europe, embodied in nations such as England, Germany, and France, served as the model for an alternative order—for instance, one in which a reformist state could be freed from the constrictions of the military and the Catholic Church. The Republic's demise meant the failure—or at least the cessation—of Spain's Europeanization, understood as the modernization of its structures according to liberal principles. By the end of the civil war in April 1939, the majority of the intellectuals who had supported that project had fled the country to avoid repression from General Franco's fascist regime. Shortly thereafter, with the outbreak of World War II, many of them were forced to flee again. This time, they did so from their initial European destinations: cities like Paris but also, in some cases, suffocating internment camps such as the one in Argelès-sur-Mer, south of Perpignan. Most exiles settled in Latin America, where cultural and linguistic commonalities eased integration; the Mexican government, for instance, proactively welcomed thousands of refugees. A smaller cohort chose to rebuild their lives in other locations, including the United States.

During the exiles' first few years of displacement, the political situation in Europe meant that the possibility of a return to the continent remained uncertain. Fascism's downfall ignited hopes of an Allied overthrow of Franco. Those did not last long, however, as the regime swiftly refashioned itself as a pioneer of anticommunism to encourage the victors' forbearance. From the Americas, much of the exiles' attention focused on those developments. Yet their most relevant creative works during this period seldom grappled with the events that were changing their homeland's configura-

tion; rather, they attempted to illuminate the deeper logic that had caused the wreckage of liberalism, a task that led them to question some of the ideals that had inspired them to work for a Europeanized Spain.

Three of those exiles stand out as exemplars in how they tried to make sense of the rise of fascism and its connections to European modernity through literary creation and philosophical reflection. As María Zambrano wandered the Americas from country to country before resettling back in Europe, she theorized on the vital and intellectual ambivalence of exile. She became the most influential female philosopher in the Hispanic world. Her close friend José Ferrater Mora was a promising author who fled his native Catalonia while still in his early twenties and turned out to be a preeminent thinker and first-rate scholar, first in Chile and then in the United States. Max Aub was a French-born Spanish writer of Jewish German descent who survived a period in French and North African concentration camps during World War II after having carried out important missions for the Republic (such as mediating to secure Picasso's support for the cause in the form of *Guernica*). He created a vast body of literature that has received increasing acclaim since the 1990s, decades after his death in Mexico. The experiences and works of these authors offer related responses to the European ideal, its failure, and its possibilities for renewal. Initially somewhat oblivious to the American context in which they penned their texts, they concurrently destabilized but also perpetuated established conceptions of modernity and of the associated construct known as "Europe."

The contributions of exiled authors such as Zambrano, Ferrater Mora, and Aub constitute a shadowed tradition that, as Mari Paz Balibrea argues, "aún está por recuperar como herencia legítima y valorable de la modernidad española" (30) [has yet to be recovered as a legitimate and valuable legacy of Spanish modernity]. In her assessment, Balibrea correctly contends that, although a few of the Republican exiles came to embody democratic values and were thus occasionally appropriated and celebrated by the state in postauthoritarian Spain, the most critical part of their legacy was largely dismissed. One of the aspects that they questioned (especially in the first few years of their displacement) was the European ideal that became an essential component of the prevailing notion of modernity in Spain, serving as a beacon for the establishment of a democratic system. While most democrats uncritically embraced Europeanization for the alternative to Francoism that it represented, exiles' relationship with that effort is more nuanced, complicating their position within the national cultural canon.

Their views engaged with the politics that led to the triumph of fascism in the civil war, and their interpretation of the rise of totalitarianism associated it with a specifically European form of rationality. Their questioning of the nature and implications of fascism was never divorced from the events that made it manifest. Factors such as the passivity of the French and English governments regarding the Spanish conflict, the reaction of Germany and Italy in support of the nationalist rebels, and the Nazi–Soviet pact of 1939 underscored the cleavage between the European ideals that fueled the Spanish reformists' mission and the diktat of political circumstance. This meant that for some authors who had been enthusiastic about what Europe represented, the long exile following 1939 was dual in nature. Intellectuals such as Zambrano, Ferrater, and Aub found themselves unable to live in their own country under Francoist rule, but they were also deprived of a larger, spiritual home: Europe, whose foundations had been shattered by the apparent impossibility of sustaining a viable project of modernity. For them, the clashes that shook the continent between 1914 and 1945 revealed that the path that Europe had built for itself led to the wrong place. Their discontent became painfully clear in the texts on Europe that they produced from their refuges in several locations across the Americas. The dramatic historical conditions they endured elicited intuitions that ultimately pointed to the dangerous divide between reason and life existing at the core of modernity. This revelation was one that exile contributed to prompt, as displacement bestowed a unique perspective.

For obvious reasons, many people forced to abandon their countries of origin for political reasons have experienced exile as a personal tragedy. Yet this view does not preclude an alternative (or complementary) approach. The noted comparatist Claudio Guillén (himself the son of an eminent Republican exile, the poet and scholar Jorge Guillén) noted that, while some exiles feel that their estrangement, with its separation from their native land and its familiar realities, cripples them insurmountably, in some other instances they regard their condition as offering a possibility for connecting with a broader spectrum of the human experience. What is initially a hardship turns into the chance for a richer life freed from the strictures of national boundaries (Guillén, "El sol"). Taking this into account, one can understand how, upon her return to Spain in 1984, María Zambrano declared that she felt a deep love for her exile experience. In her article "Amo mi exilio" [I love my exile], she explains that her years as a refugee had not just defined what she was and thought; they had substantially enabled it.

Exile tests the limits of cultural awareness and belonging. The Republi-

can diaspora of 1939 is not unique in this sense, nor in the context of Spanish history: many of Spanish culture's most renowned figures endured exile and, in some instances, mined the possibilities it brought for a renewal of perspective. The existence of an absentee artistic and intellectual elite is, as Henry Kamen has noted, "one of the crucial characteristics of Spanish history." He also points out that, in this sense, "Spain was (like Russia) a special case in European civilization. In other nations, such as Bohemia, Ireland and Poland, foreign aggressors were far and away the most compelling cause of the damage brought about by expulsion and exile. In Spain it was the Spaniards who damaged themselves, time and time again" (x). This peculiarity explains, at least in part, the nationalist bent of many Republican exiles' work. Frequently, those who reflected on Europe did so as a variation on the theme of the special position held by Spain, in their view, within the continent's history. Such an approach rarely eluded the risks of essentialism (and chauvinism), regardless of the invaluable perspective the expatriates may have gained during their time abroad. This is a recurring issue in exiled cultural production since, as Edward W. Said notes, "the interplay between nationalism and exile is like Hegel's dialectic of servant and master, opposites informing and constituting each other" ("Reflections" 176). Thus, historian Américo Castro wondered from Princeton about the extent to which Spain and Europe had developed in parallel, while, in Chile, Ferrater Mora stated that, "sea cual fuere la situación en que España se halla con respecto a Europa, la verdad es que siempre habrá algo que la distinguirá radicalmente del modo de ser europeo" ("Introducción" 11) [whatever the situation in which Spain finds itself with respect to Europe may be, the truth is that there always will be something that shall radically distinguish it from the European way of being]. Ferrater Mora and others refined these arguments as their thinking developed, progressively swayed by the experience of extraterritoriality itself and the influence of fresher ideas.

What Sebastiaan Faber has correctly identified as "the most important ideological tendencies of Spaniards' discourse in exile . . . their cultural nationalism, their moralism, their mythification of the folk or *pueblo*, [and] their fetishization of the intellectual" (6) can be most clearly seen in the texts they produced during the first few years following their departure from Spain. Still striving to come to terms with the ways their forced displacement would affect their position in the configuration of Spain's national culture, the heritage that exiles claimed for themselves implied taking a particular stand within that tradition. By choosing Miguel de Una-

muno as an exemplary precursor, as Zambrano and Ferrater explicitly did, they asserted their continued participation in the cultural life of the country they had to flee; at the same time, the choice enabled them to grapple with topics that were key for them in the 1940s: the role of the (exiled) intellectual, the roots of the conflict in Spain, the European question, and the tensions between rationality and affect. Engaging the work of Unamuno allowed them to expand on these debates, which had been previously stirred by someone they considered among the giants of contemporary Spanish and European culture, someone who had repeatedly (and adamantly) opposed convention and had gained international recognition in doing so. Moreover, by engaging, from France, in a very public fight against the authoritarianism of King Alfonso XIII and dictator Miguel Primo de Rivera during the 1920s, Unamuno had both dignified the condition of exile and exploited it for political gain. His extraterritoriality had a dual effect on his work and his persona: it prompted a change in his thinking about Europe, and it spurred the growth of his renown throughout Europe, as Ernst Robert Curtius had already noted in 1926 (Cabo Aseguinolaza 208).

Unamuno's resistance to a particular conception of Europe is not just that of a nationalist who summarily rejects foreign influence or fears the dissipation of identity traits into a broader culture. He had been an early supporter of Joaquín Costa's campaign for Spain's broad regeneration in a European mode. Soon, he moved away from the emphasis on material structural initiatives toward a more spiritual approach. In his view, which would increasingly be more that of an agitator against the establishment than that of a studious observer, hope lay in the common people, who could only unchain their potential if stirred by "vientos o ventarrones del ambiente europeo" ("Sobre el marasmo" 194) [winds or gales from the European air], as he put it in 1895 using a rhetoric that echoed Costa's. Six years later, Unamuno continued to call for a locally generated change, though this time he imagined it as being merely ventilated by some breezes from beyond the border: "Necesitamos nuestra reforma, una reforma indígena, íntima, propia, brotada del propio suelo y con jugos propios, pero al sol y a las brisas del espíritu europeo moderno. Fe para emprenderla deseo a todo español europeo" (qtd. in Ouimette 84–85) [We need our reform, a native reform, one that is intimate, our own, grown from our own land and with our own juices, but under the sun and breezes of the modern European spirit. May every European Spaniard have faith to undertake it]. His enthusiasm had definitely wound down in 1906, when in a letter to a rising star he declared feeling "furiosamente anti-europeo" (*Epistolario* 42)

[furiously anti-European]. The addressee was none other than José Ortega y Gasset, who, at age twenty-three, had studied philosophy in Germany thanks in part to the support of Unamuno, who was glad to finally recommend a student who wanted to go there to pursue something other than engineering. At that point, Ortega had published a few articles and reviews (his father was a prominent figure in the newspaper business) and had also traveled around Western Europe in constant and proclaimed admiration—to such an extent that when in 1911 he returned to Spain from another stint in Germany and France, he admitted to being "henchido de capacidad de adoración que no he logrado gastar" ("Una visita" 529) [bursting with a capacity for adoration that I have not managed to expend].

To Ortega's dismay, Unamuno advocated participating in European culture in a way that was different from the materialist currents emerging from the continent's powerhouses: Hegel's *das Hertz Europas* [the heart of Europe] or Costa's *Europa central*. Unamuno's negative reaction was aimed at the instrumentalization of reason represented by the European model that was favored by other, often younger, admirers of Costa—a few pragmatic liberal professionals and state employees who were beginning to get involved in public affairs under Ortega's precocious guidance. As Santos Juliá has noted, this group (which included Manuel Azaña, future president of the Second Republic) were as attracted by Costa's exemplary dedication to his country's progress as they were repelled by his indomitable and, in their view, naive passion, which would bring him to tears as he spoke of the need for reform (101). They intended to modernize Spain mainly by improving its infrastructure and by following the scientific models of more technologically advanced countries such as Great Britain, France, and, above all, Germany; but it was wisdom, rather than technology, that Unamuno aspired for Spaniards to acquire.

Costa's ethos was quite similar to Unamuno's agonistic stance, which the latter expressed in a vast number of texts published in Spanish and foreign media. His essay "Sobre la europeización (arbitrariedades)" [On Europeanization—arbitrary notes] is from 1906, a moment when, as we read in his letter to Ortega, he was nursing impassioned and furious anti-Europeanist feeling.[1] This essay can be seen as the foundational text of Spanish Euroskepticism. In a few pages, it combines political, aesthetic, epistemic, and existential arguments that reflect a deeply critical—albeit certainly arbitrary—engagement with the notion of Europe. Although the bent of Unamuno's essay is philosophical, he subtly frames it within a reflection on the topic's political implications: "En dos términos se cifra todo

lo que se viene pidiendo para nuestro pueblo, todo lo que para él hemos pedido casi todos, con más o menos conciencia de lo que pedíamos. Esos dos términos son: *europeo* y *moderno*" (999) [Everything that has been requested for our people, everything that most of us have requested for them, with more or less awareness of what we were asking for, can be captured in just two terms. Those two terms are *European* and *modern*]. These words, located at the beginning of the essay, express the wish of a majority within Spain's intellectual elite who, following the push for national regeneration championed by Costa, had clamored for the country's modernization, a development that, as Unamuno points out, had been too hastily equated with "Europe." These intellectuals advocated societal change for the benefit of the masses, if not necessarily with their input. Even more relevant, in Unamuno's opinion, was that they did so without giving enough thought to the deeper consequences Europeanization might bring about, primarily its effect on the "essence" of common people's lives and thus of the nation. Later on, Unamuno reconsidered his own views on the matter, as he admits in this text. But he did not renounce his guiding role, even knowing that his new position placed him in the minority. From the standpoint of that solitude, he stops to reflect on the connections between Europe and modernity and the particularities of Spain's relationship to them:

> Vuelvo a mí mismo al cabo de los años, después de haber peregrinado por diversos campos de la moderna cultura europea, y me pregunto a solas con mi conciencia: ¿soy europeo?, ¿soy moderno? Y mi conciencia me responde: no, no eres europeo, eso que se llama ser europeo; no, no eres moderno, eso que se llama moderno. . . . ¿Somos los españoles, en el fondo, irreductibles a la europeización y a la modernización? Y en caso de serlo, ¿no tenemos salvación? ¿No hay otra vida que la vida moderna y europea? ¿No hay otra cultura, o como quiera llamársela? Ante todo, y por lo que a mí hace, debo confesar que cuanto más en ello medito más descubro la íntima repugnancia que mi espíritu siente hacia todo lo que pasa por principios directores del espíritu moderno, hacia la ortodoxia científica de hoy, hacia sus métodos, hacia sus tendencias. ("Sobre la europeización" 1000)
>
> [In returning to myself after several years, having undertaken a pilgrimage through various fields of modern European culture, I ask myself, alone with my conscience: Am I European? Am I modern? And my conscience replies: no, you are not European, that which is called being

> European; no, you are not modern, that which is called being modern. . . . Are we Spaniards, deep down, irreducible to Europeanization and modernization? And, if we are, do we not stand a chance of finding salvation? Is there no life other than modern, European life? Is there no other culture, or whatever that may be called? First of all, as much as I am concerned, I must confess that the more I think about it, the more I discover the intimate disgust that my spirit feels toward everything that is supposed to serve as the guiding principles of the modern spirit, toward today's scientific orthodoxy, toward its methods, toward its tendencies.]

One of the most salient characteristics of Unamuno's work is his love of paradox, which is nevertheless not always totally apparent at first sight; thus, the rhetorical disposition of this particular essay (a solitary, introspective reflection on thinking and existence) is permeated by echoes of Descartes's *Discourse on Method* even as he claims to advance his own writing "fuera de la lógica europea moderna, con desdén de sus métodos" (999) [outside the modern European logic, disdaining its methods]. After shedding the positivism of his youth, his own method, of course, has become none other than "passion"—and its results, the arbitrary conclusions he offers. Unamuno contrasts the "knowledge" that, in his view, prevails among European minds to a "wisdom" of alleged African origin: whereas the former is a tool for life, the latter is a preparation for death. He does not claim that such wisdom is exclusively Spanish, even registering the lexical equivalents in several European languages, but he elevates it to a defining notion in his country. This richness would be lost, Unamuno asserts, were Spaniards to accept the imposition of European solutions without responding to it with an assertive affirmation of their own peculiarities. And while he concedes that "mucho hay en la cultura europea moderna y en el espíritu europeo moderno que nos conviene recibir" (1014) [there is much in modern European culture and the modern European spirit that we would do well to adopt ourselves], he argues that Spaniards cannot just passively accept the European influx. Rather, he calls for a more equal relationship that should be achieved through a "modo agresivo" (1013), an aggressive approach to the other. Unamuno is convinced that "la verdadera y honda europeización" (1014) [the true and deep Europeanization] will not happen "hasta que no tratemos de imponernos en el orden espiritual a Europa, de hacerles tragar lo nuestro, lo genuinamente nuestro, a cambio de lo suyo, hasta que no tratemos de españolizar a Europa" (1014) [until we try to impose ourselves upon Europe in the spiritual sphere, having them swallow

what is ours, genuinely ours, instead of theirs; until we try to Hispanify Europe]. The project is doomed to fail unless there is a mutual absorption of values: reason and emotion must balance each other.

Unamuno's appeal to amend the principles that had come to define the European project of modernity included a critique of the way the very notion of Europe was constructed. In a noted 1912 book, he called attention to the fabrication involved in the sublimation of a geographical term into a loaded political ideal. "¡Europa! Esta noción primitiva e inmediatamente geográfica nos la han convertido por arte mágica en una categoría casi metafísica. ¿Quién sabe hoy ya, en España por lo menos, lo que es Europa?" (*Del sentimiento trágico de la vida* 511) [Europe! They have magically turned this primitive and immediately geographic notion into an almost metaphysical category. Who knows what Europe is anymore, at least in Spain?] That consequential rhetorical move included a reduction that denied the contributions generated from the ex-centric or, to use his own word, peripheral parts of the continent: "Y cuando me pongo a escudriñar lo que llaman Europa nuestros europeizantes, paréceme a las veces que queda fuera de ella mucho de lo periférico—España desde luego, Inglaterra, Italia, Escandinavia, Rusia . . . —y que se reduce a lo central, a Franco-Alemania, con sus anejos y dependencias" (511) [And when I examine what our Europeanizers call Europe, it seems to me that they leave out of it much of the periphery—certainly Spain, England, Italy, Scandinavia, Russia . . . —reducing it to the center, to France-Germany, with its annexes and dependent parts].[2] Unamuno's great appreciation for a number of authors and languages beyond that "central" French and German tradition (his knowledge of Søren Kierkegaard, whom he read in the original Danish, is a good example of this) made him particularly critical of those who ignored those alternatives, which he felt could lead to richer, more diverse conceptions of Europe and its intellectual life. In his opinion, the so-called Europeanizers (with the Germanophile Ortega in the leading role) actually offered an exclusionary project, to such an extent that, in Unamuno's view, "nos han traído también una nueva Inquisición: la de la ciencia o la de la cultura, que usa por armas el ridículo y el desprecio para los que no se rinden a su ortodoxia" (511) [they have also brought us a new Inquisition: that of science or culture, whose weapons are ridicule and contempt for those who do not surrender to their orthodoxy].

In July 1924, Unamuno went into exile in France. He had just escaped Fuerteventura, one of the Canary Islands, where he'd been confined in February as punishment for his public opposition to the dictatorship that

came out of the agreement between King Alfonso and General Primo de Rivera.[3] On his way to France, Unamuno penned a text entitled "Impresiones de un viaje" [Impressions of a journey]. In it, the author revisits his own ideas about the relationship between Spanish and European cultures, which were, as seen previously, those of someone who considered himself "furiously anti-European." Unamuno starts this little-known essay—which remained unpublished until 1992—by wondering if he is returning to the same world that he left behind when he was sent to the Fuerteventura island off the African coast, or whether Paris, a capital of "European civilization," is (in strange diction for Spanish) "otro uno"—*an other one,* a domain that is not Spain but retains a degree of resemblance whose true nature he cannot fully grasp. The answer may depend on the existence of a "European spirit," he claims, conceding that he wishes to think of the continent as "una categoría espiritual y no geográfica" (177) [a spiritual category, not a geographical one].

In a hardly concealed self-reflective move, Unamuno identifies contradiction as Europe's foremost characteristic—the same trait that is most noticeable about his own thinking, and which he never tried to hide. "La esencia de lo que llamaría la *europeidad* es la contradicción. . . . El mayor enemigo de la europeidad es el que cree haber nacido en posesión de la verdad absoluta, el dogmatista fanático e intrasigente" (179) [The essence of what I would call *Europeanness* is contradiction. . . . The biggest enemy of Europeanness is any person who believes himself to have been born in possession of the absolute truth, the fanatical and intransigent dogmatist]. Dissent is at the core of Europe, just as it is the key to Unamuno's work and his public and private selves. In this way, the staunch defender of Spanish exceptionalism identifies himself as a quintessential European and finds amenable shelter in free Europe, where he is bound to "aprender y no a enseñar, a ser juzgado y no a juzgar. Dejemos pequeñeces de literatos y ocupémonos de lo que une a los hombres que escriben y que hablan para todos. Y nos unen nuestras propias discordias" (178) [learn and not teach, be judged and not judge. Let us leave aside writers' trivial concerns and get to what unites the men who write and speak for everyone. And our own disagreements unite us]. Lettered Europe is, for Unamuno, a union that emerges from open debate. He stands for a pancontinental public sphere that thrives not on consent, but on difference.

Far from his home in Salamanca, Unamuno realizes that his spiritual homeland might not be dissent-crushing Spain, where the political and religious authorities harass freethinkers like him, but rather Europe, an

entity that is consubstantial with contradiction and love for the truth. A truth that is understood as plural, since it is tied to each individual's "interpretación del misterio" (179) [interpretation of mystery], and thus irreducible to the lesser certainties provided by science—a type of knowledge with which others (most notably Ortega) tended to conflate all the complexity of Europe. Unamuno's most influential book outside Spain, *La agonía del cristianismo* [The agony of Christianity], written during his exile in Paris, developed these ideas further. Unamuno's essay contains some of the key elements regarding Europe that subsequent authors would develop: a trenchant critique of the ideas of modernity that the continent's name invokes; skepticism toward political usages of the notion; an approach to the issue that is in one way or another marginal, peripheral, or exilic and that is often presented through a rhetoric of movement and fluidity; and a determination to engage the European tradition, rather than dismissing it, in an effort to problematize it from the inside.

Unamuno remained in France for six years, always with an eye on the political developments in his own country. His multifaceted intellectual trajectory is a good reminder that a thinker's work cannot be limited to a few frequently quoted texts. This is particularly important in Unamuno's case, as consistency is a principle to which he refused to adhere. Given his embrace of contradiction, it should not come as a surprise that his skepticism toward Europe was not as conclusive as it might seem from his pre-World War I texts condemning Europeanization. Unamuno's feelings about Europe mutated, partly due to his exile experience. Yet, rather than idealizing Europe, as did a number of his contemporary authors, he maintained a skeptical engagement that should be seen as a measure of his concern for it and which proved fecund in the genealogy of a branch of Spanish letters that developed critical positions toward Europe. Notably, he was engaged in the construction of a culturally integrated continent from the 1920s onward. Instead of continuing to dismiss European modernity as an alien reality, Unamuno and subsequent writers for whom he was an important referent approached it from the conviction that Spanish culture represented an internal counterpoint to that rationalist tradition, which they thought obfuscated fundamental aspects of the human experience.

Unamuno's fight against Primo de Rivera's dictatorship between 1924 and 1930 from his base in France reinforced his status as a moral and intellectual beacon for Spanish progressives. Nevertheless, the extraterritoriality characterizing that chapter of his life does not seem to have been determinative in the construction of his long-term public persona;

nowadays one rarely thinks of Unamuno as an example of exile. Yet his temporal displacement for political reasons was undoubtedly on the minds of authors forced to leave Spain because of the Francoist victory in the civil war. They endured a much longer separation from their native country than Unamuno did and became prototypical exiles for following generations. One of the most influential of these authors was María Zambrano (1904–1991), whose first years of exile led her briefly to Paris and then to Latin America. During her stay in Mexico and the Caribbean in the early 1940s, a significant portion of her writings focused on Unamuno's contribution and on Europe's plight, two topics she saw as profoundly interconnected.

María Zambrano's European Agony

"Unamuno ha sido nuestra vida" (*Unamuno* 130) [Unamuno has been our life], stated Zambrano as she reflected on the writer for a Cuban audience. The "suceso" (29) [event] that Unamuno embodied was a crucial one during the years that Zambrano spent in Spain before fleeing the country in 1939. It is thus not surprising that, as she attempted to make sense of the developments that had led to the Spanish and European wars that so drastically impacted her life, she devoted a great deal of her initial work in exile to interpreting Unamuno's legacy.[4] His greatest accomplishment was, for Zambrano, that he had revealed to his fellow citizens unsavory truths about the most troubling facets of their own social existence (129–30). At the same time, she saw Unamuno as an exception to the anachronism that Spain represented with respect to Europe, arguing that his eccentric location had a great deal to do with his ability to engage the most relevant intellectual currents of the time. Forged from his seclusion in the provincial backwater of Salamanca, which allowed him a healthy distance from the pettiness of national politics and culture that consumed other authors, Unamuno's work connected instead with that of European luminaries such as his contemporaries Sigmund Freud, Henri Bergson, and Edmund Husserl. Like them, Unamuno dared to explore the depths of human consciousness; his work emphasized the sustained relevance of the spiritual and affective dimensions. From the Spanish intellectual "desert" (in Zambrano's own characterization), Unamuno refused to merely follow or adapt the latest foreign innovations, managing to become a full member of European culture by virtue of his agonistic positions. Zambrano appreciates that this participation took the form of confrontation: "Europa no fue su suelo sino su horizonte. . . . Se enfrentó a ella" (45) [Europe was not his ground, but his

horizon. . . . He confronted it]. What Unamuno contested was the kind of arrogant and violent Cartesian rationality that too easily dismissed fundamental elements of human experience, such as the religious one. Unamuno's alternative, according to Zambrano, was a "razón modesta a la medida del hombre" (89) [modest reason, in proportion to man]. Ultimately, it was the prevailing, misguided reason that he had so vehemently protested that caused the "mistificación y adulteración de todo, su invalidez, su falseamiento" (67) [mystification and adulteration of everything, its invalidity, its falsification], leading to the European catastrophe.

Unamuno's confrontational stance reverberates in Zambrano's *Pensamiento y poesía en la vida española* [Thought and poetry in Spanish life], written and published in Mexico in 1939. In this work, which compiles some of her first American reflections on the cultural and political developments preceding her exile, Zambrano partakes of the essentialist nationalism of other refugees who sought to understand the processes that led to the collapse of the liberal project. In her interpretation, Spain, which was responsible for two of the crucial events that had launched the modern era (the so-called "discovery" of the Americas and the creation of the nation-state), nevertheless stands out as a place where modern European reason did not penetrate. She presents the country as a chaste maiden "resistiendo pasivamente" (598) [passively resisting] the powerful advances of European rationalism over the centuries. Spain's isolation, which had been frequently decried by progressives there, became an advantage, given the wreckage caused by arrogant rationality.

Zambrano's analysis of those historical developments resists the formal parameters established for philosophical work by the prevailing rationalist perspective. Much like Unamuno, she avoids systematic discursive forms; instead, her writing engages genres such as poetry, confession, review, and epistle, all unusual vehicles for Western thought. It is through these that she approaches what conventional historiography (which she considers too narrowly focused on facts) leaves aside: passions, metaphors, and those "razones del corazón . . . que la razón no conoce todavía" ("Hacia un saber" 438) [reasons of the heart . . . that reason does not yet know]. These all participate in history in ways that are perhaps less conspicuous but at least as influential as other forces.

Like Unamuno, who constantly asserts the need to think feelings and feel thoughts (an idea that opens his poem "Credo poético" [Poetic creed]), Zambrano rejects the rationalist separation of feeling and understanding, as this caesura leaves out a fundamental dimension of human life. For her,

the inclusion of elements such as hope, love, fear, hatred, and mercy, which philosophers had traditionally disregarded, is an essential step for understanding the European crisis. Also, these elements can point out ways to overcome such a predicament, since the affects that Zambrano upholds have transformative power. Examining their active presence in European life, she completes and transcends the factual narrative told by empiricism with a loosely historicized inquiry into the human soul, in which the key notion is hope. In an essay originally published in Puerto Rico in 1941, she argues:

> A la historia de *hechos* tendrá que suceder la historia de las esperanzas, la verdadera historia humana. La unidad de una cultura proviene del sistema de esperanzas que en ella se dibuja. Pero como este sistema de esperanzas y desesperaciones suele estar detrás de los hechos, ha sido no solamente desconocido sino rehuido, con ese miedo del hombre moderno ante lo que va más allá de un simple acontecimiento. ("Más" 528; her emphasis)

> [The history of *facts* will have to be followed by a history of hopes, the true human history. A culture's unity comes from the system of hopes that is visible in it. Yet because this system of hopes and desperations is usually behind the facts, it has been not just unknown but shunned, thanks to modern man's fear of anything that goes beyond a simple event.]

Zambrano's epiphany that Europe was a unity characterized by deep, sustained forms of violence came out of the events that led to her exile from the continent. She made a great effort to articulate a critique of the culture (for her, a "system of hopes") that had given rise to that massive failure.

Working from that framework, and with the perspective gained from her exile in the Americas, in the 1940s Zambrano interrogated the origins of the disaster that was shaking Europe. Her own displacement was a decisive factor in the lucidity that she credited for her increasingly personal work regarding an overarching notion—the crisis of the West—that at that point, two decades after the publication of works such as Albert Demangeon's *Le Déclin de l'Europe* (1920) [The Decline of Europe] or Oswald Spengler's influential *Der Untergang des Abendlandes* (1918–1923) [The Decline of the West], was almost a commonplace. Yet her perspective stands out as that of a Spanish woman writing far from contemporary intellectual centers and attempting to harmonize liberal and religious thought. Reflecting on the

peculiarly peripheral origin of her own vision, Zambrano ascribes special importance to exile, which she exalts as the condition that frees the self from false history (dictated by politics and an incomplete although prevalent form of reason) and also reveals a path leading to truth. By virtue of the exposure that results from the experience of leaving the homeland, the exile is blessed (*bienaventurado*) with the opportunity to face the core of his or her existence. The deepest determiners of one's being in the world cannot be grasped by considering only the external, shallow facts that seem to govern life. Exile facilitates transcendence from that circumstantial history to a fuller comprehension of existence through a search that is made material in writing.

That rich perspective informs *La agonía de Europa* [The agony of Europe], an essay that contains the kernel of her major philosophical contributions, first published in book form in Buenos Aires in 1945. In the preface, Zambrano characterizes her text as a survivor's testimony. The essay is dedicated to her mother, who was trapped with Zambrano's sister in Nazi-occupied Paris while María was writing it in Cuba starting in the summer of 1940. Immersed in those tragic circumstances, Zambrano regards her work as the product of a last instant of clarity before total darkness, the result of a fleeting yet pivotal vision seen "entre la vida y la muerte" (22) [between life and death], in agony.[5] Reasoning beyond that illumination entails confronting a risk, since "todo conocimiento es lucha con algo extraño; ha habido en él un momento de peligro y urgencia" (27) [all knowledge is a fight with something strange; in it there has been a moment of danger and urgency]. But surrendering to the difficulties encountered as she attempts to make sense of the processes that have led to the tragic circumstances of the day is not an option for her: "Ha desaparecido el mundo, pero el sentir que nos enraíza en él, no" (21) [The world has disappeared, but not the feeling that roots us in it]. In the agony that Zambrano perceives both in the task of understanding and in the object of her inquiry (Europe), there are resonances of Unamuno's agonism (as exhibited in his aforementioned book *La agonía del Cristianismo*, penned during his own exile in France). Along those lines, claims Zambrano, the agony of Europe is to be understood not only as a moment of great vulnerability but also as a struggle that must carry on because, at its core, it is still imbued with hope.

The catastrophe of World War II allowed Zambrano a clearer view of what Europe was. In *La agonía de Europa*, she shifts the central question of Spain's essence, which had bedeviled intellectuals following the crisis at the turn of the century and which the civil war had revived, into an

even larger issue within a more intricate context. Unamuno and other coetaneous authors, such as José Martínez Ruiz "Azorín" and Pío Baroja, had referred to imperial Spain's political demise (symptomatic of a poor adjustment to the prevailing model of modernity) as "el desastre" [the disaster], a term that Zambrano recaptured decades later to refer to the state of Europe. After the Republican defeat and the outbreak of the new war, what puzzled her was the question of "¿qué es, que ha sido Europa?" (33) [what is, what has Europe been?]. It was there, in a Europe that was as much a territory as it was an ideal of civilization, where her hope still dwelled, but she engaged it from an oceanic distance. Puerto Rico and Cuba, the last Spanish territories in America, whose loss had prompted influential debates about a new vision for Spain during her father Blas José's generation, are the settings for Zambrano's reflection. But her priority was not the new reality that surrounded her, which she unconvincingly tried to engross. During her American exile, her main interest continued to be figuring out the European labyrinth.

In her philosophical work, Zambrano timidly attempted to absorb and confront the place that had become her refuge. After a brief and bitter professional experience in Mexico, she devoted an essay to her second destination in the Americas: *Isla de Puerto Rico. Nostalgia y esperanza de un mundo mejor* (1940) [Island of Puerto Rico: Nostalgia and hope for a better world]. In this text, written in Cuba, she praises the island—a generic one rather than Puerto Rico itself—as a merciful gift for those who come from the continent, which is, in contrast, the site of labor and condemnation. The island appears to her as the place where the force of reality and the purity of dreams coalesce (35); it is also a metaphor for both solitude, derelict as it is in the vastness of the ocean, and openness to the encounter with the other. Intended as a testimony of gratitude to her Puerto Rican hosts, Zambrano's essay may nevertheless have raised an eyebrow or two among them, as the text engages in a markedly Eurocentric discourse that depicts America as a virginal, immature land that could develop culturally thanks only to its colonizers and which, by virtue of that process, maintains a spiritual dependence on, and a debt of gratitude to, Europe. Her essay hardly admits any negative aspects of the conquest and colonization of America, although she does end with a nod to its critics (one that is also a final *captatio benevolentiae*) by declaring that Spain "ha sido, es, algo más que esa pesadilla del Imperio" (51) [has been, is, something more than that nightmare of Empire]. As Karolina Enquist Kälgren and Sebastián Fenoy Gutiérrez observe, Zambrano tasks the Americas with safeguarding

Europe's best heritage and the mission of restoring the "old" continent (26). Such an undertaking would also contribute to better understanding among the different nations of the Americas, all European offspring. Zambrano's public gratitude, however, turned to bitterness in private. In a letter to her sister, she agonized, "¿Cómo explicar lo que es América? Si tuviese que elegir una palabra sería ésta: desolación" (qtd. in Abellán, *María Zambrano* 42) [How could I explain what America is? If I had to choose one word, it would be this: grief].

Zambrano saw Europe's situation as dire, which rushed her to work on the issue that had been at the back of her mind since the precocious onset of her philosophical vocation: her first publication, an article dealing with the problems of the continent, appeared in 1914, when she was only ten. Twenty-five years later, she found herself expelled by Europe, living hand-to-mouth on the other side of the Atlantic. Yet this circumstance may have helped clear the way for the launch of her novel intellectual project. Her enterprise to achieve an inclusive understanding capable of overcoming the limitations of the prevailing forms of rationality by expanding them with a more humane "saber del alma" [knowledge of/from the soul], which she had glimpsed already in Spain in the mid-1930s, seemed a real possibility only after she had been ejected from her native country into far-off foreign lands, as Jesús Moreno Sanz suggests (210). From that distance, she gained the perspective necessary to fully comprehend what she had been unable to grasp when she lived on European soil. From her refuge in the Antilles, she could see the continent she had left behind as a meaningful whole. As she admits in *La agonía de Europa*, "Ahora, que nos hemos quedado sin asidero, se nos aparece la concordancia. . . . Es el momento de la dolorosa lucidez" (35–36) [now that we are left without hold, concordance appears in front of us. . . . It is the moment of painful clarity]. Remoteness and exposure facilitated her understanding of an entity that, prior to her estrangement, she perceived heterogeneously, as an assemblage of separate cultures. It was in the new conflictive juncture of war and exile that she saw Europe as a unified body that precludes national distinctions, a revelation that exceeds a strictly intellectual grip. European unity is a reality manifested in part by the pain it provokes in the author; this sentiment, along with something more difficult to discern (which she eventually identifies with a certain conception of culture), "nos hace sentir a Europa como una gran unidad en la que estamos incluidos íntegramente" (37) [makes us feel Europe as a great whole in which we are fully included]. Culture, the other great adhesive element, is for Zambrano "un sistema de esperanzas y de-

sesperaciones" (67) [a system of hopes and despairs] that sustains beliefs and that has more relevance than reason in the creation and destruction of collective ways of life.

Yet the unifying elements that make Europe a single entity are not necessarily related to a constructive purpose. Zambrano argues that the main factor in the region's cohesion is generated from within—by its own success, which is intrinsically associated with violence, but also by the recurring failures that Europeans mistakenly tended to dismiss once they triumphed over nature. The war (barely mentioned in the book) is not the result of a political clash among nation-states, but the latest manifestation of a long-established European attachment to violence. In her view, violence was constitutive of Europe from its inception and is not limited merely to physical or political manifestations. The deepest cause of Europe's cyclical self-destruction is a "violencia del conocimiento en la filosofía y en la ciencia" (*Agonía* 59) [violence of knowledge in philosophy and science], which has its origins in the emulation of a form of divinity that Europeans identified with creation *ex nihilo* and frantic activity, rather than with mercy. They have secularly deployed material and intellectual violence to persevere and build the worlds they dream of: a series of "delirios" [deliriums] or utopian projects that entail a continuous cycle of destruction and rebirth, of which war is the most visible consequence. Another root of the continent's decline is that Europe has ceased to be true to itself, having abandoned the search for an understanding that could go beyond factuality, something "más estable, más firme, más permanente y claro a qué servir" (*Agonía* 26) [more stable, firmer, more permanent and clearer that it could attend to]. This lack of aspiration to transcendence has a direct political result, as it channels Europe's forces toward violent confrontation. The hubris developed after centuries of achievements of rationalist thought, those "victories" over nature, made it impossible to keep seeing reality clearly. Thus, Europeans missed the new danger: "enigma y monstruo más pavoroso que la naturaleza: el monstruo de lo social" (27) [an enigma, a monster more fearful than nature: the monster of the social], which begot totalitarianism.

In Zambrano's conception, Europe is self-sufficient in its own annihilation, but its salvation requires contributions from outside strains of thought. While her historical thinking is Eurocentric as well as essentialist (and as such, hardly respectful of standard historiography), her proposed alternative to Europe's destructive reason is rooted in a marginalized tradition that is both European and not. For Zambrano, Spain, as "frenesí de Eu-

ropa" (59) [Europe's frenzy], represents an extreme that cannot conceal the aspects that Europe masks with rationality, and part of the answer to the crisis lies in exposing them. Zambrano also acknowledges the importance of Sufi, Taoist, and Buddhist influences in her project to enrich rationalism, as well as the contributions of European adapters of non-Western thought who were ignored or considered too heterodox. Above all, she vindicates the founding role of Saint Augustine, who brought from Africa, "olvidada nodriza de Europa" (79) [Europe's forgotten wet nurse], what Zambrano characterizes, rather condescendingly, as a humble and ancient wisdom. The main lesson to be extracted from those alternative traditions has to do with the role of affects in our knowledge of and relationship with the world: Europe cannot afford to ignore the vital function that love, mercy, and hope have in understanding. Zambrano's proposal celebrates multiplicity, advocating the acceptance of heterogeneity within reason, which fails to serve humans when it is constructed univocally. The certainties resulting from the prevailing monologism are a source of strength insofar as they allow powerful technical developments, but they cannot encompass the full variety of human experience, which constantly exceeds the limits of instrumental reason. Europeans' barbarism derives from their attempt to employ this form of rationality to realize on earth what could only be an ideal (epitomized by Augustine's city of God). Such an achievement would be their ultimate, most destructive success, as it would result in the abandonment both of hope and "del saber más peculiar del hombre europeo: el saber vivir en el fracaso" (85) [of European man's most unique knowledge: the knowledge of living in failure].

José Ferrater Mora's Antagonism

"¡Y cómo duele Europa!" [And how Europe is aching!], wrote Zambrano to her friend and colleague José Ferrater Mora in a 1949 letter from Rome.[6] She was shocked by what she had experienced upon first returning to Europe after her protracted stay in the Americas: despair over an utter lack of professional opportunities yet also a distinct vertigo when confronting once more the remnants of the classical world. Again, she made a point of stating how her feelings affected her thinking. Traces of the "mother" Greece suggested to her a place from which "todo puede ser entendido, en el centro mismo del mundo inteligible, que no es el mundo de la Razón pura sino el mundo de la razón del alma" [everything can be understood, in the very center of the intelligible world, which is not the world of pure

Reason but that of the reason of the soul]. The recipient of her spirited letter, the Catalan Ferrater Mora, was another Republican exile devoted to philosophy, who also had strong literary and artistic inclinations. (Later in life, he published several novels and made experimental films.) Although he and Zambrano walked very different paths as thinkers, their preoccupations during their first few years of American exile coincided in two fundamental themes: Unamuno and Europe. The two exchanged ideas on both topics when they met in Cuba after their respective stints in Paris immediately following the end of the civil war, and they kept their dialogue alive in subsequent correspondence. While Zambrano returned to Europe a decade later, Ferrater called America his home for the rest of his life (which, like Zambrano's, ended in 1991; they died barely one week apart). Zambrano's husband, Alfonso Rodríguez Aldave, who had been secretary of the Spanish Embassy in Chile, helped José secure an academic job in that country, where Ferrater remained until 1947, when he moved to the United States with the endorsement of a Guggenheim Fellowship. A couple of years later he obtained a professorship at Bryn Mawr College, where he taught for the rest of his career. His tireless writing and his monumental work compiling a philosophical dictionary earned him a reputation as one of Spain's most distinguished philosophers, even though he never permanently returned to his native country. As Jordi Gracia has noted, he turned his exile into "un avatar compensador" (*A la intemperie* 91) [a compensating vicissitude].

Notions of antagonism and defeat are central to both Zambrano's and Ferrater's readings of modernity, which are strongly indebted to Unamuno's. The two exiled Republicans go a long way to underscore the redeeming qualities of failure; their insistence on its constructive role (insofar as it facilitates the perpetuation of struggle and self-analysis) suggests an attempt to imbue the defeat of the liberal project for which they stood with a sense of hope. Deeply affected by the exilic experience's inherent rupture, they also long for the continuance of the national project of regeneration that the war halted, and for their own participation in it. In Unamuno they find a precursor who combated a military dictatorship from a distance, armed only with his intellect. He also managed to combine nationalism and cosmopolitanism, engaging Europe as both a context and an ideal that Spaniards could not afford to ignore.

Ferrater's book on Unamuno originated in articles published in Argentina and Cuba in 1940 and 1941. As Zambrano did, Ferrater underscored Unamuno's European dimension and vindicated him as one of the greatest intellectuals of his time, relating his career to those of Bergson and Freud

(*Unamuno* 36). For Ferrater, the essential notion in Unamuno's work is conflict. The precursor's inclination toward antagonism reflects that which is embodied by Spain's history in a double discord: an inner conflict and one that positions the country in opposition to Europe. Yet Ferrater argues that the key to this cultural divide is found not in the oft-mentioned clash between radical traditionalists and Europeanizers, but in the many authors, from Juan Valera to Benito Pérez Galdós and Francisco Giner de los Ríos, who took moderate stances in the debate. Like Unamuno, they were nationalists convinced of the need to look toward Europe, not only in search of models for reform but also to affirm Spain's contributions to continental culture. Consequentially, Ferrater declares himself unconvinced by Unamuno's notorious Euroskeptic outbursts, including his characterization of Europe as "un engaño, un espejismo, un fetiche" (88) [a deception, a mirage, a fetish]. Unamuno's alleged dissidence with regard to European modernity is mostly the effect of his embrace of conflict and paradox, which also underscores a deep appreciation of heterogeneity. According to Ferrater, Unamuno rejects any ultimate unity because he understands extreme harmony as a form of death, while fighting entails life and hope.

A particular notion of antagonism and the work of Unamuno are again central in *España y Europa* [Spain and Europe], from 1942, the second book that Ferrater published in Chile. For him, Spain and Europe are essentially problematic realities, something that he regards as positive since it implies that, while they may be unsolvable, both are alive and bursting with creative possibilities. Ferrater insists on confrontation as the fulcrum of their relationship. The role of Spain, he says, "en su pensamiento y en su vida, ha sido inevitablemente un enfrentarse con Europa" (8–9) [in its thought and in its life, has inevitably been to clash with Europe]. Ferrater states explicitly that Spain's problem with Europe is equal to Spain's problem with modernity. And modernity, as the author sees it, is above all things a failure, "un error, un gigantesco, necesario y glorioso error" (11) [a mistake, a gigantic, necessary and glorious mistake] that no longer offers a valid path. His proffered diagnosis is very similar to Zambrano's: the root of that mistake lies in Europeans' arrogant self-sufficiency, which led them to break the most essential links with divinity and base their lives on a version of reason that, in truth, severely constricts their world, as they assume that reality ends at the boundaries of reason.

In the face of this, Spain appears as a necessary counter-model—one that can teach the rest of the continent how to deal with failure. Not in a strictly intellectual way, however: while Europe is a generator of ideas,

Ferrater claims, Spain produces ideals. The former are the product of reason; the latter are born of "aquella actitud que el español adopta cuando quiere someter a su pasión toda la realidad ingobernable e insumisa" (14) [that attitude that Spaniards adopt when they wish to subjugate to their passion all of unruly and rebellious reality]. In other words, Spain stands out as Europe's internal, passionate other, which can balance the excesses of rationalism with an overdose of emotion and willpower: "La lucha de España contra lo moderno es . . . el afán de hacer comprender a Europa el inevitable fracaso final de su racionalismo" (25) [Spain's fight against modernity is . . . the eagerness to make Europe understand the ultimately inevitable failure of its rationalism]. Spain is a master of the crisis mode, since "el vivir español es, siempre que sea auténtico, un vivir crítico, esto es, un vivir sobre el abismo" (25) [Spanish living is, as long as it is authentic, critical living—that is, living on the abyss].

For Ferrater, Spaniards' way of belonging to Europe is to remain at its margins, ready to pick up the scraps of the latter's successes. It is not these victories, but their reverse in the form of the failure of the European ideal, that drives quixotic Spain toward Europe, even at the expense of the nation's ruin. Thus, Spain's wreckage is a consequence of the nation's selfless sacrifice to save Europe from Europe's own decline. Spain comes to the rescue when "Europa vacila, cuando deserta de su lucha y, ante la inminencia de una crisis, se apresura a abandonar lo que antes había tan decididamente acogido, se dispone a vender su moral y sus tradiciones" (55–56) [Europe hesitates, when it deserts its fight and, faced with the imminence of a crisis, it rushes to abandon what it previously had taken in so decidedly, and prepares to sell its morals and traditions]. Here Europe and Spain's respective decadences converge. Spain's has been overt and much longer in duration; in contrast, Europe's was imperceptible, disguised in the triumphs of modern reason until it finally imploded and became all too patent. Yet there is still hope for both. Whether in the form of Zambrano's recovery of the Christian-inspired "resurrection" or in Ferrater's "posibilidades de vida y de creación" (8) [possibilities of life and creation], they will overcome their terminal situation if the advocates of hegemonic reason adopt the alternatives offered by counter-models such as Spain.

By positioning Spain ambiguously vis-à-vis Europe, not alien to it and yet also not totally assimilated, Zambrano and Ferrater define Europe through internal opposition, without needing to reach outside for an other. Although writing from a non-European context, they distortedly emphasize Europe's autonomy from, and centrality to, the rest of the

world. Despite their defense of heterogeneity (manifested, for instance, in the multifaceted reason that Zambrano opposed to a monologic one), both thinkers work from the assumption of Europe's fundamental unity, which a similarly homogeneous Spain opposes. Spain and Europe perennially "are"; their transformation is negated, and both are reified as collective, impersonal agents. Certainly, the selective use of historical information limits their persuasiveness, yet the texts these two authors penned in the early 1940s from exile must be situated in context: fascism was at the height of its success, with its project of a single, totalitarian Europe advancing triumphant. From America, Zambrano and Ferrater understood that juncture as an inevitable failure, yet one that also contains a positive element because it is ultimately imbued with hope for a new beginning, one that could mean leaving behind the excesses of rationalism, or at least taming them. As they grew older in exile, their respective works became increasingly permeated by less Eurocentric views. Zambrano largely abandoned discussions of contemporary political topics, and Ferrater revisited and "corrected" his early essays; in 1963, he published a new version of *España y Europa* under the title *Tres mundos: Cataluña, España, Europa* [Three worlds: Catalonia, Spain, Europe]. In the latter he perceived a disconnect between the topic's increasing relevance and the achievement of his original text; in particular, he faulted its pedantic rhetoric. Yet the updated essay retains the main arguments made in its predecessor—among them, that Spain's obstinate attachment to anti-European attitudes and ideals has led to repeated historical failures.

Max Aub's Dramas of Hope

Failure and hope, two notions that feed each other in Zambrano's and Ferrater's early exilic work, are also key in the literature of Max Aub, another discerning witness of liberal Europe's collapse. Detained several times, Aub had a harder time escaping the continent; it was not until the end of 1942 that he found refuge in Mexico after enduring the trials of war and camp internment. His works deal with aspects of the exilic experience that Zambrano and Ferrater might have found too prosaic to engage in their early writings, as they were more concerned with broader historical and metaphysical problems than with the apparently mundane workings of power. In contrast, Aub's texts make visible the functioning and effect of the "máquina burocrática-represiva" [repressive bureaucratic machine] of modern states, as José María Naharro-Calderón calls it in his essay about the Kafkaesque

experiences Aub endured in France after the civil war (22); the harassment by the authorities that he suffered there became the source of many of his works. In this sense, Aub's oeuvre is in tune with works by other distinguished European refugees, like Hannah Arendt, who analyzed the connections between bureaucracy and totalitarianism.

Like Zambrano and Ferrater, Aub too held a critical view of success: "El desprecio del éxito . . . fue y tal vez aún es mi sentir profundo" (qtd. in Faber 219) [disdain of success . . . was and perhaps still is a deep feeling of mine]. But while the others related success to Europe's fatal arrogance, in Aub's case this rejection had to do with his own diminished presence in Spanish culture, which he considered his natural milieu but which had nevertheless estranged him as a consequence of exile. Aub also differed from his two colleagues in that he insistently posited exile as a radical rupture. While he appreciated the political freedom it granted him, exile made Aub hardly visible in the eyes of his ideal readership, the fellow Spaniards whose experiences fed his literary output. It was on his forced displacement that he blamed his difficulties in having his works published or (in the case of drama, his preferred genre) staged. This lack of recognition disturbed him until the end of his life, though it may not have been as stark as Aub's laments suggest: he became successfully integrated into Mexico's cultural circles, where he held important official positions, and was an avid networker abroad. Nevertheless, it was only about two decades after his death in 1973 that his contribution started to receive the attention it deserves as one of the most compelling bodies of work in twentieth-century Spanish literature, an enduring testimony of some of the events that have shaped contemporary Europe.

Aub's life was that of an outsider long before he fled Spain following the fall of the Republic. Born in 1903 in Paris to a German Jewish father and a French mother, both agnostic liberals, Max left with them for Spain when World War I broke out. A polyglot, he chose to write literature in Spanish, yet he retained a peculiar accent, which he acknowledged as a sign of the alterity that, along with his radical nonconformism and permanent extraterritorial situation, symbolizes the uniqueness of his production. As Michael Ugarte rightly points out, Aub's "is a voice speaking from the margins—different, other, impossibly harmonized with the prevailing song of a home that is no longer recognizable" (*Shifting Ground* 131). From that marginal perspective, his literature—an impressive corpus of novels, short stories, plays, diaries, essays, and poems—addresses issues such as commitment, memory, justice, and freedom. While the historical vicissitudes of

Spain (the country he called his by choice, despite his German and French origins and his protracted stay and naturalization in Mexico) lay at the center of his work, in the early moments of his American exile Aub set those themes within a distinctly European framework, an element that decisively influenced his gaze. His interest in the failure of the European ideal is evident in several works in the various genres he cultivated, but of particular interest are the three major dramas based on historical facts that he wrote between 1942 and 1944, in which Aub deals most directly with the issue. Since he was a newcomer to Mexico, it was virtually impossible for him to see these plays staged there, as they did not fit the commercial parameters of the local venues. However, they resonate powerfully today as matters of historical memory, border management, and massive human displacement test the principles of the European unification project in ways that have many precedents in Aub's experiences and writings in the 1930s and 1940s.

Aub penned the first of these plays, the tragedy *San Juan*, in December 1942. He had finally arrived in Mexico in late October, just a few months out of the concentration camp in Djelfa (Algeria), where French authorities had confined him the previous year along with other Spanish Republicans. Wrongly accused as a communist agent, he had been transferred there in a cargo ship from Le Vernet internment camp in southern France. Inspired by that experience, Aub sets the drama on the *San Juan,* a boat that is sailing the Mediterranean in the summer of 1938. Under official vigilance, the ship is not allowed to dock anywhere in Europe, as the more than six hundred passengers are repeatedly refused by the authorities simply because of their ethnic and religious origin: they are Jewish refugees fleeing not only the Nazis' tightening grip on Europe but also long-standing anti-Semitic feelings throughout the continent that had reemerged powerfully (as evidenced by the Italian racial laws of 1938). The boat, a decrepit merchant vessel that used to carry horses, is ill prepared for the mission. It is overcrowded with people of all ages and conditions: from children and elderly men and women, whom Aub includes to underscore the scope of the tragedy, to individualized types such as a soccer player, a law student, a rabbi, and a wealthy banker. Regardless of their prior status, they all are now equally dispossessed, seeking refuge after the repeated pogroms that have ejected Jews from their homes. The response to their plight from the European administrations, including the democratic ones, spans from indifference to rejection to open hostility. One of the elderly passengers, Esther, condenses in a few words what follows the outbursts of violence they suffer: "Nada. Nada. El silencio. La nieve sobre las ruinas. Y el olvido"

(187) [Nothing. Nothing. Silence. Snow on the ruins. And oblivion]. Meanwhile, a few young men led by a communist named Leva break with what they consider the stifling inaction of the other passengers and manage to escape, determined to reach Spain, which is currently the front line in the fight against fascism. The voluntary commando's fate remains unknown to the audience, but not that of the Spanish Republic, as abandoned as the *San Juan* in a critical moment for its survival. The deadly fate of the other passengers is sealed at the play's conclusion with the wrecking of the ship.

The tragic ending of those onboard the *San Juan*, resulting from the passengers' passivity and the European authorities' ignominious apathy (or downright contempt) toward those seeking refuge, contrasts with Leva's nonconformism. Reacting against an ill-fated future, he tries to mobilize his fellow travelers, asserting, "Siempre se puede hacer algo" [Something can always be done]. This phrase became a slogan of hope for Aub, who also used it in the title of his subsequent play: as in *San Juan*, the energetic pragmatism of a few individuals empowers the trapped characters in *El rapto de Europa, o Siempre se puede hacer algo* [The rape of Europe, or, Something can always be done], written in 1943. Although this play, like its predecessor, is a choral drama, one character stands out above the rest: Margarita Dodge, a selfless US citizen who has lived as an expatriate in Spain and France for several years and tries to assist refugees and political outcasts cornered in the port of Marseille in June 1941. She uses her privileged status as an affluent American to aid dozens of persecuted Spaniards, Italians, Germans, and Austrians with needs ranging from obtaining food and clothes to fleeing the continent. While European governments abandon or oppress their own citizens, Margarita manages to turn her humanitarian ideals—which are not the product of a specific political affiliation—into solutions, even though that means that she has to ignore the admonishments of her own consular officials. At a moment in which "toda Europa es noche" (218) [all Europe is night], in the words of Rafael, a Spanish refugee whom she helps flee the continent, Margarita appears as a beacon that can show the way for those trapped in the port city: "No hay más luz que tú, luciérnaga americana" (218) [There is no other light but you, American firefly], Rafael adds. He is one of several characters who see America as their only remaining alternative once it becomes clear that fascism has raped Europe. Bozzi, a politically committed Italian carpenter who used to live in Buenos Aires, declares, "¡Ojalá me hubiese quedado allí! . . . Y ahora el mundo parece correr hacia atrás. Creímos que se acercaba el gran día

de la libertad, y he visto nacer el fascismo. ¿Qué rapto de locura sacude a Europa? . . . Puede que América sea la única salvación" (230) [I wish I had stayed there! . . . And now it seems as if the world is running backward. We thought the great day of freedom was approaching, and instead I have seen fascism being born. What fit of madness is shaking Europe? . . . Maybe America is the only salvation possible]. Of course, their escape from an increasingly repressive Europe is far from easy, despite Margarita's ability to dodge (as the polyglot Aub underscores with the last name he gives her) the obstacles in their way. The words that Aub voices through another refuge seeker, the German writer Berta Gross, capture the feelings of those who, like the playwright himself, used to live in a more fluid Europe yet suddenly are unable to find a safe place there to call home:

> Los franceses me tienen en entredicho porque, a pesar de todo, soy alemana. ¡Y los alemanes buscan mi muerte! No hago más que correr de la esperanza al miedo, sin un momento de quietud. Ya no hay tierra firme para mí. Todo se me vuelve blando, inseguro, bamboleante. Un mundo de algodón, un suelo de barro, escurridizo, sucio. Y un cansancio enorme, porque se va la esperanza de vencer. ¿Dónde poner el pie? Ya no hay mundo para nosotros. A veces pienso que América no existe. (252)
>
> [The French doubt me because, after all, I am German. And the Germans want me dead! All I do is run from hope to fear, without a moment of rest. There is no longer firm ground for me. Everything is turning soft, uncertain, unsteady. A world of cotton, a ground of mud—slippery, dirty. And enormous fatigue, because the hope of winning is evaporating. Where to stand? There is no longer a world for us. Sometimes I think that America does not exist.]

In a sardonic twist, Aub names this character—whose plight is very much like what he experienced as a Spanish refugee of Jewish German and French origins—after the infamous "Grosse Bertha" howitzers that the Germans used in World War I. Thus, he highlights the continuities between that conflict and those of the 1930s and 1940s, all of which had a decisive impact on his life and work. The European "night" that Rafael mentions earlier in the play did not start with the advent of Nazism or the Spanish war; nor would it end with Germany's capitulation. Berta's monologue conveys the resulting deep mutual suspicion among nations (both their governments

and citizens) that after 1914 made Europe inhospitable for those who tried to transcend those divisions. This growing hostility was not only the responsibility of the nation-states; Aub's text suggests that, just as salvation often comes from individual initiatives (like those of Margarita Dodge), the rape of liberal Europe was also a product of its citizens' malice or, at the very least, of their lack of empathy and involvement when the rise of totalitarianism was plainly visible.

Aub made a starker inquiry into that widespread shortsightedness the following year, with yet another effort to turn his personal experience of that crumbling world into theater: his drama *Morir por cerrar los ojos* [To die for closing their eyes], "tragedia en busca de una explicación de la que machaca a Europa" [a tragedy in search of an explanation of the tragedy that is crushing Europe], as he defines it in the paragraphs that open the first edition (Mexico, July 1944). Aub acridly dedicates the play to the British and French leaders who signed the nonintervention agreement of 1936, which resulted in the isolation of the Spanish Republic and the strengthening of fascism. Yet what he explores is not the drama of high politics, but the petty disputes and lethal banality that so many everyday Europeans displayed. These attitudes, bolstered by authoritarianism (and vice versa), led to the collapse of French society, where the action takes place. The threats to liberalism in that country—a frequent model for Spain's progressives—raised concern during the 1930s, as far-right extremists became increasingly active. The play denounces the hypocrisy and moral blindness of the French government and the chauvinism of a bourgeoisie all too ready to forget the republican principles of freedom, equality . . . and fraternity: it is, in fact, two half-brothers, Julio and Juan Ferrándiz, who embody some of the conflicts that propel the action, set in 1940, just as the Nazis are marching on Paris.[7] Julio had established himself there two decades earlier, as the son of Spanish immigrants, and has become a small business owner, devoted to his domestic life and small fortune and unengaged in politics. He is married to María, a Frenchwoman by birth, who will become increasingly committed to the anti-fascist cause as events unfold. She is a former girlfriend of Juan's, the brother who fought on the Republican side during the Spanish Civil War and has just escaped a French concentration camp. Perhaps due to an identity mix-up, or simply as a consequence of the growing xenophobia that the worst kind of patriotism feeds as the invaders advance, the Paris police arrest Julio without a clear reason. He is, after all, an alien, and as one of the neighbors admonishes her young child, "nunca

se puede uno fiar de los extranjeros" (39) [you can never trust foreigners]. In Julio's case, the sneering remark will prove true, albeit in a paradoxical way: with a combination of cowardice and desperation, he becomes a snitch and collaborates willingly with the same authorities that arbitrarily detain him and many others.

In the first part of the play, Aub offers an unforgiving portrait of average Parisians: their self-interest, opportunism, racism, and xenophobia are the breeding ground for the collective moral breakdown that led to the downfall of France's Third Republic. The pettiness of the concierge and neighbors in Julio's building (who can hardly wait for him to be arrested to start planning how to seize his more desirable apartment and furniture) translates into a greater political problem: a democracy that has forsaken its liberal ideals and looks away when civil rights are sacrificed in the name of "security." The tragic situation depicted in the second (and final) part of the play represents some of Europe's darkest hours, as Aub recreates events that took place at the Roland Garros tennis stadium, which the French authorities turned into a prison camp for foreigners and others deemed politically suspect, and at Le Vernet concentration camp.[8] Aub presents prosaic exchanges among the internees, a hodgepodge of characters from all over Europe (whose lives are often far from heroic), and the mistreatment they suffer at the hands of the French officials, who see Marshal Pétain's collaborationist regime as an opportunity to cleanse the nation and establish a new order not unlike that of Nazi Germany.

The redemptive endurance of a very small minority is also celebrated, yet Aub's focus throughout the play is on the blindness that prompted the collapse of democratic Europe. If that blindness is the norm rather than the exception in cosmopolitan Paris, the spiritual capital of European modernity, there is little hope that the rest of the continent may harbor higher moral standards. Nevertheless, prospects are more hopeful in this drama than in *San Juan*, and answers are not as dependent on America as in *El rapto de Europa*. At the end of the play, encouraged by the selfless and brave María (once again, a woman is the most positive character), the international cohort of prisoners sings "La Marseillaise" in defiance of the wardens, a confident reminder of the enduring principles that the anthem represents.

The foreword to the drama explicitly evokes the obligation of memory: what happened in France, and in the rest of Europe, must not be forgotten. Dated June 6, 1944, as Allied troops disembarked on the shores of

Normandy, Aub's prologue also reflects his confidence that "entre todos llegaremos a Madrid" [jointly we shall reach Madrid]. The urgency of Aub's literary production (three major dramas written in a few months, while working on narratives that deal with the same experiences) parallels that of Zambrano's and Ferrater's reflections. These exiles' expectations, along with those of many other Spanish Republicans, would be crushed again when Franco remained in power, untouched, after the defeat of his former supporters Mussolini and Hitler.

2

Sense and Sensuousness

Approaching Europe under Franco's Dictatorship

Fascist Melancholy: Ernesto Giménez Caballero's European Visions

While some exiles questioned from afar the developments that had pushed liberal Europe to the verge of extinction, in Spain the victors of the civil war continued to strive to reconfigure the continent. Their plans were generally in consonance with those conceptualized by fascist intellectuals since the 1920s in Italy and (to a lesser degree) Germany, but there were, of course, discrepancies: namely, the Spaniards gave a greater weight to Christian beliefs as the glue that united Europe. However, their contributions and the vision they defended for the continent rarely appear in recent accounts of the unification process, as they taint the liberal credentials that the EU boasts. As historian Ismael Saz observes, "La existencia de una única e inequívoca idea de Europa como la Europa democrática es una falacia retrospectiva que engulle la mayor parte de la historia europea del siglo XX" (58) [The existence of a single, unequivocal idea of Europe as democratic Europe is a retrospective fallacy that engulfs the greater part of twentieth-century European history]. Saz reminds us that the commonly held view that Francoism pursued Spain's isolation from the rest of Europe mistakenly takes the consequences of the regime's policies (which kept the country out of the major postwar European developments) for their objective. In fact, many influential personalities within the dictatorship hoped the nation would adopt a leading role in a new Europe, which, in their opinion, did not have to be a democratic one; as they often stressed, the most successful precedents of pan-Europeanism were not.

Following their victory in the civil war, and with the urgency that the rapidly unfolding events in Europe demanded, Francoists discussed several approaches to a unified Europe. The inconsistencies and contradic-

tions they show speak of the tensions among the dictatorship's different supporters, from the Catholics and monarchists of Acción Española to the fascists of the Falange. When the Nazi grip on the continent appeared incontestable, several of their members contributed dense historical essays attempting to justify a prime position for Franco's Spain within the unified, totalitarian (or, for the less radical, simply "reactionary") Europe that they hoped would emerge after the war. Rather than political argumentation, these texts deployed a historical revisionism that obliterated modernity—seen as both the cause of the nation's decadence and what liberals took Europe to represent—and were as fallacious as they were biased. They depicted the so-called "Reconquest" as a centuries-long self-sacrifice by which Spain had saved the rest of Europe from obliteration at the hands of Muslim forces and the recent civil war as another example of altruism, Franco having stopped the "godless communists" in the first battle to defend the soul of the West from bolshevism. In their eyes, the continent's brightest episode had been the Spanish empire under Charles V, the "gran momento crucial de unidad y triunfo de Europa" (Aunós 53) [great crucial moment of European unity and triumph], to which local fascists tirelessly referred as a model. Regardless of how alive the Francoist intellectuals felt those glorious distant times were, however, in the early 1940s Spain's role in European affairs was marginal.

One of the most interesting peculiarities of the fascist Spanish perspective on Europe was the importance these authors gave to the enterprise's cultural dimension, which they favored above military or economic aspects. Given the pitiful material conditions Spain was enduring, their arguments in support of the country's leadership could at most emphasize, yet again, its purported spiritual exemplarity, lacking among the regimes of supposedly rampant materialism whose dehumanizing agnosticism had brought on Europe's collapse. Along these lines, Alfonso García Valdecasas defended culture as the best instrument for revitalizing and integrating the European nations. García Valdecasas, who during the Republican period founded the Frente Español (a nationalist movement inspired by Ortega y Gasset in which Zambrano participated briefly) and was later one of the first members of the Falange, argued that Spain's role in the unification project had to be that of moral guide, preventing the economic priorities driving the war effort from overshadowing Christian principles. "Cuando el alma europea no sintiera más luchas que las de los mercados, Europa habría dejado de ser" (518) [When the European soul felt only the fights of markets, Europe would have ceased to be], he stated, anticipating an argu-

ment frequently heard decades later in protests against economics-driven versions of the European project.

As objective conditions changed with the defeat of Italy and Germany, the regime's ideologues adapted their views about the leadership and alliances associated with European unification, but not about Spain's possible contribution, which, during the long period of scarcity following the war, could only be spiritual in nature. One approach that had a unique take on the continental relevance of Spanish cultural heritage and transcended the academic realm—possibly the only one—is presented by Ernesto Giménez Caballero (1899–1988) in *La Europa de Estrasburgo (Visión española del problema europeo)* [Strasbourg's Europe: A Spanish view of the European problem], from 1950. This book stands out for several reasons. First, it is the primary text in which the writer considered to be the inventor of Spanish fascism (according to José-Carlos Mainer) or its importer from Italy (as claimed by María Zambrano early on in *Pensamiento y poesía* [Thought and poetry]) deals with the role of Spain vis-à-vis Europe as the major Western powers planned the continent's unification in light of the new post-1945 political order. *La Europa de Estrasburgo* is symptomatic of the Cold War–inspired realignment of the Franco dictatorship with regard to the international arena: from fascist regime to pioneer of anticommunism—the geopolitical recalibration that crushed exiles' hopes for an Allied takeover of Spain. Second, Giménez Caballero attempts to articulate nationalism, Europeanism, Catholicism, traditionalism, and modernism in support of the authoritarian regime he served. As some of these paradigms contradict each other, his solution could only be aesthetic, rather than political, even though he aspired to have a direct impact on the government's foreign policy, as the text's publication by the Instituto de Estudios Políticos, an official think tank, shows.[1] The essay's rhetoric (with echoes of avant-garde and fascist tendencies) is representative of Giménez Caballero's unfailing combination of political and artistic pretentions, which can be traced back to his 1930s-era proposals for Spanish regeneration, such as *Genio de España* (1932) [Spirit of Spain].

Giménez Caballero, also known as Gecé, occupies a problematic place within Spanish culture. He was, as Enrique Selva aptly calls him, a crossroads man: someone who embodied the nexus between aesthetics (modernism) and politics (fascism), however unsteadily ("*Gecé*" 70). It is undeniable that Gecé played a major role in the configuration of the cultural sphere during the 1920s and 1930s as a catalyst of the native avant-garde scene; he tried his hand at cinema, including a collaboration with

the painter Maruja Mallo, and even claimed to have brought Surrealism to Spain: his *Yo, inspector de alcantarillas* [I, sewer inspector], from 1928, is at the very least markedly Freudian. His periodical *La Gaceta Literaria* [The Literary Gazette], which he founded and published from 1927 until 1932, was, during its first years of existence, a key publication for the most distinguished figures of Spanish letters. It followed the international literary scene, and its local contributors included the most prominent authors of the time, both experienced and new: Azorín, Baroja, García Lorca, Alberti, Buñuel, Ayala, and so on. To a large extent, the *Gaceta*'s demise was provoked by its founder's growing radicalization. As early as February 1927, Giménez Caballero was already projecting his own political inclinations onto some of the collaborators: he pictured Ortega y Gasset and Ramón Gómez de la Serna dressed "de un 'gris fascista,' gran color de moda, de una tentación aristocrática y ademocrática" ("Conversación" 1) [in a "fascist gray," supremely fashionable color, in an aristocratic and a-democratic temptation]. Very few colleagues joined him in his enthusiastic embrace of fascism, but those who did became instrumental in creating a public image and ideology for the regime that emerged from the civil war. Giménez Caballero was the most prolific, imaginative, and informed of them all, as well as the one who remained most aware of the importance of thinking in Europe-wide terms, convinced as he was that therein lay the key to understanding the tensions of his time. And he acted on his conviction: for example, in November 1932 he attended the Volta Conference organized by the Royal Italian Academy to discuss the future of Europe.

Yet Giménez Caballero's selective fascination with foreign developments, mainly those of Italy under Mussolini (whom he met in 1930), did not mean that he would simply acquiesce to the idea of a standard, Germany-centered Europe, as he thought Ortega had done. Instead, he indulged in an approach of antagonistic otherness reminiscent of Unamuno's. The two men had established a good rapport early in Giménez Caballero's literary career, which had begun under the threat of court-martial by the same military regime that had provoked Unamuno's exile—in Gecé's case, because of the insults and alleged sedition in his first book, *Notas marruecas de un soldado* [Moroccan notes of a soldier]. The book was written during his time serving in the disastrous colonial campaign, whose management (not its imperialistic aims) he criticized. Unamuno publicly supported the novice author, who ever after considered him his intellectual "grandfather" and was more than happy to notice and embrace his Euroskepticism, albeit in a more playful way. That was the intention Giménez Caballero expressed

in 1923, after the case against him was dropped, in a letter to Unamuno from Strasbourg. He had returned there to teach Spanish at the same university where he'd previously held a lectureship arranged for him by his mentor, Américo Castro. Back in the Alsatian city, he felt mostly uninspired by the calm, productive life of Central Europe that others (Ortega and his generation, the "parents" that Gecé rejects) wished for Spain. Always torn between his love of erudition and the siren song of action, Giménez Caballero was well aware that Unamuno shared his conflict:

> Este orden y este equilibrio siempre serán para nosotros, don Miguel, buenos iberos, queramos o no, una superstición, una ilusión. Una ilusión es quizá ésta de recoger 'el fermento' cultural de Europa para importarle [*sic*] a nuestra España. . . . Sin embargo, creo que mi generación representa ya el estadio de sonreírse del 'fermento' sin dejar de rendirle tributo. (Letter 275)
>
> [Don Miguel, this order and balance will always be for us, as good Iberians, a superstition, an illusion, whether we like it or not. This notion, too, that we might be able to take the cultural "ferment" of Europe and import it to our Spain could well be an illusion. . . . However, I believe that my generation already represents the phase of laughing at the "ferment" while still honoring it all the same].

Gecé persevered in a similarly sardonic vein, although as the times turned harsher and his political stance grew more radical, he may have been the only one still laughing. His knack for antagonism also grew. In his best-known work, *Genio de España*, he describes Spanish culture as torn between two options that he foreshadows in terms of "*guerra civil*; esto es: plantearse si la cultura en España se mejorará inspirándose en lo *castizo* o inspirándose en lo *europeo*" (60; emphasis in the original) [*civil war*—that is, pondering whether culture in Spain will be improved by drawing inspiration from what is *genuinely native* or from what is *European*]. The entity that he opposes to Spanish tradition is "la Europa desromanizada, protestante, independizada, particularizada, nacionalizada" (60) [the de-Romanized, Protestant, independent, particularized, nationalized Europe]: that is, France, England, and (pre-Nazi) Germany. The divide that Giménez Caballero draws between traditionalism and liberal, modern Europe owes much to Unamuno's most confrontational writings as well as to Gecé's own European import, Italian fascism, which he presents in terms of "Roman-

ization" or "Catholization." Thus, at the beginning of his follow-up essay, *La nueva catolicidad. Teoría general sobre el fascismo en Europa: en España* (1933; The new Catholicity: General theory of fascism in Europe: In Spain), Giménez Caballero asserts that "la palabra *Europa* es una palabra siempre bárbara y alógena para un español. . . . [E]s una palabra fatídica" (9) [the word *Europe* is always a barbaric and alien word for a Spaniard. . . . It is a fatidic word]. Much of his later work dealt with the ways that ominous term had influenced the history of his country, which he saw as destined for a leading role in a continent unified under fascism.

Having long been fascinated with fascism and having felt a servile devotion to Franco since the general's rise to power, after the war Giménez Caballero was above all a propagandist with a calling in high politics. To his dismay, however, he never obtained the ministerial position he longed for, thanks to his extravagant initiatives (in a plan to resuscitate the Habsburg monarchy, he urgently pleaded with Goebbels' wife, insisting that Hitler should marry Pilar Primo de Rivera, sister of the late Falange leader José Antonio and later head of the party's female branch) and his own fascist fervor, virtually unmatched among the Francoist elite. He got only as far as becoming an ambassador . . . in Paraguay, probably not his first choice, had he been given one. Much of what he wrote after the shuttering of his avant-garde periodicals has been all but forgotten (the collaborative project *La Gaceta* was followed by six issues of his completely self-made version, *El Robinsón Literario de España* [The Literary Robinson of Spain]), but some of his works merit attention for what they tell us about the rise of fascism and the official culture of the 1940s and 1950s, when he was always proximate to power. In many ways, his literature represents the opposite of the exiles'.

Giménez Caballero wrote *La Europa de Estrasburgo* immediately after attending the first trans-European parliamentary assembly in history: the Council of Europe, whose statute was signed on May 5, 1949, with the aim of fostering "a greater unity between its members for the purpose of safeguarding and realizing the ideals and principles which are their common heritage and facilitating their economic and social progress."[2] Years later, in a characteristically egomaniacal passage of his memoirs, Giménez Caballero claimed that his book had induced "el nuevo sueño de la 'Europa unida' y ahora liberal, al fracasar la cesárea o hitleriana" (*Memorias* 40) [the new dream of the "united Europe," now liberal, after the failure of its Cesarean or Hitlerian version]. He was there merely as an observer, however. Being a dictatorship, Spain had not been invited to what was, in practice, an assembly of democracies in the process of healing the wounds of fascism; it would

not become a member until 1977. Congressman Giménez Caballero's visit to Strasbourg, at whose university the meeting took place, was a political mission (probably with the objective of sabotaging discussions on Spain's political situation). Yet, for him, it was also a trip down memory lane. As he explains, it was "gracias a ese sueño de la Unificación europea" (*La Europa* 10) [thanks to that dream of European unification] that he returned where he had taught in the 1920s. It was also there that he had met his future wife, Edith Sironi, the sister of the (fascist) Italian consul. That had been his first contact with the ideology that would guide his life, as well as with a Europe that he had long wished to see united, albeit not on the same terms as the majority of the political representatives present at the Council desired.

For Gecé, there were two possible ways to unify Europe. One option was Caesarism, the totalitarian approach forwarded by fascism, which had failed in its attempt (the first since Napoleon) to unify Europe (63). According to Giménez Caballero, this unification effort had flopped because it lacked the moral guidance that only Spain could offer. The other was through federalism, the line of work prevailing in Strasbourg at the time. This approach was marred by a similar handicap: it ignored Spain and Portugal, the Iberian nations that were the "head of all of Europe," as the essay repeats several times, using a medieval quote to underline the claim's deep lineage.[3] The image stresses both Spain's Christian pedigree and its geostrategic position, which was particularly important during the Cold War. His argument was representative of the dictatorship's official position, which claimed that Spain deserved to be included among the nations constructing a united Europe because of its (premodern) history and its role as an anticommunist country that could serve as a moral beacon for the other partners. But the members of the Council vetoed the country's participation as long as it remained a dictatorship (Moreno Juste 90).

Gecé's book straddles the boundaries of several genres: political chronicle, travel narrative, historical essay, epistle, and manifesto; it even ends with a delirious mystic dialogue with none other than the ghost of Luis de León, the sixteenth-century poet and theologian. The work is a nostalgic meditation that mingles the historical and the personal. Giménez Caballero mourns the loss of Spain's political preeminence, the downfall of fascism, and, ultimately, a youth long gone, along with its prowess, promise, and ideals. He had just turned fifty when he wrote the chapter "Místicas afirmaciones sobre Europa" [Mystic asseverations on Europe], in which he programmatically, and with tireless emphasis, presents his position regarding the emerging project of European unification. By then, fascism

had already been subdued by the new order that followed the defeat of the Axis, which he had so fervently admired; Giménez tried to conceal his past preference, though not with the same assiduousness of other Franco officials. The pioneer of Spanish fascism, the man whom Hitler awarded the Cross of the Order of the German Eagle in 1943, shows no qualms in this book about referring to 1945 as the "año de la Victoria" (77) [Victory year]. Yet Giménez Caballero's fascism, however politically downcast, is still palpable in the exalted rhetoric of his "afirmaciones," which, in his own words, take the form of a delirious manifesto (132)—quite a vision for Spain and for Europe.

The praxis that Gecé's program advocates is dangerously close to the ideology that had by that point been defeated in the rest of Western Europe but was still prevalent in Franco's Spain. Giménez Caballero stands up for a continental unity based on an "idea-fortaleza" [fortress idea], a concept with clear Nazi resonances: during the war, the Germans conceived of a *Festung Europa* [Fortress Europe] as a way to secure their hold on the continent. The text exudes a dual fear of identity loss: on the one hand, Gecé feels threatened by the (for him) soft power of the United States and that country's cultural and commercial hegemony; on the other, he rails against the Asian communists, who are more clearly hostile to his idea of civilization. Along with their defensive overtones, his arguments encompass several Eurocentric axioms, including some that contradict previous pages in the same essay (wherein the old fascist sets aside his devotion to violence and upholds peace) as well as older works that celebrated Oriental contributions to European culture (for instance, the appreciation of al-Andalus expressed in *Genio de España*). Gecé arranges his manifesto in seventeen points that assert Europe's continuous rebirths, animated by an elitist and exclusively European cultural lineage. This type of cycle is evocative of Zambrano's *La agonía de Europa*, in which she ventured that "Europa es tal vez lo único—en la Historia—que no puede morir del todo; lo único que puede resucitar" (42) [Europe is perhaps the only thing in history that cannot die completely; the only thing that can come back to life]. Yet whereas Zambrano denounced various forms of violence (physical, but also intellectual) as the cause of Europe's cataclysm, Giménez Caballero invokes the need for constant belligerence to prevent its disappearance. In fact, he understands violence to be ontologically inherent to the idea of Europe, as for him "Europa es pelea constante. Europa es guerrear. Europa es peligro" (138) [Europe is constant combat. Europe is war-making. Europe is danger]. Zambrano might well have agreed with this assessment as a diagnosis, but certainly not as a response in which to persevere.

Promoting a "viril" [manly], antagonistic imperialism as the basis of any pan-European project—rather than the cooperation the Council advocates—Gecé's priority is order, not peace. The stability he longs for can be achieved with a combination of strong authority and belligerent religiosity: one modeled after the Inquisition and its autos-da-fé (132). Unsurprisingly, such an arrangement finds an ideal realization under Franco's National-Catholic regime. Yet the doctrine presented in these pages, with its unmistakable fascist overtones, is again tamed and contradicted in the oneiric epilogue that follows. Luis de León appears in the Strasbourg hotel room of a sleepless Giménez Caballero, carrying a message of Christian peace for Europe. Gecé's chosen guide for a new continental order is not a political leader but a serene sage, poet, and victim of an inquisitorial process four centuries back. The ghost explains his notion of peace as a reflection of celestial harmony, which Giménez Caballero interprets as a utopia that some hope to see achieved in postwar Europe: "Orden sosegado. Unidad jerárquica entre Grandes y Pequeñas potencias. . . . O sea: statu quo, el 'tal como ha quedado.' Ese sería, sin duda, el ideal de este Consejo de Europa democrática que tenemos enfrente" (143) [Calm order. Hierarchical unity between large and small powers. . . . That is, status quo, or "as it has resulted." Indeed, that would be the ideal of this Council of democratic Europe that we have in front of us]. Unconvinced by these prospects, Gecé turns the dialogue into a bizarre discussion of contemporary international politics. He is met by the apparition's silence when he asks about the United States (of which Giménez now declares himself an admirer); the initiatives to federalize Europe (which should include Morocco); and the Jewish people, who according to the author are rehearsing "el Fascismo más delirante y entusiasta de la Historia" (146) [the most delirious and enthusiastic fascism in history] to ensure peace in the Middle East. Ultimately, Gecé and his ghostly visitor agree to deplore the lack of Christian inspiration in the emerging European organization, whose members think they can solve "todo mal y desorden con la receta de la Razón" (147) [every ill and disorder with the remedy of Reason]. It seems safe to state that, at this point in his essay, that is one principle that the consummate irrationalist Giménez Caballero rejects.

All its peculiar traits notwithstanding, Gecé's work shows that neither Franco's regime nor its cultural apologists had turned their back on Europe. The dictatorship's public reaction to the censure of its democratic neighbors was to reaffirm nationalism so as to rally its people against the foreign "interventionists" who failed to respect Spanish sovereignty, yet the regime also realized that, in military and economic terms, it needed to

achieve a certain harmony with Europe instead of seeing it as a threat. Consequently, the government worked to avoid further isolation, requesting to participate in several regional integration initiatives, particularly those related to commerce. At the same time, the opposition started to perceive Europe as a key element in the path toward regime change. Beyond these political considerations, however, evolving ideas about Europe provoked new anxieties in the cultural realm.

Two Munich Moments: Ortega and Ridruejo

When in September 1953 José Ortega y Gasset addressed a Munich audience with a lecture titled "European Culture and European Peoples," the Europeanist enthusiasm that had characterized his youth was long gone. After the wars of the first half of the century, Europe could hardly represent the solution to Spain's problems that he had envisioned while studying in Germany in the early 1900s. The dystopian predictions he had made about the continent in essays such as *La rebelión de las masas* (1930) [*The Revolt of the Masses* (1932)] had been fatally confirmed by war, genocide, and the ensuing resentment among nations. Toward the end of his life, he claimed that Europe—once the compass he had fashioned in an attempt to guide Spain out of its labyrinth of historical contradictions—found itself at a moment of great uncertainty about its identity and its role in the world. The cause of the continent's radical disorientation, Ortega argued in Munich, was that the European nations had withdrawn into themselves, moved by distrust and provincialism—precisely two of the main faults that had caused the intellectual isolation and technical backwardness that he had fought in his native country decades earlier.

At the beginning of his career, Ortega made a great effort to create a public distance from Miguel de Unamuno, to his own symbolic gain. An idealized "Europe," which Ortega identified with the triumphant science that Unamuno resisted as the opposite of existential wisdom, became his much-touted beacon. But Ortega also overstated the radicalism and negativity of Unamuno's views on the matter. He simplified them as an irrational, categorical dismissal of modern European thought, which, he argued, the jingoist Unamuno was misrepresenting in bad faith, failing to abide by one of the guiding principles for any intellectual, one that was intensely invoked by Unamuno himself: respect for the truth. "Don Miguel de Unamuno, energúmeno español, ha faltado a la verdad" (259) [Don Miguel de Unamuno, Spanish maniac, has failed to speak the truth], Ortega

concluded in his 1909 article "Unamuno y Europa, fábula" [Unamuno and Europe: A fable]. Discrediting the famous chancellor of the University of Salamanca, the twenty-six-year-old Ortega strove to position himself as the main champion of Europe (and, indirectly, of modernity) in Spain, displacing the elderly, ailing Joaquín Costa and challenging Unamuno's leadership in the intellectual arena. Spain's renewal, he reiterated, would come not from Africa and its wisdom (as Unamuno had argued provocatively) but from Europe and its science. Looking back on the Spanish cultural tradition to better signify his own heroic role within it, Ortega realized that "la historia moderna de España se reduce, probablemente, a la historia de su resistencia a la cultura moderna. . . . Pero la cultura moderna es genuinamente la cultura europea, y España la única raza europea que ha resistido a Europa" ("La estética" 122) [Spain's modern history can probably be reduced to the history of its resistance to modern culture. . . . But modern culture is genuinely European culture, and Spain is the only European race that has resisted Europe]. Although he claimed to place his Europeanness above his patriotism,[4] at the beginning of his career his project was unquestionably a nationalistic one—and it could be said that at a personal level his quarrel with Unamuno over Europeanization was also a tactic in service of his strategy to establish himself at the center of Spain's public life.[5]

Ortega's argument positing Europe as the solution to Spain's problematic relation with modernity was at the core of his breakthrough as a public intellectual. His celebrated dictum "España es el problema; Europa, la solución" [Spain is the problem; Europe, the solution], first formulated in a talk he gave in Bilbao in 1910, became the motto of Spanish reformist elites for decades. Yet while this early position has dominated assessments of his work, Ortega did not always remain so enthusiastic about Europe. In the Munich lecture, Ortega declared himself "ashamed" and "disgusted" by Europe: "debía haber más europeos que por primera vez, y a su pesar, sienten asco hacia Europa. . . . Yo soy uno y lo declaro a todos los vientos. Tengo cierta autoridad para hacerlo porque muy probablemente soy hoy, entre los vivientes, el decano de la Idea de Europa" (*Cultura europea* 949) [There should be more Europeans that, for the first time, and to their chagrin, are disgusted by Europe. . . . I am one of them, and I declare it loudly. I have some authority to say this, as I am, very probably, the oldest living advocate of the Idea of Europe]. The notion of Europe he had cherished since his youth was based on the continent's unity, which, according to Ortega, took the form of a common "cultural conscience" derived from sharing a

"social space" that preceded the formation of the different nation-states. That unity also existed politically: Ortega saw every European nation as being conditioned and limited by its neighbors in a fashion equivalent to the inner workings of a classically defined state. Thus, though it may not have existed de jure, a supranational European state had existed de facto for centuries under a variety of denominations, such as European "concert" or "balance." The postwar isolationism that the different European nations were engaging in did not come from a heightened sense of their own worth, said Ortega in Munich, but rather from a generalized fatigue and the need to recover through the reassuring comfort of tradition. However, before an audience of students so eager to hear him that their tussling over available lecture-hall seats made the next day's papers, Ortega managed to find a trace of optimism in that impasse. The moment of crisis, the continent's "pathological state," could only be temporary. The solution would come from within the problem itself:

> El hecho de que nuestra civilización se haya vuelto problemática, que todos nuestros principios sin excepción parezcan cuestionables, no es algo necesariamente triste o deplorable y, de ningún modo, representa un signo de agonía, sino, al contrario, un síntoma de que una nueva forma de civilización está aflorando entre nosotros. . . . La civilización europea duda seriamente de sí misma. Podemos felicitarnos de que sea así. Yo no recuerdo que ninguna civilización haya muerto de un ataque de duda. Creo recordar más bien que las civilizaciones han solido morir por una petrificación de su fe tradicional, por una arterioesclerosis de sus creencias. (950)
>
> [The fact that our civilization has become problematic, that all our principles without exception seem to be questionable, is not necessarily something sad or deplorable. In no way does this represent a sign of agony; on the contrary, it is a symptom of the blossoming of a new civilization among us. . . . European civilization is seriously doubting itself. We can be glad this is so. I do not recall any civilization dying from a doubt attack. Rather, I seem to recall that civilizations usually die from a petrification of their traditional faith, from the arteriosclerosis of their beliefs.]

The key to Europe's recovery was to abandon the lingering faith in the old idea of the nation, which was useless for grappling with the continental-

scale problems afflicting the region (and which was sometimes even the source of those problems). The wounds of war were starting to heal. The need for cooperation was about to engender the experiment that we now know as the EU.

Ortega saw himself as Europe's intellectual redeemer; his own "circunstancia" [circumstance], an essential notion in his philosophy that refers to the unique horizon that conditions one's life, was not limited to the restrictive context of Spain's postwar era. There, the Franco dictatorship plunged into the delusion of "autarky," or self-sufficiency—born of the combination of nationalism and international isolation. Given Europe's grim situation, it was not clear toward what kind of horizon those Spaniards who felt oppressed by or simply uneasy with the Francoist regime could march. Nevertheless, as had been the case at the beginning of his career, Ortega deemed it urgently necessary to "salvar" [save] Spain from itself, something that could only happen within the context of a recomposed, unified Europe.

When Ortega died in 1955, the *New York Times* called him "the champion of Europeanization," and this political and cultural project "the great intellectual conflict of the century, which Spain has yet to settle." The editorial eulogy, published on October 20, regards Ortega "a failure in the sense that Spain is still outside of Europe," though the text concludes with optimistic assurance that the philosopher's cherished undertaking would eventually succeed. The piece provoked the objections of José M. de Areilza, the Spanish ambassador to the United States, who in a public letter to the *Times* condemns what he terms the editorialist's "wishful thinking" and the insistence on the notion that Spain is "more or less . . . an Arab country, which, by the way, is not an insult, but an honor" ("Spain's Place in Europe," October 25, 1955). The letter reflects Ortega's controversial status in Franco's Spain. Much to the perplexity of his exiled disciples and friends, who felt betrayed, Ortega frequently returned to Spain starting in the mid-1940s, splitting his time between Lisbon and Madrid. Notoriously, he engaged in a number of public activities (such as lectures and private courses), although he refused to publish in Spain's regime-controlled press.[6] Though the Spanish ambassador had words of praise for Ortega after the philosopher's death, Areilza's letter also went as far as positing a causal relationship between Ortega's Europeanist passion and the most tragic episode in Spain's recent history. According to Areilza, Ortega "expressly recommended the steps to be taken to make of our nation a member of Europe. The result was a terrible catastrophe which ended in a civil war that cost us a million casualties and irreparable loss, both cultural and material." Ortega, Areilza

asserted, "was the first to confess publicly his mistake."[7] The ambassador's distortions evidence the regime's attitude toward its critics (Ortega among them) and the issue of Europeanization.

In Madrid, university students protested the government's manipulation of the facts of Ortega's death (which alleged that the lifelong "a-Catholic" had repented in his last moments) and his public persona. Their homage to the man they called "absent master" was the first in a series of escalating activities opposing the regime. Often considered the first major challenge to the dictatorship, those actions culminated in the crisis of February 1956: following several low-profile initiatives such as the issuing of manifestos and petitions by opposition students and the subsequent clashes between them and their pro-regime counterparts, the government declared a state of national emergency. The authorities closed the university temporarily, dismissed a few top-ranking officials (including two ministers) who were considered too lenient, and arrested students and intellectuals who had been peacefully involved in the protests (Abellán, *Ortega* 211–65). The dictatorship presented the rebellion as the result of a communist plot, but in fact some of the detainees were former fascists who had become disenchanted with the regime.

Foremost among them was the writer and political activist Dionisio Ridruejo (1912–1975). In his youth, Ridruejo had been a devoted member of the Falange and one of the most prominent cultural administrators of Franco's new state. He participated in the civil war as chief of propaganda for the nationalists, and later, acting upon his conviction that "el fascismo podía representar el modelo de una Europa racional" (*Escrito* 15) [fascism could represent the model of a rational Europe], he served as a volunteer in the Blue Division, the Spanish army corps that fought alongside the Germans on the Eastern Front. This experience, which confronted him with the less idealistic aspects of war, along with his growing disappointment with Franco's pragmatic discounting of the Falange's principles after the Axis defeat, prompted Ridruejo's evolution toward liberal positions whose core values included a different sort of Europeanism. During his time as a preeminent fascist, his criticisms of the regime were largely excused as an idealistic veteran's disillusionment with policies that had moved away from the Falange's plans for revolution. The indulgence the government showed Ridruejo diminished as his embrace of democracy became increasingly apparent, especially after his stay in Italy between 1948 and 1951. As Jordi Gracia has noted, by then a few Falangistas had realized that there was no room for their fascist creed in a Europe that was quickly changing ("Opti-

mismo" 223). As a public intellectual, Ridruejo's path toward democratic realignment included advocating for the symbolic rescue of a few eminent Republican figures such as Antonio Machado, Unamuno, and Ortega. Though these authors had been demonized by the Franco regime's most reactionary followers, Ridruejo argued that the Spain emerging in the postwar period could not afford to dismiss their contributions, at least not those that were less controversial in the dictatorship's eyes. He claimed that to analyze and overcome the challenges facing the nation, some understanding of the antagonists' positions was necessary (Ridruejo, "Excluyentes y comprensivos"). This selective recovery embraced the controversial Ortega, whose seventieth birthday Ridruejo celebrated with an article that won the Mariano de Cavia journalism award. Even though he distanced himself from Ortega's "insensibilidad" [insensitivity] regarding religiosity and from the philosopher's "repugnancia" [disgust] for the revolt of the masses—a phenomenon arguably parallel to the Falange's revolution—Ridruejo called for Ortega to be recognized as the great master/teacher of modern Spain. The thinker and cultural catalyst had held this role to such an extent, Ridruejo claimed, that "nuestro siglo XX se llama Ortega y Gasset" [our twentieth century is called Ortega y Gasset] ("En los setenta" 237–38).

Following the example that Ortega had set in a very different context half a century earlier, Ridruejo turned his attention to Europe as the solution for Spain's stagnation. Yet Ortega had envisioned Europe primarily as a model of cultural and scientific advancement, while for the former fascist it represented, above all, political freedom. In his 1960 essay "La vida cultural española y la problemática europeísta" [Spanish cultural life and the Europeanist issue], Ridruejo invokes Ortega at the beginning and at the end decries the Franco regime's dogmatic attempts to purge Spain of any trace of modern thought. Such efforts are pointless, claims Ridruejo: government control of cultural institutions does not impede the growth of an alternative body of thought capable of sustaining the country's intellectual needs, something that dogmatic, regime-supported scholasticism could never achieve. Moreover, such control does not preclude discrepant currents that, working discretely or clandestinely from a variety of artistic and scientific approaches, would reject the regime's isolating nationalism.

The focus of those critical artists and intellectuals was, in fact, the new Europe, where they hoped to find the remedy for Spain's shortcomings. Yet Ridruejo was wary and noted, "Encontrarse con una Europa a la defensiva, cerrada en sí misma o en un resentimiento de reina destronada, constituiría para estos españoles—habitantes del sueño común de un

mundo transformado para la libertad—la más cruel de las decepciones" ("La vida cultural" 75) [Encountering a Europe on the defensive, closed in on itself or on a resentment like that of a dethroned queen, would be, for these Spaniards—the inhabitants of the shared dream of a world transformed in the name of freedom—the cruelest of disappointments]. Nevertheless, Ridruejo was among those with high hopes for the unified region's potential role in Spain's political evolution. Starting in the mid-1950s, many activists and scholars critical of the regime coalesced around Europeanist topics and initiatives, as was the case with socialist University of Salamanca professor (and years later, post-Franco, mayor of Madrid) Enrique Tierno Galván and his Asociación por la Unidad Funcional de Europa [Association for the Functional Unity of Europe] (Crespo MacLennan 51). Yet as they turned toward Europe, which was beginning to integrate as the Cold War heated up, they did so with caution for several reasons: the preceding fascist unification project, which Ridruejo had first participated in and later abhorred; communist interests, which many considered a danger comparable to fascism; and the intransigence of Franco's regime, which became a very tangible threat for the most conspicuous of its critics (Tierno Galván, for instance, was forced into exile in 1960). Many of those activities were funded by the Paris-based Fondation pour une Entraide Intellectuelle Européenne [Foundation for European Intellectual Cooperation] and its parent organization, the Congress for Cultural Freedom (CCF). The CCF was the CIA's main covert operation to fight communism in intellectual circles, unbeknownst to the majority of those who enjoyed the organization's generous support into the mid-1960s (Berghahn 241–49; Glondys).

Ridruejo and others who participated in those semi-clandestine initiatives in Spain had an important role in the key event that demonstrated the different pro-democracy Spanish forces' reconciliation and their unified commitment to the Europeanist cause: in June 1962, 118 Spaniards (eighty of them exiles) met in Munich for the fourth congress of the European Movement.[8] There were representatives from most of the segments opposing the Francoist regime, from monarchists and social-democrats to Basque nationalists. The most noted absentees were the communists, who had not been invited (they nevertheless approved of the meeting's goal, although they were against the idea of the European Community). For the first time since the end of the civil war, former political enemies, such as the conservative José María Gil-Robles and the socialist Rodolfo Llopis, asserted their agreement on the direction that Spain should follow. The Spanish delegates drafted a resolution demanding that their country

peacefully transition to a fully democratic state before being considered for any closer association with "Europe"; they called for the creation of truly representative institutions and respect for human rights. Salvador de Madariaga, the internationally prestigious patriarch of Spanish Europeanism, presented the document, which the European Movement as a whole approved enthusiastically. The resolution posed an additional obstacle to the Franco regime's aspirations with respect to Europe after isolationism had proved economically unsustainable.

The dictatorship's reaction against the Munich meeting participants was expeditious and harsh. Depicted as traitors to the homeland, even as agents of the Antichrist, most of the delegates who returned to Spain were arrested, forced into exile, or sent to Fuerteventura (the same island where Primo de Rivera's dictatorship had marooned Unamuno in 1924, as seen in Chapter 1). The more public side of Franco's backlash included anti-European diatribes that echoed the isolationism of earlier times. Such nationalistic discourse contradicted the initiatives that his own officials had been leading since the late 1950s with the goal of establishing ties with the nascent European community. The dictatorship's reprisal against the Munich meeting attendees provoked censure from political parties and institutions throughout Western Europe, which demanded that Spain not be accepted into the EEC until it became a democratic country. It is important to note that, despite Franco's invective, by then "Europe" had become instrumental not only for the democratic opposition but also for the regime, which wished to partake in the strong economic growth that the EEC members were enjoying. In fact, in February 1962, just a few weeks before the Munich meeting, Franco's government had petitioned to begin negotiating Spain's admission, but the organization had refused, arguing that dictatorships would not be allowed.

Lettered Men, Sex, and the Threat of Gendered Europe

The EEC's refusal did not prevent other connections between Spain and Europe that, though they did not include institutional exchanges, nevertheless combined a variety of social, political, and creative elements. As Ridruejo remarked in "La vida cultural española," literature and other cultural manifestations managed to transcend the limits set by the regime as well as the isolation Spain seemed destined to as long it remained under Francoist rule. Yet, while Ridruejo and others of his generation mulled over what

made Spain different from the rest of the West, considering this topic from a charged perspective as those who had fought in the war, some younger writers were eager to break away from what they considered the suffocating nationalism of those debates, and explored less obviously political aspects of Europeanism. A few of these latter authors celebrated the opportunities for social oxygenation that Europeanism offered by emphasizing high culture; others eyed the possibility of a massive influx of tourists with a mixture of anticipation and apprehension. Common to all was a sense of inadequacy compared with Europe, an entity construed as a female other, alternatively idealized and sexualized, which elicited contradictory reactions. Fantasies of erotic contact or domination coexisted with fears of diminished male power and national identity. Facing a process of continental integration, the "phallocentric logic of the nation state" (Linke 221) is one of the structures subject, at least potentially, to revision.

As writers such as Pere Gimferrer, Guillermo Carnero, Antonio Colinas, or Leopoldo María Panero emerged in the mid-1960s, they mined icons of European history as the apex of high culture—and Spain's conflictive relationship to it—as a way of renewing the country's literary panorama. Their works offered an alternative both to the cultural dogmatism of the dictatorship and to the tired emancipatory discourse of many opposition writers whose primary goal was to denounce political oppression. When a very young Pere Gimferrer (b. 1945) wrote his influential *Arde el mar* [Sea afire], which caused a sensation on the country's poetry scene in 1966, prominent older authors had recently published volumes that explicitly conjured Spain's political reality. Gabriel Celaya's *Episodios nacionales* [National episodes], from 1962, and Blas de Otero's *Que trata de España* [On Spain], from 1964, are typical examples of the engaged literature being written at the time, which, from a Marxist position, lauded the resilience of the common people and the dignity of their homeland. In contrast, Gimferrer's book showcases a more expansive cultural space and a less conspicuous political commitment. Most of the poems in *Arde el mar* make explicit reference to different places in Europe, including Venice, Montreux, D'Annunzio's villa on the shores of Lake Garda, and Geneva, locations that Gimferrer expressly associates with artistic and literary figures. However, his imaginary pilgrimages to the continent are not mere escapism in response to Spain's grim circumstances at the time; rather, they emphasize that his country's cultural history is interwoven more profoundly with Europe's than it might seem because of the Franco regime's political exclusion. Gimferrer overcomes both Francoist isolationism and anti-Francoist navel-

gazing by turning his eyes to an idealized Europe, which he identifies as the model for a renewed Spanish culture that aspires to a notion of "normality" attendant to the social and artistic trends prevalent beyond the Pyrenees (more on the limitations of this vision in Chapter 3).

Affected melancholy is the prevailing tone of *Arde el mar*, in which the lyric "I" contemplates itself with a mixture of irony and delight in a decadent landscape of European sophistication that is the antithesis of dull Spain, which hardly appears in the book. From the first lines of the opening poem, "Mazurka en este día" [Mazurka on this day], Gimferrer points to the contrast between Spanish and European circumstances, employing a subtle humor that sheds the anguish so characteristic of his predecessors' discourse on the nation yet remains aware of Spain's plight. At first glance, however, the references seem greatly removed from the author's immediate context.

> Vellido Dolfos mató al rey
> a las puertas de Zamora.
> Tres veces la corneja en el camino, y casi
> color tierra las uñas sobre la barbacana,
> desmochadas, oh légamo, barbas, barbas, Vellido
> como un simio de mármol más que un fauno en Castilla,
> no en Florencia de príncipes, brocado y muslos tibios.
> ¡Trompetas del poniente! (105)
>
> [Vellido Dolfos killed the king
> at the gates of Zamora.
> Three times the crow on the road, nearly
> earth-colored the fingernails on the barbican,
> torn out, oh lode, beards, beards, Vellido
> more like a marble ape than a faun in Castile,
> not in the Florence of princes, brocade, and tepid thighs.
> Trumpets of the West!]

The historical remove of the episode alluded to in the poem helped Gimferrer, on the one hand, elude censorship and, on the other, engage readers' emotions without an overt display of feeling. The first lines evoke a scene from nine centuries ago: King Sancho II's murder at the hands of the nobleman Vellido Dolfos. Medieval ballads tell the story of how Sancho, disgruntled by his father Ferdinand's dying wish to leave Zamora to his

sister Urraca, lay siege to the city. Dolfos, Urraca's partisan, pretended to switch sides to gain Sancho's confidence and then killed him. Gimferrer revisits the story, fashioning a kingdom immersed in a fratricidal conflict whose protagonists acquire grotesque traits through both ethopoeia (duplicity, cruelty, and disgrace taint all those involved, especially Dolfos) and prosopography: the unkempt nails and body hair are stressed to the point that the pun between "Vellido" and "velludo" [hairy] elicits the association between the murderer and an ape. (More obvious are the resonances between "the crow on the road" and Urraca [magpie]). Contrasting with the rough landscape wracked by low passions, Gimferrer inserts the flash of an idealized Florence, a city that embodies refinement and, in general, serves as an antithesis to medieval Castile—and to the contemporary context of the rest of the piece (the University of Barcelona), a setting that appears to have no explicit connection with the previous one other than water imagery of the river flowing past the besieged city and the rain falling in the school courtyard. Florence (of "tepid thighs") and the other European locations in the book—places with a lavish, even unbearable appeal (in a different poem, one of the characters "en Venecia de belleza murió" (108) [died of beauty in Venice])—are presented as the sensual opposite of Franco's Spain, a barren land still suffering the effects of a sordid civil war.

Other authors entering the literary scene in the 1960s explored how sensuousness and antagonism articulated the relations between Spain and the rest of Europe. They regarded a metaphorical "possession" of the continent as an adequate alternative to acceptance or belonging, which seemed out of reach as long as their nation continued to be under Franco's rule. Antonio Colinas's (b. 1946) poem "Vamos, vamos a Europa" [Come on, on to Europe], included in *Sepulcro en Tarquinia* [Tomb in Tarquinia], a book that earned the Criticism Prize in 1975, presents a voyage of double initiation: the pleasure of frenetic cultural discovery on the continent overlapping with engagement in erotic experience. The poem's momentum is produced by the use of the first-person plural, although the characters' precise identities are never specified beyond their being a group hungry for European experiences:

> y dijimos: vamos, vamos a Europa,
> alta Ginebra de cristal muy grueso,
> cafetines de piedra con luz roja, oh Calvino,
> y cuánto lago y catedral, Friburgo, Salisburgo,
> Nietzsche pasea loco por los bosques de Sils,

yo creo que está un poco desgastado
el disco de París, pero sus oros . . .
y dijimos: más lejos, aunque arda
la piel, caía la lluvia en Boulogne,
entre dos anarquistas la irlandesa
cantaba, los aviones sobre los chorreantes
prados de Welwyns Gardens, un cielo de cerveza,
Siena, Siena, tus rizos de doncella
y el labio suave como oliva,
se levanta la noche con magnolias
sobre los lupanares de Pompei,
deprisa, llegaremos aún a tiempo
de tocarle los pechos a la noche griega (102)

[and we said: come on, on to Europe,
high Geneva of thickest glass,
stone cafés with red lights, oh Calvin,
so much lake and cathedral, Freiburg, Salzburg,
Nietzsche strolls mad through the forest of Sils,
and I think it's a little stale,
that Parisian music, but its gold . . .
and we said: farther, though our skin is
on fire, rain fell in Boulogne,
between two anarchists the Irish woman
sang, airplanes over the wet
meadows of Welwyn Gardens, a sky of beer,
Siena, Siena, your maiden locks
and your lip soft as olive,
the night rising with magnolias
over the brothels of Pompeii,
quick, we're still in time
to touch the breasts of the Greek night]

The fabled Grand Tour (the protracted European journey that wealthy young men, particularly English and German, made as part of their education) is succinctly rewritten in Colinas's verses. The decision to go on tour appears in medias res, with the opening in a lowercase letter, as if it were the result of a fit rather than of careful planning. The Spanish language points to a reversal in the direction of the classic initiation trip: this time, it

is young southerners who travel north in search of learning and adventure. The sexual dimension of the trip, often silenced in Grand Tour accounts, is also apparent in the poem. As Ian Littlewood has pointed out, the experience of the Grand Tour had "the intertwined appeal of the exotic and the erotic" (156). Colinas's poem depicts a hasty possession of the continent; the resonances of the classic myth of the rape of Europa are in line with the author's affinities, as he frequently draws from Greco-Roman sources. The group's intense desire to enjoy the continent's delights goes far beyond intellectual curiosity (represented by the mention of sober John Calvin): they are driven by sensuality, their urgency stressed by the prominence of red and gold hues. As if pointing to this Dionysian aspect, there is a glimpse of the isolated figure of Nietzsche, whose spirit roams the Central European forests; what once was wild is swallowed up in a continent where few places remain untouched by culture. The pleasures of body and spirit commingle in the passionate exploration of a region where even places of ill repute—such as a brothel—are ennobled by the passage of history. Several cities are merely listed, appearing as flashes evoking refinement but also increasing the confusion and vertigo of the experience. The journey's feverish nature is emphasized through rhythm: the ellipses merely hint at the sexual episodes, while the commas give just enough pause for breath to keep going forward. The re-creation of the passionate initiation rite concludes with the travelers approaching a feminized Greece, Europe's *alma mater* (nourishing mother), while the omission of a final period suggests their undertaking is not over.[9]

For some young Spanish writers eager to go beyond their homeland's stifled cultural landscape, high culture may have provided a symbolic link with an idealized Europe bounteous with both intellectual and sensual pleasures. For a majority of citizens, however, the most visible of the emerging connections that broke the institutional stalemate between unifying Europe and Francoist Spain was mass tourism—a more prosaic phenomenon, yet one that was also considered a sensuous disruption of the prudish normality imposed by the dictatorship. From the late 1950s on, millions of visitors from countries such as France, Germany, Sweden, and the United Kingdom flocked to Spain to vacation on its beaches. As historian Sasha Pack points out, tourism "was a form of engagement with democratic Europe, where political pressures prevented close high-level ties to the Franco regime" (11). Pack has characterized the arrival of tourists as "Europe's peaceful invasion" of Spain. As he argues, European tourists "represented the hallmarks of postwar European civilization—consumer entitlement,

transnational mobility, efficiency, comfort, and permissiveness. . . . They brought with them the fashions and tastes of their time, frivolity, and relaxed sexual attitudes" (1). Most of them were probably unaware of the consequential effects their presence would have on their hosts. On a very different scale, and with enormously dissimilar consequences, their arrival supplanted the anticipated Allied march on Franco's territory after World War II that Republicans such as exile Max Aub had awaited to no avail. Moreover, the new type of "invasion" that mass tourism represented was a double-edged sword. On the one side, tourism indirectly supported the dictatorship by contributing decisively to financing the country's development (which, years after the civil war, had largely replaced it as a staple in the efforts to justify Francoism) while quietly acquiescing to its authoritarian practices. On the other, the habits of the visitors and their (real or imagined) interactions with Spaniards challenged the suffocating moral climate established by the National-Catholic regime.

The most notable aspect of the so-called "invasion"—a term that itself reveals the anxieties provoked by the new phenomenon—was the arrival of female tourists, whose presence troubled many, not only those who abided by the staunchly Catholic official guidelines on public decency. The literary treatment of relationships between male Spanish characters and female non-Spanish (European) characters is indicative of the extent to which some authors had internalized, and helped reproduce, the dictatorship's discourse on Spain's identitary "difference" from the rest of the West. The Franco regime emphasized that difference (with roots in foreign and domestic prejudice) to justify its own existence. From romantic-era stereotypes about Spain's orientalist allure to dicta about its citizens' incapacity for achieving orderly self-governance, an array of notions emphasizing the country's eccentricity vis-à-vis Europe were used to validate National-Catholic authoritarianism. The dictatorship also used otherness as a promotional tool for tourism: "Spain is different" was the slogan chosen for the hospitality industry.

Encounters between European women and local men are the main topic of a large number of works from the 1960s and 1970s that reveal concerns about the alleged threats to Spain's national identity posed by a Europeanization process that went beyond institutional politics. In more or less open terms, many saw this identity as being inextricably linked to the traditional forms of gender relations that prevailed during the dictatorship and to the normative masculinity those forms (re)produced. Thus, in a number of these texts, female tourists, especially those traveling alone, appear

as a menacing force to be wary of, rather than as a fresh, liberating presence whose customs contravene moral strictures. The most sophisticated of these works display high degrees of self-awareness regarding Spain's status within Europe, which is construed as a feminized symbolic and political space that Spanish men cannot be accepted in, possess, or control. Ultimately, these texts point to fears related to an anticipation of men's diminishing authority in a post-Franco, Europeanized Spanish society.[10]

Authors from both ends of the political spectrum reacted uneasily to the arrival of "las suecas" [the Swedish women], a tag used to refer indiscriminately to all foreign female tourists, whose presence became a topic of both popular discussion and literary treatment—primarily because even in academic studies it is often assumed that they visited Spain with the aim of having casual sex with local men (Godsland 229). In a letter dated March 12, 1963, the novelist and future Nobel Prize winner Camilo José Cela told the exiled Max Aub of his plans to approach a northern European neighbor whom he had noticed next to his Palma de Mallorca house, "una criaturita que está como un tren y que *me enseña* las tetas, desde su alto tejado, todas las mañanas a las 9. ¡Oh, el orden sueco, las mozas suecas, la gimnasia sueca!" (625–26; emphasis added) [a really hot little creature who *shows me* her tits from her roof every morning at nine o'clock. Oh, Swedish order, Swedish girls, Swedish gymnastics!]. Most of the numerous works dealing with informal (non-institutional) exchanges between Spaniards and citizens of other European countries at the time were not much more profound than Cela's presumptuous, ribald lines. A majority were films of zero artistic achievement yet significant commercial success; for instance, director Pedro Lazaga was responsible for works such as *El turismo es un gran invento* (1968) [Tourism is a great invention], *Verano 70* (1969) [Summer 70], and *Tres suecas para tres Rodríguez* (1975) [Three Swedish women for three Rodríguezes]. Dozens of comedies in this vein exploited the disjunctions between the country's Catholic and authoritarian rule, the social changes leading toward an urban consumer society, and the sexual drive of common Spanish men in the tide of tourism that "las suecas" embodied. After the womanizers are repeatedly ridiculed, the reactionary order is restored and celebrated with their marriage to decent, homely Spanish wives who have nothing to do with the Europeans, who are depicted as brainless temptresses.

Others in the film industry looked at the issue in more nuanced ways. The most celebrated screenwriter in the history of Spanish cinema, Rafael

Azcona (1926–2008), was also the author of *Los europeos* [The Europeans], published in 1960, a finely crafted novel that analyzes the effects of tourism at a moment when the vacationing foreigners' influence was just starting to be felt beyond their coastal destinations. The novel tells the story of Antonio, a spoiled rich kid, and Miguel, a low-level employee of Antonio's father, two *madrileños* in their late twenties or early thirties who spend a long summer vacation on the island of Ibiza. As Antonio attempts to convince his reluctant friend to join him, he assures him that on Ibiza "nos espera Europa. ¡Europa en bikini, Miguelito! . . . suecas, francesas, alemanas, italianas . . ." (18) [Europe awaits us. Europe in a bikini, Miguelito! . . . Women from Sweden, France, Germany, Italy . . .]. Even before meeting them, Antonio swears that they are "enloquecidas por el fuego del sol y de los hombres de España" (18) [crazed by the fire of Spain's sun and men]. Their trip offers the promise of cheap leisure and casual sex. Despite their social ineptness, Antonio and Miguel succeed at meeting women, both Spanish and foreign. Although initially the two friends regard those women who are looking for more than just sex as a nuisance, Miguel soon finds himself attached to Odette, a sensible, politically aware, hard-working young Parisian. Rather hastily, he declares his love for her and proposes that they to go to Madrid together, which she rejects. Things get complicated when Odette becomes pregnant and Miguel reacts pettily, trying to avoid his share of responsibility by invoking the very moral strictures that he had deplored when he perceived them as an intolerable limitation on his freedom. After overcoming his own hesitations, he convinces Odette to go with him to Barcelona for a clandestine abortion. When a friend there asks Miguel how Odette is feeling, he replies, "Peor lo estoy pasando yo . . . Ella, con llorar y decir que no quiere molestarme . . . Me he empeñado para sacar dinero, he perdido tres kilos, me ha reventado las vacaciones y, ahora, aquí me tienes, con el corazón en la boca . . . Las extranjeras . . . Todo bicho viviente diciendo que son lo mejor del mundo, y mira . . ." (216) [I am doing way worse than she is . . . She just cries and says that she doesn't want to bother me . . . I've had to borrow money, I've lost three kilos, she's ruined my vacation, and now here I am, worried sick . . . Foreign women . . . Everyone says they're the best thing in the whole world, and look . . .]. After the procedure is carried out successfully, they spend a couple more days touring the city, much to the agony of Miguel, who cannot wait for Odette to leave. In the novel's final scene, as soon as she boards the train to Paris, Miguel tears up the piece of paper where she has written down her address so that he can keep in touch

and visit her, as he has promised to do repeatedly, and contemplates the idea of going back to Ibiza, where Antonio awaits him among newly arrived European women.

Azcona's novel presents a stark contrast between the sensibility of European women (as embodied mainly in Odette) and their male Spanish counterparts, who prove incapable of empathy and solidarity as well as utterly unprepared for gender equality. Their contacts with the foreign women—who are much closer to the ideal of equality than the locals are—end up exposing these men's most provincial and selfish sides. Their attitudes prove to be well adjusted to the hypocrisy of Francoist society regarding relationships between men and women in general and sexual mores in particular. Arguably one of the best examples of critical realism of the period, Azcona's exploration of the petty morals of common Spaniards and their unfavorable contrast with more liberated Europeans was unacceptable to the dictatorship, leading to the book's unusual publication and reception. As Juan A. Ríos Carratalá points out, the novel was published semi-clandestinely by Fernando Baeza, the son of an exiled writer, who also had close ties to Ridruejo and the students who had led the 1956 protests discussed earlier in this chapter (84). To avoid censorship, Baeza falsely credited Paris as the novel's place of publication—which is fitting, given Azcona's portrayal of the freedom to be found on the other side of the Pyrenees. The snappy dialogue and the critical distance the narrator maintains helped make the text an artistic success, and it has held up well over the decades. In fact, Azcona published a new, barely modified version in 2000.

While Azcona's use of the masculine form for Spanish plural nouns raises questions about who the people referred to in the title *Los europeos* might be (Europeans in general, European men, or, in line with the author's distinctive irony, the male Spanish characters who prove to be hardly attuned to modern European attitudes), Francisco Umbral's *Las europeas* (1970) leaves little need for lucubration. In Umbral's novel, an unnamed male Spanish narrator rhapsodizes about his relationships with five women who have come to his country from different European nations to the north. He sees them as fugitives from an excessively rational, civilized land, in search of the primal authenticity that Spain, refreshingly un-European, can still offer them—and which they can enjoy most directly in the form of sex with him.

Umbral (1932–2007) was one of the most prolific and best-known authors in Spain starting in the 1960s, when he began his career as an esteemed

journalist, essayist, and novelist. In 2000 he was recognized with the Cervantes Prize, Spain's highest literary honor. As Shelley Godsland has remarked, from his early writings Umbral showed an interest in analyzing tourism, a phenomenon that he scorned. In her perceptive reading of *Las europeas*, Godsland asserts that the novel expresses "Umbral's attempts to gender his negative stance toward Spain's development as a holiday destination . . . and to overcome his own disempowerment within the political system that promoted tourism"—that is to say, Francoism (243). I would also add that the novel exemplifies a common attitude among Spanish male authors who anxiously identified Europeanization with a loss of Spanish identity and male authority.

Umbral's version of a Don Juan who negotiates between Spanish and European identities has some pedigree in twentieth-century Spanish literature. Jo Labanyi has studied how the myth of Don Juan was used in the first half of the century to articulate Spain's symbolic relationship with Europe. In Labanyi's reading, author Ernesto Giménez Caballero, for example, "takes up the figure of Don Juan as a revolutionary antidote to what he sees as a debilitating European courtly love tradition that places men in the service of women" (202) in his early fascist essays. In a much later text, his *Memorias de un dictador* (1979) [Memoirs of a dictator], Giménez Caballero recalls his days of European "discovery" while in Strasbourg in terms that relate Europeanization, nationalism, and sexuality. Although Giménez Caballero went there in the 1920s as a student to immerse himself in Germanic intellectualism, convinced that it could "save" Spain from its political predicaments, on certain occasions, he claims, "me acordaba que también tenía sangre castellana y a pesar de las ascesis a que estaba sometido no pude dejar de extasiarme con la mejor manifestación de Europa, las europeas" (38) [I remembered that I had Castilian blood also, and in spite of the asceticism imposed on me, I could not help seeking ecstasy with the best manifestation of Europe: European women]. It was also in Strasbourg that he met his Italian wife-to-be, a union that he understands as a carnal solution to the cultural problem of Spain's Europeanization: "al unirme a esa toscana criatura resolví de modo *visceral* lo que intelectualmente no hubiera sido posible: ¡el soñado *fermento europeico*!" (53; emphasis in the original) [by yoking myself to that Tuscan creature, I solved in a *visceral* way what would not have been possible intellectually: it was the dreamed-of *European ferment*!].

While Umbral's narrator is not quite the "fascist superman" (Labanyi 202) imagined by Giménez Caballero, in *Las europeas* the sex between the

Spanish narrator and his European lovers—whom he also depicts as "creatures" with animal traits—is similarly posed as a response to sociopolitical issues. In Umbral's novel, these issues are often presented as variants of the speculation on the relationships between nature, sex, imagination, and freedom that fed attempts at societal transformation in the West during the 1960s, epitomized by the events of 1968 in Paris and elsewhere.[11] Yet, while seemingly embracing the emancipatory ideals that animated those revolts, *Las europeas* is imbued with a reactionary spirit that presents Europe—in which feminism is advancing society toward greater gender equity—as a dangerous example for a Spain that is in obvious need of transformational models.

Umbral opens the novel with a quote from Herbert Marcuse, one of the main inspirers of the alternative social movements of the time, on the sexually repressive role of culture. Yet the novelist's take on the issue has a markedly nationalist approach that conflicts with Marcuse's more universalist propositions. While poets such as Gimferrer and Colinas celebrate high culture as a way to relate to Europe, and Azcona ignores it in his portrayal of the encounters between Spaniards and tourists, Umbral condemns European culture. On the one hand, following Marcuse, the narrator of *Las europeas* sees it as the fundament of an oppressive system that severs people from nature; on the other, he perceives it as a threat to the identity of Spain, one of the few places on the continent where one can still escape the reach of European culture because the country's isolation has preserved many of its "primal" qualities—among them, a patriarchal power structure. Thus, the sex in which Umbral's narrator and the European women engage is first presented as a liberating force for both parties, but ultimately reveals itself to be a form of local resistance against the Europeanizing wave that the visiting females embody.

The narrator justifies his womanizing as a way to get back in touch with what he calls "our first nature," which is being superseded by arts and literature. While he claims to be assisting his lovers in their struggle to free themselves from European rationalism (one example is Childe, a British girl who has run away to Spain to escape her overbearing father, a contributor to the *Encyclopedia Britannica*), his gaze and language repeatedly objectify and/or animalize the women, rendering them one more element of the coastal landscape favored by vacationers, or, more often, a prey for him to hunt. When referring to his French lover Jeanette, he takes her as a synecdoche of something else: "su cuerpo, la mujer, cualquier mujer, sí era, sí es naturaleza. Quizás, el último camino de vuelta a la naturaleza

que le queda a uno es el sexo. . . . [O]tra mujer, después de tanto tiempo, era como salir al campo después de una larga convalecencia de lecturas" (18–19) [her body, the woman, any woman, was, indeed is nature. Maybe the last of the available ways back to nature is sex. . . . [A]nother woman, after so long, was like going out to the countryside after a long convalescence spent reading]. As components of "nature," the singularity of his partners is negated; during sex, he cannot distinguish one from the other: "¿Qué mujer de idioma distante me huele a Europa en el desnudo de la noche?" (42) [Which foreign-tongued woman smells of Europe in the naked night?], he wonders. "Defining woman as that which is mired in nature," claims Stacey Alaimo, "thrusts woman outside the domain of human subjectivity, rationality, and agency" (2). All the diversity existing within the two elements of otherness that define Umbral's male narrator by opposition—women and Europe—collate as a single female body placed outside the *polis*.

In line with the narrator's constant focus on the women's physicality, any traces of intellect in them repel him. The Norwegian Bodil—who has a large body, a small head "como de ave" [like a bird's] and a voracious appetite—is "lista, *demasiado* lista" (109; emphasis added) [smart, *too* smart]; "una mujer demasiado inteligente" (112) [too intelligent a woman], he insists a few times. Part of his trouble with the women's capacity for independent thinking has to do with the possibility that they'll use the intimate knowledge of Spain they acquire under his guidance to judge his homeland as inferior, instead of enjoying what it has to offer at a more basic, sensory level. Bodil's glance at the Spaniards that she and her lover come across is "la mirada conmiserativa de Europa sobre una tribu oscura y alegre" (113–14) [Europe's patronizing gaze on a dark and joyful tribe]. In the narrator's interpretation, her critical stance tries to hide the real yearning of a modern, emancipated woman for the old order. In Europe, Bodil and the narrator's other lovers "han sufrido la intemperie de su libertad, de su independencia . . . las altas torres de la razón, la palabra y la norma" (52) [have suffered the inclemency of their own freedom, of their independence . . . the high towers of reason, logos, and law]. It should not be surprising, then, that he believes that Bodil "añoraba de alguna forma secreta y animal aquella vida vegetativa, matriarcal, antigua" (114) [in some secret and animal way, longed for that vegetative, matriarchal, ancient life]. For him, therein lies the deep reason behind the women's visits to his country: un-European Spain can still offer an existence unadulterated by modernity. However, according to Umbral's text, it is, alas, in danger of disappearing. The narrator, opposed to the loss of primitive, national

idiosyncrasy, uses sex to resist the advance of over-rationalistic Europe: through their carnal knowledge, he helps Hispanicize (and thus "save") the women who are both the envoys of modern Europe and its victims. The womanizer becomes the nation's first line of defense against the threat of "unnatural" uniformity that comes from the North and is most evidently manifest in the advance of women's rights.

The freedom and visibility that his European lovers enjoy are deeply troubling to Umbral's narrator, who tries to present the women as victims of the liberation movement that allows them, among other things, to travel however and wherever they wish. Such possibilities were greatly limited in Spain by the Franco regime's patriarchal regulations, which, for example, required that a woman get permission from her father or husband to be issued a passport. However, local women were challenging those laws and the mind-set behind them around the time that *Las europeas* was first published in 1970; they had created organizations that achieved some advances in Spanish women's legal status starting in the 1960s (Threlfall 36). Specific issues, such as women's visibility and the identification between women and nature (which Umbral spun in the ways we have just discussed) were two fundamental preoccupations of feminist artists such as the Catalan Olga L. Pijoan (1952–1997), who addressed both topics in her performance art piece *Herba* [Grass], from 1973. Pijoan's piece resulted in a black-and-white photographic sequence in which she is presented as a subject in opposition to nature, as Rocío de la Villa suggests (184). Similar concerns were addressed in two action pieces by another Catalan artist, Fina Miralles (b. 1950): *Traslacions: Dona-arbre* [Translations: Woman-tree], also from 1973, and *Relacions: Relació del cos amb elements naturals. El cos cobert de palla* [Relationships: Relationship of the body with natural elements. The body covered by straw], from 1975. Although noticed by a very small minority in comparison with the readership of Umbral's novel (which was reprinted several times over the course of the 1970s), the contributions of Pijoan and Miralles, along with those of many more Spanish artists and authors, effectively contested the reactionary message of *Las europeas* and other works that, sometimes under the cloak of progressive anti-Francoism, resisted the winds of change in gender relations blowing in from Europe. It is worth noting that the Treaty of Rome, considered the EU's founding document, introduced the principle of equal pay for men and women (Article 119); other regulations that followed have kept gender issues in the limelight.[12]

In the 1970s women's rights were seen as a "European visa" that Spaniards needed to obtain to be able to leave authoritarianism behind, as

Pamela B. Radcliff has noted (53). Through diverse forms of activism that included, very importantly, artistic and literary expression, feminists inside and outside Spain paved the way for the nation's acceptance into the European Community. Historians of feminism in Spain have remarked that, although the movement dealt with the issue of Spain's European integration only insofar as it related to feminists' two main concerns (women's rights and democratization), the movement was nevertheless "clave para la rápida europeización de España" (Threlfall 44) [key to Spain's rapid Europeanization]. The connection between women's emancipation and Europeanization is also at the heart of some of the qualms of authors such as Umbral, who resisted a process that would transform the gender structures that had largely defined traditional Spain.

PART TWO

Examining the Union from Within

3

Unanimity in Question

The Un-debate: Europeanization in Spain's Postauthoritarian State of Culture

The discourse in favor of fully incorporating Spain into an increasingly united Europe endures as one of the most solid components of the nation's dominant narrative at work since the restoration of democracy in the 1970s. As if putting an end to the long history of eccentricity that Francisco Franco's dictatorship had prolonged, Spain's formal inclusion in the European Community in 1985 was taken as the most visible sign that the nation had become a "normal" one within the West. That conception of "normality" (which is currently under scrutiny) assumed a central role in the new regime. The democratic establishment presented the Europeanization goal as the nation's historical destiny rather than the result of political choice and negotiations. In the push to reach the coveted status of "normal European nation" expeditiously, social agents hardly debated Spain's necessary concessions. In fact, as they dealt with and later participated in the transnational European institutions, Spanish political actors simultaneously adopted and contributed to creating a framework whose representativeness critics called into question, complaining of a "democracy deficit."

Although democratic opposition to the dictatorship had posited Europeanization as an indispensable factor in the country's social and political transformation since the 1960s, that discourse did not become hegemonic until the 1980s. Since then, two important elements have been effaced from the narrative of Spain's postauthoritarian development: first, the cleavage between the political and cultural elites, who were almost unanimously for European integration, and all those who were not as persuaded by it; second, the need to qualify the apparent consensus among those elites, since substantial debates on the issue were scarce and arguments critical of Europeanization were largely ignored. In Parliament, the unanimity seen

in votes on joining the EC obliterated the plurality of perspectives evident in the discussions that did take place. Within the comparatively more heterogeneous cultural realm, voices that disrupted the ideal of Europe or of Europeanized Spain went almost unnoticed.

This erasure is a salient example of what critics such as Luisa Elena Delgado, Amador Fernández-Savater, and Guillem Martínez (following mainly the work of Jacques Rancière) have referred to as Spain's "consensual democracy" or "post-democracy."[1] Put simply, this political order, which is not exclusive to Spain, renders invisible a portion of the citizenry (which Rancière, evoking its Greek origins, calls *demos*). Consequently, "post-democracy" curtails participation and broadly open, inclusive debate. It also privileges formal procedures leading to consent rather than the confrontation of diverging projects. Since stability is the primary value, litigiousness tends to be eradicated by silencing those whose positions could threaten the nation's cohesion and unity of purpose—namely, by denying them the legitimacy to join the discussion and restricting the issues that are deemed subject to deliberation. Questioning the logic of "normality" or "consensus" is perceived as an invitation to political uncertainty and, ultimately, the system's failure. In Spain's case, that danger had a frightening precedent in the polarization that had led to the civil war, the ultimate systemic breakdown whose recurrence had to be conjured as the nation reinvented itself following Franco's death.

One of the fundamental pillars of the consensual democracy that emerged in Spain after the end of the dictatorship was the discourse that identified EU membership with political and societal normality. This association derived from the sanctified position that "Europe" occupied in the hegemonic national narrative, appearing along with other prevailing notions upheld by the new regime, such as the cohesion reflected in the administrative configuration of the territory (composed of "autonomous communities") and the type of government (parliamentary monarchy). Whereas Spain's continued membership in NATO, another essential foreign policy matter, was hotly debated in the first half of the 1980s, "Europe" remained a nonissue—this even though membership in the European Community was much more consequential for Spaniards' daily life.[2] The consensus was that there was no choice: joining the EC was a necessary step for the nation to consolidate its assimilation within the West. For the cultural and political mainstream, healthy political advancement was inextricable from that involvement. Adherence to the continental partnership represented a key measure in preventing Spain's sliding back toward

authoritarianism and in producing economic effects that liberal democrats considered undesirable.

Initially, a liberal notion of "Europe," and subsequently its various institutional embodiments, became basic referents for the political elites who were shaping the system that had replaced the dictatorship, yet the model was not totally exemplary. Paradoxically, some characteristics of the EU's development may have helped foster the faults critics have noted in the form of democracy that was established after Franco's death. Andreas Follesdal and Simon Hix have summarized the leading academic analyses of the so-called "democratic deficit" marring European integration: scholars have found that the process has meant "a decrease in the power of national parliaments and an increase in the power of executives," associated with a general "decline in the power of parliamentary institutions." This problem is exacerbated by the absence of a "genuine electoral contest to determine the make-up of 'government' at the European level," which adds to the distance that separates EU institutions from the citizenry. Finally, Follesdal and Hix claim, all of the above allows the adoption of "policies that are not supported by a majority of citizens in many or even most Member States" (534–37).

In Spain, however, critics such as political scientist Carlos Taibo object to the term "deficit," suggesting that it misleadingly points to shortcomings that could be satisfied with little effort, thus concealing the fact that these traits are, in fact, structural components of the Union ("La Unión Europea y sus mitos" 100), while economist Juan Francisco Martín Seco claims that the "democratic deficit" is the manifestation of an ideology that is suspicious of and therefore limits the citizenry's direct political participation, favoring formulaic representational processes as well as allegedly inexorable "technical" responses to political problems (22). What stands out is that the rise of consensual democracy in Spain overlapped with the increasing weight of that problematic "democratic deficit" present at the core of what served as the main beacon for the post-Franco transitional process, the EC. Their parallel developments are interlinked.

Franco's death in 1975 removed the main obstacle that had prevented Spain's acceptance into the EC since the government first applied for membership in 1962. Once parliamentary rule was formally established and political caveats were mostly overcome, economic considerations gained relevance in the negotiations. In the early 1980s, Spain was significantly poorer than the standing members (with the exception of Greece), yet it nearly matched the largest ones in area and population. Although the so-

cial model of the nations that formed the European Community was still regarded as a "third way," between US capitalism and Soviet communism, the EC had already started its march toward economic neoliberalism, and newcomers had to adapt to that paradigm. The EC was just emerging from a difficult decade marked by a weak identity within the Cold War context, the global oil crisis, and a sluggish economy, factors that slowed the integration project. In 1983, the lyrics of "Europa," one of the most celebrated songs of postpunk band Derribos Arias (1981–1987), stated that not only was the place too crowded, it was "la decadencia letal" [lethal decadence]. The uneasy musical setting, in addition to the ostensibly disharmonious singing of the band's leader Poch, suits the challenge that the lyrics posed to the conventional wisdom of the time, which presented "joining Europe" as the successful culmination of an inescapable historical process.

As a result of the hard accession negotiations, the Spanish administrations implemented a series of tough adjustments in areas such as agriculture, fisheries, and manufacturing. The social tensions produced by those reforms were justified as the price Spain had to pay to get up to speed with what the EC expected of and demanded from its newest members.[3] As officials were finalizing their negotiations for Spain's accession to the EC, a considerable portion of the citizenry remained unpersuaded of the benefits integration might generate. According to an opinion poll sponsored by the EC in 1985, 20 percent of Spaniards claimed to be against a political union of the European states, and an additional 57 percent declared that they would feel indifferent or relieved if they were told one day that the organization had been suddenly scrapped (Eurobarometer 24). Yet their views were not reflected in Parliament, which on June 26, 1985, voted unanimously in favor of joining the EC. The Treaty of Accession, signed with the greatest possible solemnity on June 12 in Madrid's Royal Palace, came into force in January of the following year. A long-standing aspiration had been fulfilled. Since in official rhetoric "Europe" was repeatedly reduced to the EC, being European had finally acquired a precise meaning: belonging to that organization.

Spain's European dream seemed to be turning into a tangible reality—almost as palpable as the granite monolith in the heart of Madrid that has commemorated the occasion ever since. Located in the Plaza de la Provincia (adjacent to the Plaza Mayor), opposite the palace that houses the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the monument is inscribed with a list of the nations that signed the treaty with the Kingdom of Spain (fig. 3.1). The setting of the treaty's signing ceremony and the inscription in the monolith—with

Figure 3.1. Monument commemorating the 1985 treaty by which Spain joined the European Community. Plaza de la Provincia, Madrid. Author photo.

its reference to the "Kingdom," a rarely used term even though it is part of the country's official name—ask us to credit the restored monarchy with having had an instrumental role in achieving the historical landmark. Connecting the realm of King Juan Carlos I to Europe, an idea that politicians insisted on identifying with democracy itself, was another step in reinforcing the legitimacy of the head of state, whom Franco had appointed as successor in 1969. Monarchy and EC-style Europeanization went hand in hand, becoming entrenched in the postauthoritarian political landscape without substantial debates.

The apparently undivided support of the post-Franco establishment for the dominant model of Europeanization did not accurately represent the diversity of the Spanish people's opinions regarding the process, but it still needs to be qualified. As political scientist Miguel Ángel Quintanilla Navarro observes, after the restoration of democracy, Spanish political parties defended a variety of approaches to the European integration project that were sometimes in contradiction. But their disagreements in Parliament repeatedly evaporated when the legislators cast their votes, which were

almost invariably and unanimously in favor of moving forward with the process as designed by Brussels. This superficial accord, which seldom translated into a divided Parliament or an effective critique of EU policies, sustained, in Quintanilla Navarro's words, "la falsa idea de que existe un único europeísmo español" (294) (the deceptive idea that there is just one Spanish form of Europeanism). Had the process truly been carried out under such unanimity, we would have to acknowledge the Spaniards as peerless (and rather naive) champions of Europeanization. In fact, however, entering the EC meant making difficult concessions. Among other major changes, membership entailed a loss of sovereignty, the adoption of the accumulated body of European law, and the often-painful implementation of changes to the country's productive structure. Despite those controversial issues, the political debate about such a consequential step was very limited. However, the Parliamentary votes imply unanimity, which tends to obscure even the minimal debate that took place.

Referring to that apparent harmony, Pablo Castellano (b. 1934), a prominent politician and renowned jurist who at the time was one of a few openly critical members within the ruling Socialist Party, promptly denounced the fact that "lo primero que llama la atención es la ausencia de debate previo . . . sobre la incorporación al Mercado Común; quizás hubiera exigido una profundización sobre su propia esencia y personalidad, sobre sus condicionamientos, y sus sometimientos" (150) [what is striking is, first, the absence of a prior debate . . . on joining the Common Market; perhaps it would have demanded a deep reflection about its essence and personality, its conditions, and its subjugations].[4] The lack of substantive debate on the political nature and goals of the European organization and Spain's role within it that Castellano lamented just a few weeks before the Iberian nations officially entered the EC on January 1, 1986, remained the norm for the next two decades. Major decisions regarding Europeanization, up to and including the 1992 ratification of the Maastricht Treaty (which brought about the creation of the EU and the euro), passed in Spain with very limited discussion. The adjustments required, especially those related to the economy, were hard on some groups (such as industrial workers, farmers, and small-business owners), but few can deny that in general terms the country experienced a positive transformation in the last quarter of the past century. Given the starting point, a fascist dictatorship, it would be shocking to claim otherwise. Obviously, this development cannot be ascribed exclusively to the impact of EC membership, although its effects were significant from both material and less tangible standpoints. In the

two decades following accession, Spain benefited greatly from the development ("structural cohesion") funds distributed from Brussels. Whether they were put to work in the best interest of the Spanish people—for instance, the decision to prioritize public works over education or welfare—is a different matter.

Spain's rushed integration produced "nuevos ricos, nuevos libres y nuevos europeos" (864) [nouveaux rich, new free, and new Europeans], according to Juan Goytisolo. In other words, instead of a robust democratic sphere, there emerged a top-down culture that "froze," rather than "solved," the main issues at stake after the end of the dictatorship, such as clashing nationalism and devolution, historical memory, and the nature of the state; chief among these issues, of course, was the monarchy itself (Fernández-Savater). I would add that Europeanization was promoted as a new form of identification that, on the surface, effaced the most visible undesirable traces of Francoism while preserving values such as political conformism and a specific view of economic relations (neoliberal free-market capitalism). The resilience of this narrative was seriously threatened only with the advent of the post-2007 Great Recession, as I shall explain in Chapter 5.

The issue of European integration was not raised for thorough debate, but rather presented as a phenomenon to be accepted—indeed, to be celebrated—as part of the nation's postauthoritarian reconfiguration. Civil society did little to balance that lack of debate, and the cultural arena played along. The mainstream cultural sphere, increasingly associated with (and dependent on) the public and private institutions that largely defined the new democracy's terms, rarely questioned the widespread enthusiasm about integration. Nevertheless, a few authors who cannot be considered marginal (since they often contributed to the most influential media outlets) advanced critiques that would become common in the twenty-first century, when a majority of citizens began seeing the Europeanist project's flaws. Starting in the 1980s, their works disrupted the ideal of Europe or of Europeanized Spain. Sometimes they did so in an oblique manner, or in language that was far from politically correct. For the most part, they were dismissed at the time as alternatives that were futilely swimming against the tide of history.

The advent of democracy has seen the increasing intermingling of the state and the intellectual and artistic fields as a result of the new political elite's conscious effort to make Spain an "Estado de Cultura" (State of Culture): one in which cultural development is considered one of the objectives or functions of government (Tajadura Tejada 89). The Ministry

of Culture was created in 1977, and the process of devolution led to the proliferation of autonomous (regional) official agencies with equivalent goals in their respective territories.[5] The 1978 Constitution proclaimed that "los poderes públicos promoverán y tutelarán el acceso a la cultura, a la que todos tienen derecho" (Article 44) [the administrations shall promote and safeguard access to culture, to which is everyone is entitled] and that "el Estado considerará el servicio de la cultura como deber y atribución esencial" (Article 149.2) [the state shall consider the service of culture as one of its essential duties and powers]. Notwithstanding the vagueness of the wording, terms such as "promover" and "tutelar" (respectively, "promoting" and "acting as guardian to something or someone") reveal the paternalistic spirit of the law.[6]

Following the Constitution's dictated mission, the different administrations created an extended network of infrastructures, institutions, and awards that had a large role in molding the conditions under which much of Spain's intellectual and artistic production developed over the years to come. Public museums, concert halls, cultural centers, publishing houses, university distinctions, national and local honors, and so on did not merely facilitate access to culture; they also set a framework that became essential in determining what was considered to be "culture" proper. According to critics such as Guillem Martínez and Noemí de Haro, this regularization was one of the central traits of the post-Franco Spanish cultural paradigm. Unsurprisingly, the model was not created from scratch—actually, it owed a great deal to an authoritarian understanding of culture's role in society. In his account of the relationship between the art world and the government since the 1950s, Jorge Luis Marzo highlights the centuries-old dependence of Spanish creators on national rulers' support and recognition. Starting in early modern times, monarchial and clerical attention to cultural production fostered what came to be known as the Spanish Tradition, which has remained essentially unaltered to this day. Marzo shows how the Franco regime sponsored artists, especially the so-called informalist painters (e.g., Antoni Tàpies, Antonio Saura), whose work government agencies presented abroad as a "modern" image of Spain without running the risk of politically inconvenient interpretations. "El arte español es el directo resultado del continuado esfuerzo del poder por promoverlo, acogerlo y darle sentido nacional" (14) [Spanish art is the direct result of power's continued effort to promote it, shelter it, and give it a nationalist meaning], Marzo concludes. What he attributes to the arts is largely applicable to the rest of the cultural sphere in the democratic period.

Often under public sponsorship, artists and intellectuals could rightly be seen as having their independence compromised. Governmental bounty was not without strings attached, as the State of Culture explicitly sought culture to serve as an instrument for national cohesion and stability. Other sources of patronage, such as large media corporations or financial institutions, also exerted their influence, which did not contradict the national consensus on culture's role. However, the State of Culture should not be understood as merely the result of a top-down patronage relationship. This cultural order rapidly became naturalized and assumed by artists, intellectuals, journalists, curators, and the like, many of whom were involved in its emergence and consolidation. To a large degree, they stopped to challenge and analyze—first and foremost, the nature and role of their own contributions. Their main task became smoothing the problematic aspects of social life, as Elena Delgado argues: "Para servir en esa función creadora de intereses comunes, la cultura deja de ser el terreno propicio para cuestionar y explorar tensiones, conflictividad, resistencias y complicidades, para dedicarse a la búsqueda de cohesión y sentido común, que es también sentido de estado" (*Nación singular* 116) [To fulfill that function of creating common interests, culture ceases to be auspicious ground for the questioning and exploring of tensions, conflict, resistance, and complicity, and instead it devotes itself to searching for cohesion and common sense, which is also a sense of state]. While some activities were overtly guided toward the dissemination of specific messages in favor of that view (one can think of art shows or publications devoted to the celebration at home and abroad of "national heroes" such as Joan Miró or Pablo Picasso), on many occasions their influence was subtler. The Spanish State of Culture largely determined which issues could be subjected to critical scrutiny by state-sponsored work (for example, the so-called "peripheral" nationalisms in Catalonia and the Basque Country) and which ones were off-limits. Europeanization was among the latter. Despite a certain degree of cooptation of the cultural arena, it is clear that many authors regarded participation in the most tangible embodiment of the European ideal ever known as a solution for the tired arguments about Spain's historical nature, debates that had kept vague notions of Europe in the spotlight. The insistence that the problematic relationship between Spain and Europe (again, a keyword for modernity) had been solved for good is yet another manifestation of a conception of democracy that fetishizes consensus and endorses cultural production that supports a certain notion of "normality."

This conception of normality arose as Spaniards began to assume that

they had successfully overcome the aberrations that had caused their country's apparent exclusion from the West for four centuries. The influential Catalan essayist Lluís Racionero (b. 1940) observed in his *España en Europa* [Spain in Europe], "Este año de 1986 se ha conseguido lo que pretendía la generación del 98: entrar en Europa, abrirnos a la cultura occidental, cerrar el sepulcro del Cid; normalizarnos, en una palabra" (129) [What the generation of 1898 intended has been accomplished in this year of 1986: entering Europe, opening ourselves to Western culture, locking the Cid's sepulcher—in a word, normalizing ourselves]. The subtitle of Racionero's book could not state this view any more clearly: by joining the EC, Spain had reached "el fin de la 'edad conflictiva'" [the end of the conflictive age] that had started "con las expulsiones, el imperialismo y la intransigencia del siglo XVI" (16) [with the expulsions, imperialism, and intransigence of the sixteenth century]. For Racionero, acceptance into the EC was the culmination of a process of "rectificaciones y transformaciones" [corrections and transformations] that started at the end of the nineteenth century with the well-intentioned yet reductive view of Unamuno and other authors (Ángel Ganivet, Azorín . . .). Racionero's views provide a good example of how the relatively young continental institution was given a fundamental symbolic role in the nation's historical development. In addition to being credited with establishing the material conditions that contributed to peace and growth on the continent after World War II, the European organization was now seen among Spaniards as a guarantor of stability. With that particular embodiment, "Europe" became a key factor in the configuration of a new period of political consensus and cultural acquiescence. Since Europe had served as a horizon in the agreements that founded democratic Spain, its advocates acted as if debating Europeanization would jeopardize the newly designed coexistence.

Yet there are some spots in the cultural discourse of the 1980s and 1990s that counter the harmonious image of Europeanization. They reveal its status not as a necessary passage on the only admissible path for the country, but as an element of the "dominant fiction" (Silverman) or "fantasy" (Delgado), a construct that became the sustaining narrative for the postauthoritarian Spanish polity. This fantasy had very real effects. It supported a certain image of the nation that worked for local consumption or self-fashioning as well as for those observing Spain from abroad. The discordant voices found little echo in a country that was eager to embrace its new status in the international arena, turning the page on its recent past and starting a new chapter as a nation that was finally free of the historical

handicaps that signaled its difference from its more developed neighbors. However, authors at both ends of the political spectrum identified the notion of Europe as potentially more controversial than many had suggested during the restoration of democracy. Their contributions problematized what appeared to be a neutral matter within the public debate, one that hardly needed discussion because it unfailingly generated unanimous agreement. Spain's accession to the EC did not put old debates to rest; rather, it awoke some demons and insecurities, which affected both the country's self-perception and the ideal that Europe represented.

Essences Threatened

The perception of Spain's exceptionality within the West waned rapidly after the end of the dictatorship and the country's accession to the EC. Yet dissolving inherited exceptionalism posed challenges to lingering notions of national identity. For Spain to be considered fully European, some differential aspects had to be erased from, or renegotiated within, the country's "dominant fiction" (Silverman 48). Not everyone was happy to discard images of Spain as unique within its context, to repudiate the memory of empire, or to give up on the idea of the virile, militaristic, and Catholic nation propagated by Francoism. These transmutations generated anxiety among members of the local intelligentsia, who worried that Europeanization might mean a loss of identity, especially at a time when clashing nationalisms within the country and the incipient trends of globalization and multiculturalism provoked growing insecurity regarding Spanishness.

As Spain was just about to join the EC, Julián Marías (1914–2005), one of Ortega y Gasset's most prominent disciples, warned of diluting national identity as a consequence of Europeanization. As he had been appointed a senator in the first term following the end of the dictatorship (during the constitutional process of 1977–1979) and was a highly respected public intellectual, his voice was influential when he published *España inteligible. Razón histórica de las Españas* [Intelligible Spain. Historical reason of the Spains (*sic*)] in 1985. In his essay, a sweeping meditation on two millennia of history, Marías distinguished two main phases in the nation's latest Europeanization process. The first, which took place at the beginning of the twentieth century, was in his opinion positive, though it had affected only the intellectual elites. Guided primarily by Ortega, it was then that Spanish scientists, artists, and thinkers became the equals of their European counterparts, after generations of lagging behind. The second phase

occurred in the second half of that century, when European prosperity reached the everyday lives of the majority of Spaniards. Starting in the 1950s, foreign tourists began spending their money on the country's coasts, and Spanish migrants sent home a big portion of what they earned working in the thriving German and French industries. A few fortunate ones were able to study abroad. Nevertheless, though Marías considered these exchanges to be positive from a socioeconomic standpoint (with the gradual improvement of living standards to match those in Western Europe and the pacifying influence that process had on Spaniards), he was troubled by the "losses" that this second type of Europeanization implied with regard to national identities across the region: "En toda Europa la personalidad de cada nación se ha desdibujado; es un hecho más bien negativo, porque no significa la formación de una enérgica *europeidad* . . . sino una nivelación y relativa atonía. Esto—disminución de las diferencias y a la vez del interés recíproco—tiene como consecuencia un empobrecimiento de la *realidad* de Europa, aunque no lo sea de su economía" (381; emphasis in the original) [Throughout Europe the personality of each nation has become diluted. This is a rather negative phenomenon, because it does not mean the formation of an energetic *Europeanness* . . . but an assimilation and relative apathy. This attenuation of differences and, at the same time, of reciprocal interest has as a consequence an impoverishment of Europe's *reality*, even if not of its economy].

For Marías, the concessions that Spain made to become fully involved in the process of European integration paid off financially but not in terms of cultural or spiritual richness: "la europeización de España, en el sentido nuevo de la palabra, no ha dejado de tener considerables pérdidas. . . . Ha hecho que se pierda la conciencia de peculiaridad nacional, en favor de un prestigio algo abstracto de lo "europeo," que ha dominado la esfera de lo público durante unos cuantos años" (381) [The Europeanization of Spain, in the newest sense of the word, has brought with it considerable losses. . . . It has meant the loss of the consciousness of national uniqueness in favor of a somewhat abstract prestige regarding what may be "European," which has dominated the public sphere for several years]. He thus reversed the evaluation that prevailed around the time when the country negotiated and formalized its accession to the EC. The losses that concerned Marías had to do not with the national economy's traditional productive sectors but with the sacrifice of autochthonous forms of life. The price to be paid for Europeanization was mainly cultural. This cost could not be compensated by acquiring a European identity, which he saw as a shallow discourse—

regardless of how political leaders may have presented it—because there was very little reciprocal knowledge between the nation members. This problem was not exclusive to Spain; in Marías's opinion, this same process of homogenization was driving most European countries to become humdrum entities.

European hegemony requires the transformation or erasure of certain identity traits to make the new partner conform to the basic tenets that sustain the integration project. This elimination of differences would be an ominous prospect, claimed Marías, "si no fuera por esa soterrada vitalidad que veo en España" (382) [were it not for that underground vitality that I can see in Spain]. Opposition to the dullness of a Europeanized way of life took an organic form that might emerge from within the people if they resisted the values that went against the grain of Spanish originality. The dearth of life that continental assimilation would bring could be prevented, therefore, thanks to the idiosyncrasies that have distinguished Spaniards: a combination of individualism and idealism as well as a rejection of a utilitarian conception of life. Marías's ideas are a variation on prevalent themes in twentieth-century Spanish thought that owe a great deal to Ortega's notion of life as a person's project and to Unamuno's views on the common people as the keepers of national essences.

Some of the anxieties born of the alleged endangerment of an essential Spanishness by Europeanization were made manifest and satirized in *Ya semos* [*sic*] *europeos* [Europeans at last], a series of television mockumentaries created in 1989 by Albert Boadella and the theater troupe he led, Els Joglars [The Jesters]. Boadella (b. 1943) founded this Catalan company in 1961 in collaboration with fellow actors Carlota Soldevila and Antón Pont. Boadella was the main playwright for the group and its director until 2012, when he passed the directorship to the actor Ramon Fontserè. Els Joglars is one of Spain's most emblematic theater groups for its uninterrupted professional activity of more than fifty years, its declared independence from public institutions (it is self-supported, although it does accept commissions from official agencies), and its understanding of theater as an art whose basic function is to reveal to the audience some of the truths about social reality that are hidden by the mass media. Els Joglars' self-proclaimed role as modern jesters who mock authority and mainstream conventions has occasionally led to serious problems with powerful organizations and persons. Foremost in their notorious history of clashes with the Spanish authorities is the troupe's military arrest and court-martial in 1977 for their controversial play *La torna* (Catalan for "The roundup"). The

show dealt with issues such as capital punishment and the corruption of the judiciary. Boadella, then director, avoided the military trial with a very theatrical evasion—he escaped a hospital disguised as a doctor—followed by a period of exile in France. Nevertheless, the recurrent attacks caused by the company's often polemical plays has had a positive impact on its commercial success and endurance by keeping the group in the limelight. Els Joglars' prominence and constant work to develop new forms and address a range of topics in their productions have won the company a place among the modern classics of Spanish theater.[7]

Although the troupe's plays have been the object of a sizable number of academic studies, little attention has been paid to their original work for television, which had a wider impact. Els Joglars recorded their seven-episode mockumentary *Ya semos europeos* between March and May 1989. The company had used the same format the previous year to produce *Som 1 meravella* [We're a bloody marvel], a six-episode miniseries that analyzed the state of Catalonia partly as a satirical response to the Catalan government's jingoistic campaign *Som 6 milions* [We are six million]. During November and December 1989, *Ya semos europeos* was broadcast on Channel 2 of Spanish public television, with an estimated audience of six million viewers. The state broadcasting company was at the time under what would be the relatively short (1986–1989) but extremely influential directorship of filmmaker Pilar Miró, who encouraged unorthodox approaches to television as a medium for creative work.[8] Boadella seized the opportunity, creating a series that was coherent with his stated desire to "get as close to reality as possible. Not surface reality—television or the news already do that. I try to get closer to the reality of what moves people" ("Theatre" 307).

Ya semos europeos consists of a number of reports presented by a television journalist played by Boadella. Through several humorous sketches in each episode, the program focuses on the clash between the social reality of Spain and a certain model of "Europe" that corresponded to the mainstream view of the EC at the time, one that had been fed to Spain by the Europhile political and intellectual elites, although, as seen above, not everybody shared it. The massive official output in favor of Europeanization got a linguistically economical response from Els Joglars. In their performance, the setting (including costumes, characterization, stage, and other elements) often surpasses the importance of the word in conveying the message. The script is minimal, and the reporter holds an authorial voice that often creates ironic situations when his comments clash with the actions the other actors perform.

Boadella and his crew aimed their criticism at two assumptions that had become commonplace in Spanish society: first, that by the 1980s Spain had finally overcome its secular underdevelopment and occupied its rightful place in Europe, and second, that the EC embodied the apex of civilization—in the form that many Spanish progressives had aspired to for about a century when referencing their European ideal. Els Joglars' satirical portrait of the Iberian nation and its northern neighbors showcases the futility of declaring that a country can suddenly "become European" (in a sense that goes far beyond mere geographical adscription) without engaging in a radical exercise of debate and transformation. Defining the parameters of Europeanness could not be as simple as the political elites presented it. Furthermore, the episodes reveal the less-than-ideal reality of that mystified Europe. The EC is portrayed as a heterogeneous group of countries that, far from being the balanced, cosmopolitan, and intellectually advanced nations presented in the official discourse, sometimes embrace racist, chauvinistic, and irrational attitudes and policies.

Mockumentaries often include nonfictional excerpts, contributing to the erosion of the boundaries between genres. That tool is employed just once in *Ya semos europeos*, but to great effect. The only real-life video clip used in the series is strategically placed to sum up the government's position regarding the changes required for Spain to "become" European. The excerpt also highlights the company's subsequent satirical response to the government's stance on the matter: at the end of an episode, the reporter played by Boadella—dressed up for the occasion as a Chaplinesque dictator—"castiga" [punishes] the audience with a clip of a speech by then-President Felipe González that he had delivered in the 1989 State of the Nation debate in Parliament and was broadcast by the same channel as Els Joglars' show. During the clip, González speaks of the "momento de nuestra integración" [moment of our integration] into the EC and of the speed of the "tren comunitario" [communitarian train] that Spain could not afford to miss. These brief instants of official solemnity and political rhetoric, with their message about the need to make collective sacrifices in order to shed the weight of the past so as to advance toward a higher (more "European") level of societal progress, are instrumental to Boadella's satire. Within the frame that the reporter-dictator has created, the President's words, along with the politician's performance, offer the perfect counterpoint to the show: González's speech encapsulates the topics that Els Joglars' series questions. By including the recording as just another portion of the episode, Boadella stresses the performative nature of the

politician's role (a fundamental aspect of the aestheticization of politics that dominates public debate). In Boadella's production, González becomes the character of a man self-fashioned as a Western European democratic leader, speaking to a parliament—but also to a television audience—with the orthodox message, tone, and demeanor that are to be expected from someone in that position. Thus, *Ya semos europeos* offers not only a satire of local customs but also a parody of the predictable and vacuous discourse on Europe prevalent among Spanish politicians. The critique goes beyond the performative dimension of politics to also undermine its rarefied language, something that is especially apparent in the Spanish parliament, where most speeches are actually read from a previous script, thereby curtailing open dialogue. No one responds to González in the show; the monologism depicted mirrors the inadequacy of the debate on the topic of Europe that had marred Spain's accession to the EC.

The attention that Boadella and his crew pay to language is noteworthy both for the subtlety it adds to their political critique and for what it represents in the company's artistic development. When Els Joglars began in the 1960s, they performed mime shows exclusively. They did so to avoid Francoist censorship on the one hand and, on the other, as a way to explore the expressive possibilities of stage austerity. Only gradually did they begin to include sounds and, eventually, verbal language. But while Boadella always made an effort to remind the company's actors and audiences of those wordless beginnings and to underscore the importance that action, gestures, and music have over "literature" in his conception of drama, in some instances he did experiment with very specific linguistic items to achieve his communicative goals—an approach that became increasingly vital in his productions. The title *Ya semos europeos* itself is a telling example of the most intricate work along these lines that he is capable of.

The present indicative form *semos* (for the standard *somos*) is "extremadamente vulgar" [extremely vulgar], as the *Diccionario Hispánico de Dudas* puts it. The malapropism in the series title is a gesture toward Spain's self-perceived social, political, and economic backwardness (or inappropriateness) in contrast with the rest of Western Europe around the time it was inducted into the EC. At the same time, it is significant that the intrusive letter in Els Joglars' title is an *e* (for Europe). In the series' opening titles, the conventional emblem composed of the interlaced E and C (standing for "European Community" and also used for the ECU, the currency that preceded the euro) is inserted into the ontological form *somos* [we are] as if it were corrupting the very essence of Spanish identity. The first person

plural implicit in "semos" encompasses Spanish citizenry, whom Boadella and his crew portray in sketch after sketch as living a sort of schizophrenic existence: wishing to assimilate into Europe while fearing losing what supposedly defines them in terms of their national identity. While nationalists see distinctive elements of that idiosyncrasy, such as bullfighting and folklore, as something to be cherished, others perceive them as symptoms of backwardness or negative difference. More than mocking traditional Spanishness, Els Joglars satirize both those who mourn its loss without realizing its burden and those who scorn it without appreciating the value it may have.

Boadella has always been extremely attentive to the musical aspect of his creations, which he considers more important than their literary dimension. The opening credits are initially run to the theme tune of *No-Do*, the official news broadcast during Franco's era, which was mandatorily screened before movies in cinemas until 1976. The tune was written and arranged by Manuel Parada, a prolific film soundtrack composer. Significantly, Parada's first work for the cinema was the score for *Raza* [Race], the 1942 film written and directed by José Luis Sáenz de Heredia and based on the eponymous novel written by none other than Francisco Franco. In Els Joglars' show, the *No-Do* tune, which had been imposed on Spanish audiences for decades as a fanfare that announced the propagandistic newscast, uninterruptedly shifts into (and briefly overlaps with) the strains of the EC's anthem, the famous "Ode to Joy" from Beethoven's Ninth Symphony. This juxtaposition of the two musical pieces evokes Spain's jagged transition from a dictatorship, a form of government unacceptable to the EC, to a democratic, full-fledged member of that organization in just one decade.

As the opening music plays, we see a series of still black-and-white images of a number of well-known politicians and other famous (and infamous) protagonists from the period of Spanish history stretching from Franco's late years to the time of the show's production. These public figures include some who could embody the nation's "pre-European," dictatorial past: Franco himself and his collaborators Luis Carrero Blanco, Manuel Fraga, and Carlos Arias Navarro; Cardinal Vicente Enrique y Tarancón; an unidentified bullfighter, possibly El Cordobés; the singer Massiel (winner of the 1968 Eurovision contest); and the outlaw Eleuterio Sánchez, aka "El Lute." The postdictatorial period—that of alleged Europeanness—is represented by King Juan Carlos I; the politicians Adolfo Suárez, Josep Tarradellas, Leopoldo Calvo-Sotelo, Alfonso Guerra, Felipe González, and

Miguel Boyer (who appears with his wife, the socialite Isabel Preysler, and their newborn child); the labor union leaders Nicolás Redondo and Antonio Gutiérrez; and the scandalous businessman José María Ruiz Mateos. Also present is Lieutenant Colonel Antonio Tejero, who led the 1981 coup d'état attempt. Tejero's failed coup is evoked by the superimposed sound of gunshots, which paradoxically appear visually imprinted on the black-and-white photograms as the circle of twelve yellow five-pointed stars that symbolizes the EC. Els Joglars may suggest that Spain's attaining membership in the institution was not as democratic as it should have been: some things did not change after the dictator's death, as important political decisions were made without in-depth, open discussion. In any case, the framework prepared by Boadella and his company for their satire seems to indicate that while the tune and the characters of the national drama may have changed, the goal of its political leaders is still to maintain their own hold on power. It also warns viewers of the establishment's efforts to (mis) use media to protect itself.

Other aspects of this mockumentary series are far less subtle than the musical and linguistic elements displayed in the opening of each episode. Especially striking is Els Joglars' treatment of the impact that joining the EC had on the dominant model of Spanish masculinity. In *Ya semos europeos*, Boadella and his company bring to the fore two phenomena that are rarely so explicitly addressed. On the one hand, the show touches on the anxieties about loss of identity that the Europeanization of Spain provoked. On the other, it makes masculinity visible, mostly by emphasizing men's physicality and centering a number of sketches on what could be termed a phallic obsession. The series implies that the sort of hegemonic masculinity that prevailed under Franco to the point of being perceived as quintessentially Spanish became threatened as a side effect of Europeanization.

Even as they grapple with those issues, Els Joglars cannot escape their own biases and contradictions. A close look at the program and a reading of some additional texts written by the company's founder reveal that they shared those very same anxieties. While I find Boadella's take on the dominant discourse on Europeanization effective in its satirical and parodic practices in the *parerga* (title, opening credits, music, introduction, and so on) and in a number of the sketches, the series' undermining of reactionary Spanish nationalism fails to convincingly address one of its main tenets: the Francoist model of masculinity. In fact, the show partly reinforces sexist and homophobic stances that were prevalent in Spanish society under the dictatorship and which endured long after Franco's demise.

One of the main components of the nationalist defense of *hispanidad* promoted a particular conception of manliness and enshrined another of femininity, which historian Aurora Morcillo calls "True Catholic Womanhood." The model of reactionary Spanish nationalism prevalent during the twentieth century, especially the one upheld by the Franco regime, included a specific set of traits, some of which defined the normative masculinity that was one of the pillars of Spain's social order imposed by the dictatorship. Mary Vincent has reconstructed the masculine codes that Franco's New State sought to impose as it fought to eliminate alternative social models. Francoist masculinity drew from Catholic, Fascist, and Carlist gender ideologies, which frequently overlapped. It was less visible, however, than the ideal of femininity; as Vincent states, "reminders to Catholic girls to conduct themselves in a manner appropriate to their sex were extremely common; parallel directives to young men were more unusual. Masculinity masqueraded as the norm: men were accustomed to being viewed as individuals, not defined by their sex" (70–71). An essentialist notion of what it meant to be Spanish was reinforced by an equally essentialist construct of the masculine as protector of the race (namely, male warriors) and inseminator (men with an insatiable heterosexual appetite). Boadella manages to make visible this hegemonic masculinity, a latent code assumed as the "normal" way of being a man in Spain. His approach in the series partly consists of a hyperbolic exaggeration of male sexuality, with a particular emphasis on its bodily aspects.

In one of the most grotesque sketches, which deals with different ways of keeping the unemployed busy throughout Europe, we see a group of Spanish men floating face-up in a small pool. At this carnival-like attraction, a few women play ring toss, with the men's fake oversized penises as the targets. Another episode specifically addresses the effects (and affects) that the Single European Act produced for common Spaniards.[9] Just by virtue of its name, this piece of legislation is presented in the show as a force against cultural diversity. In Boadella's satire, those who are most disturbed by it are those who differ from the Aryan type, who see their physiognomy altered to fit that ethnicity; Europeanization has started to alter even the genetics of the nation. As an Andalusian mother explains in an interview, "A todos se nos ha ido poniendo la piel blanca. Observe a mis hijos: no parecen españoles. No sé lo que nos está pasando. ¡Seguro que los del Mercado Común nos están poniendo algo en la comida!" [Our skin has been turning white. Look at my children: they don't look like Spaniards. I'm sure those Common Market guys are putting something in

our food!]. Far from reassuring the woman, the reporter declares, "Nuestra raza, efectivamente, está cambiando. Cada vez será más difícil encontrar aquellos hombres tan machos, de tez morena, canijos, hirsutos, gastados por el viento, sin hormonas femeninas" [That's right: our race is changing. It will be increasingly difficult to find those macho men, with dark skin, shortish, hairy, weather-beaten, without feminine hormones]. He goes on to explain how the government is getting ready for the changes the country will undergo when the Single European Act comes into force and national borders between the member nations disappear.

In preparation, he explains, a new Ministry for the Conservation of Patriotic Values is being created with the mission of protecting Spain's racial and cultural essence. Boadella shows a visit to the Alcázar of Segovia, a castle from which such icons of Catholic Spanish nationalism as King Ferdinand and Queen Isabella once ruled the nation. In *Ya semos europeos*, the place is converted into ministry offices and a Spanish (human) stud farm. There, a number of local men have their penises sized and are then confined at the farm to protect them from the widespread emasculation resulting from the Europeanization of Spain. The new ministry is also in charge of reservations where Spanish customs and ancestral values are safeguarded. These include "la costumbre de chatear, las discusiones de vecinas, los celos, las pasiones de la sangre y el sexo, el espíritu militar, la picaresca, las tertulias, los chafardeos, el cante" [the custom of having wine and tapas, neighbors' quarrels, jealousy, the passions of blood and sex, military spirit, craftiness, get-togethers, gossip, folk singing]. For Els Joglars, these symbols of collective particularism, often inextricably linked to a patriarchal conception of society, seemed to be on the verge of vanishing as a consequence of the "normalizing" push of European integration.

Boadella's views on the threat that the process of Europeanization allegedly posed to Spanish identity, and especially to the type of masculinity associated with it, are apparent not only in *Ya semos europeos*. For instance, in his prologue to Ramón de España's *Europa mon amour: Cómo despreciar a los europeos* (1991) [Europe mon amour: How to despise the Europeans], Boadella warns that Spaniards, overtly fascinated with and self-conscious about the alleged superiority of their European neighbors, are "indigno[s] de los descendientes de aquellos gloriosos tercios que paseaban orgullosamente por Europa, cruz en alza y falo en ristre" (7) [unworthy of the descendants of those glorious battalions that marched proudly on Europe, with a cross held high and their phalluses ready for battle]. For Boadella, Europe can be divided into "países más mariquitas y otros más putas" (8)

[countries that are more sissified and others that are more whorish]. As Stephanie Mueller has demonstrated, this kind of crass metaphorical discourse has been recurrent in his work over the past four decades, including his autobiographical writings. Boadella's creations are deeply rooted in the kind of masculinity that dominated Franco's Spain: one that was militaristic, homophobic, and sexist. For Boadella, entry into the EC brought with it the risk of hopelessly damaging the essence of Spanishness that he and his company effectively satirized, but whose values they were not ready to discard completely.

The book by Ramón de España (b. 1956), a Catalan writer, journalist, and filmmaker, has, according to Boadella, a "función desacralizadora" [demystifying purpose]: to expose the reality of a Europe that Spaniards have idealized for too long. Few would dare to deflate this notion, as those who should are too invested in the myth's endurance as beneficiaries of the State of Culture that upholds it: "Artistas, escritores e intelectuales están mayoritariamente del otro lado, en la Corte de la adulación, tratando de no comprometerse y aspirar así al funcionariado" (10) [Artists, writers, and intellectuals are for the most part on the other side, in the court of flattery, trying not to jeopardize themselves and aspiring to a position in the civil service]. De España, on the contrary, appears ready to discard that fascination once and for all by showing how each one of the European nation partners is despicable on its own and that the supposedly ever-closer union among them is a fabrication, as they actually despise each other. It is fortunate that they do, he adds; if instead they respected and loved their neighbors, "el aburrimiento acabaría haciendo mella en los ciudadanos de unos países idénticos que compartirían costumbres, idioma, moneda" (18) [boredom would end up harming the citizens of a group of identical countries that would share customs, language, currency]. Concerns over the erasure of difference that may be a by-product of integration emerge again, as they did in Julián Marías's text.

De España's book is a defamatory essay consisting of eleven satirical depictions of the nations that made up the EU (then still known as the EC) in 1991, when the text was published. The author claims that his essay is revenge for the various neurotic complexes that Europeans provoked in Spaniards. Interestingly, he sees Europe as Franco's unsuspected partner in demeaning Spaniards' national pride: "Entre ellos y el general Franco nos han hecho sentir peor de lo que somos, consiguiendo que la idea de Europa nos haga babear de envidia cuando, francamente, tampoco hay para tanto" (16) [All it took was them (Europeans) and General Franco to make us

feel like we are worse than we actually are. They made us drool with envy over the idea of Europe when, frankly, it's not anything that great]. While the dictator needed the Spanish people to feel inferior to protect his rule, Europeans despised them "porque no teníamos democracia, porque éramos bajitos, porque no nos comíamos un rosco o porque matábamos toros en público" (16) [because we didn't have a democracy, because we were short, because we didn't get laid, or because we killed bulls in public]. To get back at them, de España calls on his countrymen to emulate Salvador Dalí's method for overcoming social anxiety: imagining a sizeable turd on the interlocutor's head.

Each chapter consists of a few anecdotes from de España's visits to a European country and some impressionistic notes on that country's history, canonical writers, or most notable artists. Of course, the conclusions that de España reaches are never positive. The French are rude; the Belgians, dumb; the Greeks, filthy; the Portuguese, boring; the British, perverted; and so on. The author pays particular attention to their sexual mores and gender politics—or, more accurately, what he imagines them to be. For instance, he divides Italian men (all androgynous-looking) into three groups: homosexuals, sex maniacs, and harassers (40). Italian women, for their part, are just waiting for the men to leave their country in search of victims so that they can "recibir a los extranjeros con los brazos abiertos" [welcome foreign men with open arms]. Spain is spared in the satire—in part, according to the author, because it is such a "viril" [manly] and stern country that it should be feared (43).

Novelist, essayist, and journalist Manuel Vázquez Montalbán (1939–2003) did not share the concerns of Marías, Boadella, and de España regarding the potential consequences of Europeanization for national identity. In Vázquez Montalbán's view, their arguments were baseless from the outset because, for him, Europe did not exist—at least, not as an entity with real power to affect anything of importance, much less the identity of its members.[10] He did, however, see a need for it to exist—just not on the terms on which the EU was being devised. As a historical materialist, Vázquez Montalbán was convinced that the meaning of Europe had to be constructed as a political and cultural goal, along with a proper strategy that could ensure its fulfillment. Starting in the 1980s, he denounced in many of his newspaper columns the ambiguity of the prevailing European project, arguing that the EU should make room for social movements that could counter the growing power of financial interests; if it did not, the organization would remain merely a giant marketplace.

In his essay "Europa o el Misterio de la Inmaculada Concepción" [Europe, or the Mystery of the Immaculate Conception], Vázquez Montalbán expanded on the ideas that he had sketched out in those shorter articles, articulating a more ambitious goal for Europe: it should become a moral alternative to the neoliberal model of globalization. The essay, published as part of his book *Panfleto desde el planeta de los simios* [Pamphlet from the planet of the apes] ten years after Spain joined the Union, argues that this alternative model of Europe is a political necessity that is yet to be realized. Economic considerations have prevailed over cultural ones in the organization's design. Disappointingly, the European utopia that gained momentum after World War II had largely been reduced to a series of trade agreements (117). Clashing nationalisms and economic inequalities between the continent's rich and poor countries will not disappear by virtue of those financial arrangements, says Vázquez Montalbán. In his opinion, the inability to produce a pan-European identity is the result of the empty rhetoric on cultural unity that leaders have used with the sole objective of concealing the "obscenamente materialista" (120) [obscenely materialistic] goal of creating the single market.

The organization of the European economic space was not accompanied by a parallel "esfuerzo cultural serio para crear una consciencia europea" [serious cultural effort to create a European conscience], argues Vázquez Montalbán, and the closest thing that political leaders have accomplished is an essentialist rhetoric that merely covers up that void. They trusted that the single market would generate a European identity. Yet, far from producing "los contenidos doctrinales de una idea de Europa" (121) [the doctrinal contents of an idea of Europe], the common market leads instead to increased xenophobia in times of economic crisis. And the kinds of exchanges it favors, with mass tourism foremost among them, perpetuate prejudice among nations rather than prevent it. If that discourse on the continent's spiritual unity were more substantiated (for instance, developing a shared educational policy and a common cultural industry across the entire Union), a European imaginary would emerge. Vázquez Montalbán sees this imaginary as necessary for establishing worthy goals for the integration project, whose raison d'être, for most progressives, was not merely to become a transnational marketplace.

Not surprisingly, given the terms of the Spanish State of Culture in which he operated and his own Marxist affiliation, Vázquez Montalbán advocates top-down guidance and intervention to produce a consensual imaginary for the unified continent. He laments the failure to "invent a

tradition" that could sustain Europe-wide identity claims and argues that such a project would be able to renew enthusiasm for the idea of Europe. It would also entail a more relevant mission that might have significance beyond the confines of the Union: "una Europa decantada hacia una finalidad emancipadora podría ser el punto de apoyo de una relativizada nueva racionalidad universal" (124) [a Europe that was being steered toward an emancipatory end could become the fulcrum of a new, relativized universal rationality]. While Vázquez Montalbán is aware of the Eurocentric overtones of this vision, he finds Europe's redeeming value precisely in the duality contained within it. Only by fully grappling with Europe's troubling past—including the realities of colonialism and totalitarianism—may the best of its liberal and revolutionary heritage be reassessed in order for it to reemerge and guide those seeking a set of ideas for thinking and acting in a new globalized world: "Se precisa, pues, un imaginario que nos recuerde cuántos Guernikas [*sic*], Sarajevos y Buchenwalds llevamos sobre nuestra mala conciencia y cuál ha sido nuestro papel imperialista depredador y creador de desquites que ocultamos en nuestra falsa conciencia" (125) [We therefore need an imaginary that reminds us of all the Guernicas, Sarajevos, and Buchenwalds we carry on our bad conscience and of the imperialistic, depredatory, retribution-provoking role we've played, which we conceal in our false consciousness]. This proposal that Europe acknowledge the darkest chapters of its past and address the problems posed by the post-Enlightenment model of rationality echoes some of the main tenets of the Frankfurt School, especially as manifested in the work, first, of Max Horkheimer and Theodor W. Adorno and, later, of Jürgen Habermas, probably the most influential German thinker for the Spanish left at the end of last century.

Vázquez Montalbán admits that in the bureaucratic and mercantile version of Europe embodied by the EU there is no room for this association between an obligation to memory and the critique of reason. Political parties with that kind of message would never win an election, he claims. It would also mean career suicide for any EU leader "que se empeñara en sustituir los espejos deformadores por espejos necesarios" (125) [who insisted on replacing the deforming mirrors for necessary ones].[11] Therefore, he concludes, "seguiremos autoengañándonos con la inestimable ayuda del lenguaje" (125) [we shall keep on lying to ourselves with the invaluable assistance of language]. Nevertheless, a few of Vázquez Montalbán's writer colleagues would also show that a critical approach to language, especially the ways it interrogates history through literature, could also be of invalu-

able assistance in shedding light on the nature of contemporary Europe and how it may face its challenges.

Such an approach is part of what has been termed "the third wave of Europeanization," which focuses on cultural integration. Since the 1990s, it has complemented the economic and political unifications that were at the center of the first and second waves, respectively. Cultural Europeanization involves "complex and strongly disputed processes such as linguistic homogenization and the inculcation of a 'European' amalgam of knowledge, attitudes and values . . . to provide 'new Europe' with a suitable cultural-symbolic foundation for political guidance and legitimacy" (Karlsson 38). As Spanish artists and intellectuals have engaged in this process, they have attempted to situate their country's historical consciousness within that of the transnational project. That has implied, to a large extent, an effort to make problematic aspects of the intertwining Spanish and European pasts visible. In the last decade of the twentieth century, the narratives of these two pasts underwent critical revisions according to the principle that negative examples—and not just the celebration of a positive heritage—were fundamental for creating awareness about the uniqueness of their respective developments as well as for building responsible, self-reflecting identity formations. In other words, the predominantly triumphant assessments of the Spanish postauthoritarian transition and its connection to European integration needed to be balanced with critical reflections on the dark side of the European ideal.

Cultural Memory and the Dark Side of the European Ideal: Jorge Semprún and Juan Mayorga

Attempts to tame the enthrallment with Europe that has been one of the pillars of democratic Spain's imaginary came from artists and intellectuals who were, nevertheless, generally supportive of considering Europeanization as a valid path for their society. Like Vázquez Montalbán, however, they sensed that a European project that did not recognize the negative obverse of its humanitarian ideal would be inadequate and ultimately fail. Their goal was not to delegitimize the process of continental integration but to contribute to its sound democratic progress by advocating for a historically aware political reflection that pushed unification beyond mere economic goals. They contributed to the demystification of the process by questioning the larger implications of European history's darkest episodes, insist-

ing on the specificity of those developments: the events of the past and the circumstances leading to them were largely determined by the logic of European modernity. They also stressed the role that culture, as an instrument both of domination and of critique, had played in the atrocities that Europe generated. Along these lines, they saw the collapse of Enlightenment ideals, which was at the core of totalitarianism, as a turning point. Only after confronting this collective failure, to which no European could be indifferent, would it be possible to envision a new moral ground for the integrated continent.

This revision of the European ideal clashed with the reassuring version of the recent past that had dominated Spain's "national fiction of normality" (Delgado, *La nación*) since the 1980s. In the hegemonic narrative, the nation had overcome the secular maladies that set it apart from other Western countries. As a result, it won admission to what was presented as the most advanced political organization on the planet, the EU—an innovative experiment that was reinventing the region and allegedly making it exemplary again. Yet that historical construct commingled oblivion and selective memory, as is the case with any process of nation building or redesign.[12] The authors who were ready to dismantle that discourse were convinced that Spaniards still had to confront the implications of the most troubling events of their history, from the expulsion of the Jews in 1492 to the most recent civil war and its aftermath. Likewise, they posited that violence and exclusion were defining elements of the Europe that Spain was "joining" just as much as the humanitarian and democratic values the Union claimed to stand for. They maintained that this negative heritage should not be repressed or cleansed with mere gestures. Managing this problematic legacy required fully acknowledging its roots as well as facing its latest manifestations. Therefore, the assertion of Spain's Europeanness also had to include a reflection on the less virtuous chapters of the national and continental histories, which overlapped in many important ways.

Beginning in the 1990s, the growing interest in European history's bleakest hours led to a wave of works that underscored the Spanish connections to those dark events. That this surge in attention occurred then, and not earlier, may have had to do with the intersection of two major factors. First was Spain's admission into the EU, which increased the sense of belonging to Europe and thus the attention to defining elements of what it means to be European. This led to the second factor: the critical revision of the continental memory, prompted by the commemorations of the fiftieth anniversaries of the beginning and end of World War II, often presented as the

foundational event of contemporary Europe, as Dan Diner has argued (9). Yet this conception of Europe's origins might bolster the old view of Spain as a nation operating on the continent's fringes. As is well known, Spain's involvement in the conflict was comparatively marginal. That some Spanish authors examined the war and its larger implications from a perspective that emphasized their country's ties to it is symptomatic of the new perception of Spain's symbolic position within Europe that was emerging in the last two decades of the twentieth century.

Those authors began to prioritize one element of the conflict in particular: the Holocaust. This was due, in part, to the Shoah's increased prominence in the continent's moral landscape—to such an extent that addressing it became something akin to a political obligation. Discussing the symbolic requirements for "admission" to Europe, historian Tony Judt stated in his seminal 2005 book *Postwar*, "Holocaust recognition is our contemporary European entry ticket. . . . [T]he recovered memory of Europe's dead Jews has become the very definition and guarantee of the continent's restored humanity" (803–4). After some years of invisibility following the end of the war, the result of a combination of factors including shame and attention diverted to the Cold War,[13] the Shoah became the key element of a negative heritage that Europeans had to acknowledge and confront. Its presence at the crux of the continental narrative called into question the most fundamental tenets of their culture. As Hayden White explains, reflections on the Holocaust provided "insights into the *real* nature of European civilization" (26, his emphasis). Any serious deliberation on the issue of Europeanness had to include that dark period as an essential component.[14] This conviction (or the pretense of such, as it can be exploited for political gain) reached beyond the immediate contexts where the Holocaust had taken place, as was the case with Spain.

There are some unique inflections in the way the Holocaust has been dealt with in Spain, and not all are necessarily related to the country's peripheral relationship with the mass murders. Alejandro Baer has correctly addressed some of the local particularities of the Spanish discourse on the memory of the Holocaust since approximately 2001, such as the polemics on the political uses of some chapters of Spain's recent history, especially those related to Francoist repression. Yet there are other important aspects that can also be traced back to a few years earlier. The attention that World War II and the Holocaust started to receive in Spain during the early 1990s may be symptomatic of an aspiration to inscribe the nation in the mainstream of European affairs, even those of a most traumatic nature, and,

perhaps more significantly, in the ensuing historical and ethical debates about them. The reexamination of Spain's ties to the conflict and its aftermath reflected a deeper sense of belonging to "a common European canon of remembrance" (Diner 17) that may constitute the grounds for a shared continental identity. At the same time, it became clear that there was something rotten in Europe and its modernity that Spaniards, in their idealization of those two entities, had failed to address. Anti-Semitism and, even more so, totalitarianism stood out among the connecting points of Spanish and European history that writers such as Jorge Semprún, Juan Mayorga, Juana Salabert, Antonio Martínez Sarrión, and Antonio Muñoz Molina dealt with in works that challenged the ideal of Europeanness around the turn of the century.[15] (Interestingly, colonialism did not receive the same kind of attention.)

The evocation of Guernica, Buchenwald, and Sarajevo as symbols of Europe's uneasy memories in Vázquez Montalbán's essay discussed in the previous section brings to mind the figure of Jorge Semprún (1923–2011), whose life and works are exemplary of the interweaving of the histories of Spain and Europe since the 1930s. Semprún was born in Madrid to a conservative Republican family (his maternal grandfather, Antonio Maura, had served as prime minister under Alfonso XIII). When the civil war broke out, the family left Spain and settled first in Holland and then in France, where Jorge joined the anti-Nazi resistance movement. He was captured by the Gestapo and interned in the Buchenwald camp in 1943. After liberation, he worked as an interpreter for the United Nations, and in the 1950s he fought Franco's dictatorship as a clandestine member of the Spanish Communist Party, from which he was expelled in 1964 for his differences with the leadership. Disillusioned with communism, he turned to writing literature and for the cinema. He gained recognition as a highly esteemed author in both French and Spanish, and he always maintained a strong interest in politics. In 1988 Socialist President Felipe González named him minister of culture, a position Semprún held until 1991. During the last years of his life, he participated in numerous Europeanist initiatives, including the Association Paris-Sarajevo-Europe, which he led. By the time of his death, Semprún was considered an icon of European culture. His long career had stretched from fighting fascism to embodying the State of Culture. His time in Buchenwald and his commitment to politics lay at the core of his writing, but he had one broader preoccupation that encapsulated all others: Europe. In his work, he admonished fellow citizens in both Europe and Spain that their recent political accomplishments could not,

and should not, obliterate the remembrance of their traumatic past; there were pending issues that had been left in shadow.

Although Semprún distinguished himself from those who saw an integrated Europe mostly as an economic arrangement, he did not fall into an idealization of the origins and significance of the unification process. Arguing against an idealistic view of Europe, Semprún wrote that it "no es el producto depurado de una idea filosófica: es el resultado compacto, denso, a veces opaco y trágico, de largos siglos de enfrentamientos y de amalgamas, de invasiones y resistencias" ("Política cultural" 137–38) [is not the refined product of a philosophical idea: it is the compact, dense result, sometimes opaque and tragic, of long centuries of conflicts and fusions, of invasions and resistances]. Contemporary Europe was not, he argued, the offspring of the intellectual traditions (that of classical Greece chief among them) that thinkers such as his admired Edmund Husserl invoked as its source. Rather, without denying the importance of those traditions and others less frequently mentioned (such as the Jewish and Arabic legacies), Semprún interpreted the momentum toward integration primarily as a product of the fight against fascist and communist totalitarianisms. Those movements of resistance had engendered a reinforced "democratic reason" that was, more so than the single market or the common currency, what propelled European unification. Fundamentally, his "democratic reason" is a renewed European ideal: one that was born with the Enlightenment, but whose principles had been substantially revised through the remembrance of the horrors of totalitarianism.

Many of Semprún's ideas on the European integration process are condensed in an essay from 1992 titled "Política cultural: Unidad y diversidad en la Europa reunificada" [Cultural policy: Unity and diversity in the reunified Europe]. In it, he objects to the reductive identification between Europe and a political entity, the European Economic Community, a conflation that was taking hold when the latter was about to be absorbed by and renamed the European Union in 1993. According to Semprún, a larger, single cultural Europe preceded the new Union, one that came to an abrupt end with the Yalta Conference in 1945. That is why at the final years of the twentieth century it made sense to him to speak of the reunification of Europe, rather than of its "enlargement," as the official rhetoric described the inclusion of the former communist countries in the EU. Semprún maintained that the construction of a new, united Europe should not be limited to the nations of the continent's West, nor to economic or political integration. Years later, he continued to argue that the expansion of the EU had to be

accomplished under the aegis of "democratic reason," which would form the basis for a cultural or "spiritual" unity that crowned the process of continental integration. But this unity, he was quick to add, could not mean uniformity or homogeneity (*El hombre* 196). At the end of his life, Semprún the activist clearly saw that the most important work that remained to be done in the reunification process had to do not with institutional or economic politics but with cultural ones.

To preempt centralism and homogeneity in a bureaucratically unified Europe, Semprún advocated for the creation of a series of wide-ranging projects that would bring together several countries with specific goals. The most urgent of these projects, he claimed, lay within the realm of culture: the reconstruction of a memory common to all of Europe (*El hombre* 194–95). Since Semprún viewed World War II as being simultaneously the apex of European modernity gone awry and the foundational event for an integrated continent, it is not surprising that he presented Weimar–Buchenwald as the symbol of that memory. Those two places, located barely five miles apart, represent the best and worst of the European spirit. While the city of Weimar is associated with the German Enlightenment (mostly because Goethe and Schiller both lived there), the Bauhaus movement, and the 1919–1933 Republican period, the Buchenwald camp stands as a notorious site of totalitarianism's atrocities. In 1937 the Nazis built the camp, where they interned and eliminated thousands of people, from political prisoners to Jews, Roma, and prisoners-of-war. Following its liberation in 1945, Buchenwald, under Soviet command, became part of the Gulag as an internment camp until 1950.

As Semprún sees it, perhaps paradoxically, "fue en los campos nazis donde se forjó el primer esbozo de un espíritu europeo" (*El hombre* 98) [it was in the Nazi camps that the first draft of a European spirit was forged]. In Buchenwald he had interacted with a multinational mix of common citizens as well as many intellectuals from all over Europe. Some of the latter, such as Maurice Halbwachs and Léon Blum, were already established figures by the time of their internment. Others, such as Semprún himself and Jean Améry, or future Nobel Prize winners Imre Kertész and Elie Wiesel, would devote much of their lives to creating a literary memory of the camp experience. In Semprún's case, this traumatic experience formed a vector in which internationalism, cooperation, and democratic values converged in what he would later regard as the prelude to the spiritual integration of the European peoples. That "spirit" can be understood as the cultural memory that sustains the moral dimension of the renewed

European ideal. This ideal was rebuilt on the initially unthinkable—yet unavoidable—reality of the camps set up by totalitarianism. It is a legacy that any democratic project on the continent must assume as its own—hopefully, as a way to prevent new attacks on human dignity.

Authors who see themselves as the executors of the legacy bestowed by Semprún's generation claim that its memory of suffering, resistance, and humanitarianism has been betrayed. European institutions have repeatedly dishonored it with policies that ignore human rights—for instance, in the treatment of refugees seeking asylum (see Chapter 4). High culture, once regarded as an instrument of humanization that could help prevent moral decay, is now another mistrustful element that participates in the logic that allows injustice and domination. One of the most insightful critics of this condition is Juan Mayorga (b. 1965), probably the most renowned contemporary Spanish playwright both at home and abroad (his work has been translated into more than twenty languages). As he declared in a December 13, 2013, interview with Anna M. Iglesia for Nuvol.com:

> Si pensamos en la Europa actual, no podemos decir que la sociedad europea sea una sociedad culta. . . . De algún modo la gran cultura está siendo cada vez más olvidada, o encerrada en nichos, pero más preocupante que esto es que Europa está olvidando Auschwitz. Muchos podrían discutirme esta idea diciendo que vivimos en la época de la memoria, que se han hecho muchas películas acerca de este tema, muchos museos, muchas conmemoraciones, pero yo creo que se ha olvidado lo esencial: la lógica que condujo a las cámaras de gas. En este sentido, y sin querer hacer ningún tipo de comparación con aquella catástrofe incomparable, creo que acontecimientos como el reciente desastre de Lampedusa o fenómenos más cercanos a nosotros como la retirada de la tarjeta sanitaria a los indocumentados o las vallas cortantes de Melilla indican que la mayor parte de los europeos no creen realmente en los derechos humanos, no creen que los humanos, por el simple hecho de serlo, tengan derechos. Los derechos se asocian a los papeles, a la documentación, dejan de ser derechos humanos para convertirse en derechos de estado.
>
> [If we think of Europe as it is today, we could not say that European society is a cultured one. . . . Somehow, great culture is being increasingly forgotten, or rather niched; but more importantly, Europe is forgetting Auschwitz. Many people could argue that we live in the age of memory, that many films about this topic have been made, and that there are many

> museums and commemorations. But I believe that what is essential has been forgotten: the logic that led to the gas chambers. In that sense, though I have no wish to compare what is incomparable, I think that events such as the recent disaster in Lampedusa or some that are closer to us such as the exclusion of undocumented migrants from the public health system or the razor-wire–topped border walls in Melilla indicate that a majority of Europeans do not really believe in human rights, that they do not believe that humans, just for being human, have rights. Rights are associated with papers, with documentation: they stop being human rights and instead become state rights.]

In keeping with these statements, Mayorga's theatrical project emerges from an imaginary and critical revision of twentieth-century history that challenges widespread rhetoric about the goodness of contemporary Europe and its values.[16] Many of his writings focus on how European modernity shaped forms of violence and domination that are still at work—often stealthily, but also in ways that we can only claim to ignore. Mayorga started his literary career in the late 1980s while he was completing advanced training in philosophy with a doctoral dissertation on Walter Benjamin (later published as *Revolución conservadora y conservación revolucionaria* [Conservative revolution and revolutionary conservation]). The influence of the German thinker's reflections on history, the relationship between aesthetics and politics, and issues regarding translation (among other topics), as well as Benjamin's own life in the conflicted Europe of the first four decades of the twentieth century, were all fundamental sources of inspiration for Mayorga from the outset. His plays explore those issues, connecting their manifestations to the memory of Europe's bleakest hours. Some of his early works in that vein include *El traductor de Blumemberg* [The translator of Blumemberg], from 1993, and *Cartas de amor a Stalin* [Love letters to Stalin], written in 1999 (*Teatro 1989–2014*). Both address, at different levels, the memory of totalitarianism and, inseparable from that political malaise, the dark forces of Europe's cultural heritage that are still active, sometimes with the quiet acquiescence of governments and citizens.

El traductor de Blumemberg is probably the richest work from Mayorga's early period. It deals with the reverse of Semprún's "democratic reason" and the cultural memory associated with it. The play points to the existence of *another* memory of totalitarianism—one that brings forth not the remembrance of its evils but rather the persistence of its perverse appeal in contemporary Europe. In the play, two characters meet in a train that

is crossing the continent from Lisbon to Berlin: Blumemberg, an elderly, wounded German who has just come back to Europe from his exile in Argentina disguised as a blind toy dealer, and Juan Calderón, a younger and rather crass Spaniard. Soon we learn two facts: one, that Calderón has been hired to translate Blumemberg's last book, a philosophical treatise with echoes of Martin Heidegger and Carl Schmitt; and two, that the aging author had a great influence on the Nazi movement, including Hitler himself, for whom the work was originally intended. Blumemberg does not have a written version of his book, which burned at the end of the war, so he speaks it out from memory to the translator, sentence by sentence. The strange arrangements to facilitate this are the work of a third character named Silesius, who never appears on stage and, it is implied, may have died a violent death as the leader of a neo-Nazi organization.

The action progresses through a complex mix of sounds, spaces, and unstable identities. The long journey to Berlin defies chronological and spatial logic, as the train goes by places as off-track as Moscow, Istanbul, and Copenhagen. It also suffers several mishaps: first it is attacked by protesting strikers, later it derails, and it stops several times for no apparent reason. The cumbersome trajectory challenges the notions of fluidity and mobility that supposedly characterize present-day Europe and that have often been used as metaphors for its political integration (a topic discussed in Chapter 4 of this book). The awkward journey can also be read as a response to the propaganda that since the 1990s has presented Spain's high-speed train system as one the main symbols of the nation's progress and its connection with the rest of Europe (as opposed to the previous railway system, which was incompatible with the European railroad for technical reasons that some have interpreted as a political determination to keep the nation isolated from the rest of the continent).

The scenes of what turns out to be an increasingly erratic journey mingle with others that take place in a basement beneath the Berlin train station. Blumemberg lives confined there, for upon his return to Germany he was received "como si saliese del fondo de una pesadilla" (126) [as if emerging from the depths of a nightmare]. While critic Emilio Peral Vega has interpreted that basement full of symbols of failed knowledge as a reconfiguration of Plato's cave (56), the space also suggests containment and concealment. If for Semprún the camp was the place where the new postwar European spirit was forged, Mayorga's basement is the site where its latest destruction is bred. Underground, inside Hegel's *das Herz Europas*, the philosophy that brought about annihilation still endures, a latent

demon about to reemerge and haunt the continent again. "Tengo todo el ruido de Europa en la cabeza" (136) [I have all the noise of Europe in my head], declares Blumemberg, claiming that the clamor is about to explode in a conflict of unforeseen consequences. Outside, signs that the times are becoming ripe for a new bloodbath abound. Berlin is an apocalyptical setting: railroad workers from around Europe have arrived and are attacking the Roma minority, while some people are trying to flee the city and others are on the verge of taking their own lives.

One of the most striking features of the play is its intricate linguistic diversity. While it is set mostly in Spanish (spoken, in the case of Blumemberg, with German and Argentinean accents), there is also a great deal of German and some French. Other languages, such as Catalan, are also heard in the background. This multilingualism underscores the European dimension of the setting, but it also hints at a deeper, related topic: the relationship between language and ideas and also, most fundamentally, their connection to power and the violence it relies on. The book-in-progress that brought the two characters together quickly becomes a source of conflict between them. They fight about its authorship, its political significance, and its content, which is unstable even in its very title: while Calderón has translated it as "Critique of Violence," Blumemberg claims that it should read "Critique of Power." Both of them, however, coincide in the abjection that their own work makes them feel: what it conveys fascinates and repels them at the same time. Yet the ideas in the work are so atrocious—we are to understand that they form the basis of a totalitarian ideology—that, out of an ethical obligation to future generations, Calderón finally feels the need to burn it. However, as Blumemberg warns him at the end of the play, its poisonous message is already in the translator's memory, rendering the destruction of the manuscript useless. After all, the worldview the book sustains outlasted the defeat of 1945; it will certainly survive the translator's attempt at preventing its dissemination. A more intricately interconnected continent is not necessarily a more ethical one; in that sense, the railway theme emphasized throughout the play hints at the circulation of ideas that can have malicious implications.

El traductor de Blumemberg questions the European integration project's moral foundations by unearthing the existence of alternative, sometimes pernicious ideologies that also unite the continent, albeit following principles that do not correspond to humanitarian ideals. Fascism did not disappear with the Nazi regime, which had its own project for a united continent; the new Europe that grew out of its apparent demise must remain

alert, especially to the ways in which totalitarianism can regenerate and disseminate. Along these lines, Mayorga's play casts a shadow of suspicion on the role that sophisticated (and highly ambivalent) discourses such as philosophy or translation may have, as well as on the prestige of intellectuals, universities, and great cities. Their status played an important part in the circulation and empowerment of ideas that lead to the wars that tore the continent apart. That the focus of the play is on the perpetrators of evil (or their intellectual instigators, assuming that distinction is a valid one) rather than on the victims is part of a larger project. Mayorga posits his writing as an intervention against oblivion and a champion for historical responsibility, thus contesting the distinction between winners and losers, or between dominators and the oppressed. *El traductor de Blumemberg* underscores that the memory of Europe's demons is incomplete without an awareness of their lingering presence.

Mayorga advocates for a theater conceived "Frente a Europa"—this is, *facing* or even *opposing* Europe. In a manifesto thus titled, he celebrates the fluidity that characterizes cultural exchanges (particularly ones related to theater) on the continent, where potential partners and translations can open up new opportunities for interpretation. Yet Mayorga also warns of an inherent danger. The current easiness in the relations among European playwrights, companies, and audiences could lead to a theater created with that framework in mind, one that would become, as he puts it, "Un teatro Samsonite, prête à traduire, un teatro IKEA" [a Samsonite theater, *prête-à-traduire,* an IKEA theater]. This is a historically unspecific, unproblematic drama, one that would offer easy consumption for any audience—works that smooth out divergences rather than addressing them critically. He goes on to state:

> Trabajar para un teatro así corresponde a cierta idea de Europa que me espanta, y que me asalta cada vez que miro un billete de cualquier número de euros. En esos billetes veo puentes y puertas que—hasta donde yo sé—no existen en ningún lugar. En vez de sitios reales—cargados de honores y de heridas—para representar a Europa, Bruselas ha elegido no-lugares. . . . Como si Ponte Vecchio—y Plaça dos Restauradores, y el Castillo de Praga, y Auschwitz-Birkenau, y las playas de Normandía—no fuesen de todos los europeos. A una idea pasteurizada y amnésica de Europa corresponde un teatro asimismo amnésico y pasteurizado. Una dramaturgia obediente, leal, burocrática. (192)

> [Working for a theater like that befits an idea of Europe that appalls me, and which strikes me every time I see a euro bill in any amount. On those bills I see bridges and gates that, for all I know, do not exist anywhere. Instead of real places—steeped in honors and wounds—Brussels has chosen non-places to represent Europe. . . . As if the Ponte Vecchio—and the Plaça dos Restauradores, and Prague Castle, and Auschwitz-Birkenau, and the beaches of Normandy—did not belong to all Europeans. A sterilized, amnesic idea of Europe befits a theater that is also sterilized and amnesic: an obedient, loyal, and bureaucratic dramaturgy.]

Mayorga denounces the policies that have designed a united Europe based on a purposefully shallow presentation of the continent's history. Their ultimate goal is to facilitate economic exchange by erasing both the particularities that differentiate Europeans and the links that bind them together. Mayorga calls for a deeper integration that requires a conflictive approach to a conflictive history. Its medium is a culture that operates within dissent, not normality; an instrument capable of exposing and dissecting the frames of meaning that construct contemporary Europe in ways that include those described in the next two chapters.

4

On the Move in a Static Europe

Confining Europe

In recent years, the ways that Europeans think about themselves in relation to the space they inhabit and the history they come from have changed partly as a consequence of a number of unprecedented political and technological developments. The turn of the century brought revolutions in transportation and communications exemplified by high-speed rail networks, low-cost air travel, and the Internet. Along with the vast experiment in international relations currently known as the European Union—with its apparent dissolution of long-established political divisions—those new realities created the conditions for not only an extraordinary fluidity of movement but also the conflicts that stem from the resulting interactions. Mobility is a broad concept that comprises phenomena as diverse as capital flow, tourism, business travel, and migration. While the unrestricted movement of goods and services is considered one of the basic principles of the European Single Market and is rarely the subject of dispute, the flow of people within and into the Union raises a number of issues, some of them closely related to the evolving notions of Europeanness and European identity. These matters have become the source of conflicts and debates whose participants come in all guises and hold equally diverse views.

Mobility has been regarded as a fundamental factor for considerations of Europeanness at least since Immanuel Kant linked the development of European cosmopolitanism to the wanderlust of his idealized inhabitant of the continent. Nowadays, fluidity is the leading metaphor for the Europeanization process and the search for a pancontinental, cosmopolitan sense of identity for observers such as Vittoria Borsò, Jacques Derrida, Ulrich Beck, and Edgar Grande. Others, such as Claudio Guillén, reject the call for a common identity, nonetheless underscoring the importance of movement and fluidity for grasping Europe's complexity, which Guillén

finds to be "movediza" [movable, shifting] and "de perfil nunca fijo" [with contours that are never stationary] ("Europa" 377). Similarly, Denis Guénoun conceives of Europe fundamentally "as a passage" (4). Rosi Braidotti pushes the links between location, mobility, and identity even further with her notion of a "nomadic" identity, which would imply a European subject "in transit within different identity-formations, but sufficiently anchored to a historical position to accept responsibility for it" (75). In this sense, Braidotti's approach prefigures "the end of pure and steady identities, or in other words, creolization and hybridization producing a multicultural minoritarian Europe, within which 'new' Europeans can take their place alongside others" (79). Braidotti's is a bold alternative to the notion of static, essentialist "Fortress Europe," whose proponents call—in more or less explicit terms—for the preservation of an exclusionary set of values that they relate to a restrictive understanding of heritage as the basis for a common Europeanness. These tenets, posited with some nuances by thinkers such as Giovanni Sartori and Samuel Huntington, and more crudely presented in recent times by politicians such as Viktor Orbán, Marine Le Pen, and Umberto Bossi, are often used as rhetorical ammunition in conflicts regarding migration and the continent's increasing diversity. They claim that free movement of (mostly nonwhite, non–"originally" European) people can undermine Europe's security and, ultimately, corrupt its identity.

Those diverging ideas about the effects of mobility on Europeanness have very real consequences for large numbers of people. From the inception of the integration project, the experience of migration—with all its complexity—has been one of the key factors in both the construction and the questioning of a unified Europe. While the EU has been widely recognized for facilitating mobility by erasing the borders between its member states, their governments occasionally express their uneasiness with such openness, especially depending on the identity or national origin of the possible beneficiaries. For instance, citizens from Eastern European countries seeking jobs in the West and members of the Roma minority have encountered strong opposition, both popular and official, to their intra-European migrations, notwithstanding the Union's stated support for such movements. Yet, alongside its defense of unrestricted movement within its territory as one of the pillars of Europeanness (manifested most clearly in the enforcement of the Schengen agreement, which enables that freedom), the EU has posed ever-greater obstacles to those who try to access it from the outside. This incongruity produces "a Europe distinguished by intense mobility through a landscape of differences" yet "requires sophisticated

strategies of identification that can fix the distinction between Europeans and non-Europeans or, in this case, can legitimate certain mobilities and exclude others," as Ginette Verstraete aptly puts it (89). The tension between advocates of open mobility and defenders of exclusionary notions of identity is one of the most significant manifestations of the conflicts at the core of the process of European integration. Since the early 1950s, the dominant official discourse on the project has embraced an idea of unification guided by fluidity and solidarity. Yet critics have raised alarms from two opposing stances. On the one hand, the EU is censured for not being vigorous enough in its advocacy of equal mobility for all. On the other hand, the Union is contested from positions that discriminate against those whose fit within certain ethnic and religious ideals of Europe is deemed problematic.

This latter view finds its most tangible manifestation in the notion of Fortress Europe. Although the term came into wide use in the early 1990s, it originated in the German "Festung Europa," which referred to Hitler's attempts to fortify areas unified under Nazi rule against an Allied invasion. Today, it is invoked chiefly as a critical or pejorative reference to the EU's policies regarding migration from so-called third countries—those not belonging to the Union. Yet "Fortress Europe" is not merely a catchy phrase in discourse. The concept is most patently embodied in the European Agency for the Management of Operational Cooperation at the External Borders of the Member States of the EU (FRONTEX), a network of increasingly sophisticated and militarized border controls organized in 2004. The agency's practices, aimed at regulating the movement of people in and out the Union, often pose serious challenges to some of the values that officials present as characterizing the EU: solidarity, openness, and fluidity. These have been among the mainstays of the European dream for those who advocate for an ever-closer union among the nations of the continent. Their antitheses are fed by "a nightmare that has haunted the European imagination ever since the end of the Cold War," according to Matthew Carr, one that has resulted in "the most sustained and extensive border enforcement program in history" (3).

The inhabitants of southern Europe are particularly familiar with the plight of the migrants (including refuge seekers) who try to avoid those controls to make it into the continent. The Italian island of Lampedusa was the site of dramatic episodes during the Arab Spring revolts of 2011, when thousands of Tunisians arrived there during the events that are now part of the global memory of migration. A few years later, similar scenes took place

on Greek islands such as Lesbos and Kos. While the citizens living closest to the borders were the direct witnesses of these circumstances, other Europeans could not claim ignorance. The flow of people who, fleeing the war in Syria, reached the European borders in the summer of 2015 resulted in one of the most formidable challenges the EU has ever faced. Dismayed by a number of national governments that pressed to suspend the Schengen agreement to prevent the refugees from entering their countries (even just as a passage to more welcoming lands), Dimitris Avramopoulos, EU commissioner for migration, home affairs, and citizenship, declared, "Schengen is the greatest and most tangible achievement of European integration. . . . Unfortunately, the European dream has vanished" (*Guardian*, November 11, 2015). As of this writing, thousands continue to make the trip to Europe from Africa and the Middle East, and many die before they reach shore. The treatment they receive reveals time and again the conflict between the EU's declared humanitarian principles and the self-interested, short-sighted policies it sometimes implements. Member states' governments and citizens clash over how to handle this influx. The images of a crowd welcoming Syrian refugees in Munich's railway station, or of Italian navy sailors hauling them from the Mediterranean, appear side by side with news of police forces, whether on the Spanish coasts or along the Hungarian border, violently stopping those seeking refuge in Europe, or reports of anti-immigration rallies organized by PEGIDA (Patriotic Europeans Against the Islamization of the West) in Dresden and other German cities.

In light of these circumstances, the EU, an organization that prides itself on its high humanitarian standards and claims to set an example for the rest of the world, has instead been perceived as a group of countries that have chosen to display their association mainly as "united selfishness," as French thinker Bernard-Henri Lévy puts it (*Irish Examiner*, September 7, 2015). Unfortunately, more often than not, when the Union has to deal with a controversial mobility issue, "the result is another group of people being denied basic rights," writes Lévy in reference to the Syrian asylum seekers rejected by European border authorities. He goes on to connect their plight to the roots of Europe (and thus its identity), arguing that what is at stake in the management of these flows is much more than an issue of population regulations: "These individuals—whose course to Europe resembles that of the Phoenician Princess Europa, who arrived from Tyre on Zeus's back several millennia ago—are being wholly rejected; indeed, walls are being constructed to keep them out. . . . Europe, harassed by its xenophobes and consumed by self-doubt, has turned its back on its values. Indeed, it has

forgotten what it is. The bell tolls not only for the migrants, but also for a Europe whose humanistic patrimony is crumbling before our very eyes." Interestingly, at the same time that Lévy criticizes the ways the European integration project manifests itself, he partakes of an extended fallacy in presenting United Europe as a historical actor whose development tends to erase its member nations' darkest past. This notion of "Europeanness" presents their common heritage as sustaining an entity that is morally superior to its distinct national parts—as if the sum of them could obliterate their individual responsibilities.

Lévy's words have particular resonance in those regions where people encounter the materiality of borders on a daily basis. The ideals of mobility and openness, which many claim should be among the EU's main principles if it is to be something other than a free-trade zone, clash with the unquestionable reality of fences, passport controls, and deportations. Yet the migratory experience is a diverse one, and so is the array of insights it can offer us about the European project. A look at several responses to this issue from a specific cultural context such as twenty-first century Spain provides a helpful analysis that attempts to make the phenomenon's complexity visible, not hidden. Owing to its ambiguous relationship with the rest of Europe, its status as a former imperial power, and its proximity to Africa, Spain stands out as a country where the tensions produced by the conjunction of mobility and conflicting notions of identity have been determinant. The country's accession to the EU did not resolve those longstanding issues—if anything, they have become more intricate since then, as the new framework for international relations has been built upon a basic contradiction between freedom and curtailment of movement, respectively, within and into the Union.

Numerous Spanish artists and public intellectuals have dealt with these matters, which are of great consequence for an understanding of European ideals and their problematic institutional and cultural manifestations. These produce paradoxical practices and discourses that authors tackle in different genres, using approaches that range from the overtly political to the more nuanced. Juan Goytisolo, Valeriano López, Mercedes Cebrián, and Jordi Puntí are among those who have advanced a critique of the intersections of mobility and identity from a variety of Euroskeptic positions, transcending their national context to address these issues from a cosmopolitan perspective. Their contributions confront the stealthy development of a European unity based on the exclusion of many who are seen as antagonists or misfits: migrants from outside the Union, the Roma people,

poor citizens of the so-called PIGS nations (based on the acronym for Portugal, Italy, Greece, and Spain), etc. They expose the EU's self-proclaimed adherence to humanitarian ideals of solidarity as an idealization in itself—a moral fantasy at the service of a political project managed by elites.

At the Gates of Fortress Europe: Valeriano López's Video Art

Relatively new political structures such as the EU acknowledge the need to look beyond their member countries' borders to revive historical connections, even if those organizations do not always live up to their stated promises. Such is the case with the initiative known as the Barcelona Process, or Euro-Mediterranean Partnership (initially formalized in 1995), which intended to deepen "relations between Europe and other Mediterranean countries as part of a strengthened Euro-Mediterranean partnership which produces tangible results for citizens in the region," according to the language of the original declaration. One of the three key aspects of the agreement was the establishment of a "partnership in social, cultural and human affairs: Developing human resources, promoting understanding between cultures and exchanges between civil societies." In typical EU rhetoric, that official declaration "recognized that the traditions of culture and civilization throughout the Mediterranean region, dialogue between these cultures and exchanges at human, scientific and technological level [*sic*] are an essential factor in bringing their peoples closer, promoting understanding between them and improving their perception of each other."[1] Yet it is also the case that the benevolent yet vague language of the text regarding North-South relations was followed by very specific references to the problems of clandestine migration, terrorism, and drug trafficking. Another institutional initiative called Union for the Mediterranean, created in 2008, narrowed the focus to smaller, more manageable issues and emphasized surveillance policies. All in all, since the turn of the century, "an exclusionist approach to security increasingly prevails in European policy toward North Africa. . . . Migration has been increasingly defined as a security concern. The lifting of border controls within Europe has been accompanied by a strengthening of external controls," Kristina Kausch and Richard Youngs contend (965). Contacts and exchanges between the two regions are accepted as long as they are experienced at a distance, yet the movement of people from the South into the North is in practice demonized by European institutions. The legal and moral duties many Europeans feel toward refugee seekers and

migrants in general, and the demand for additional security that is raised when they are perceived as potential threats rather than victims, result in a series of conflictive views.[2]

Motivations in the Mediterranean for obstructing the influx from Africa into Europe vary, but not so much the ideas behind those efforts and the way they are communicated to the larger public. The arguments used to justify strict border controls generally oppose what is presented as European welfare and support the notion that sophisticated culture is a patrimony of its native citizens, which must be protected from Africans' poverty and insatiable appetite. In cruder terms, civilization must defend itself from barbarism. This timeworn discourse resurfaced around the same time that the cultural relevance of the division between Western and Eastern Europe diminished following the collapse of the Cold War imaginary, giving way to a "search for new identity markers, which has also meant a return to older ideas (such as in the case of the re-emergence of Islam as Europe's main significant Other)," as Gerard Delanty notes (248). Those ideas are certainly nothing new in Europe's discourses of exceptionality, nor exclusive to that area of the world. Although the ideas are articulated differently depending on national circumstances, at least one element can be identified as common to the majority of those discourses: the view that Europe must fortify itself against outsiders. As a result of the threat allegedly posed by migrants from beyond the confines of the Union (especially Africa), European governments have often adhered to what can be called, following the Italian philosopher Roberto Esposito, an immunitary paradigm. Working from the notion of immunity as the key to advancing Michel Foucault's ideas on biopolitics, Esposito grounds his investigation in the etymological root that "community" and "immunity" share as well as in the use of the latter term as a medical and politico-legal concept. Succinctly put, the danger implicit in the immunity paradigm, originally intended to protect life, is that its extreme realization can end up destroying that same life (*Bios* 45–77). European efforts to isolate its community from purported outside threats endanger not only those who attempt to join that society but also its own long-term survival, as the continent's population is dwindling and increasingly elderly. Europe's future well-being may be determined by how it handles its impending demographic crisis, which adds to the incongruence of the Union's severely restrictive migration policies. The prosperity and welfare systems of countries such as Germany, Poland, Portugal, Italy, and Spain (to name just a few of those that have very low fertility rates)

will be seriously damaged unless they become more open to flows from outside the EU.

But the Union seems either unable or unwilling—depending on who the actors behind its stated positions are—to address the implications of these projected demographic scenarios. As a consequence, it does not dispute the outdated approaches enshrined in the population, migration, and citizenship policies of many of its member nations; indeed, it facilitates a framework that contributes to their perpetuation. The containment and control efforts of Fortress Europe are prioritized over the different countries' own long-term demographic needs, as is the case with Spain. Because of its proximity to Africa and its special relationship with Latin America, Spain turned out to be a key element in Europe's immunity paradigm. Its role as a guardian of the Union's southwestern borders from those arriving from Africa became particularly visible at the end of last century. Yet official attempts at regulating human traffic through the Mediterranean often proved futile, and even counterproductive. Since 1988, when the first corpse appeared on one of Spain's southern beaches, an estimated six thousand to eighteen thousand migrants have lost their lives—a fact that provokes reactions among Spaniards ranging from anguish and solidarity to indifference to, in the worst cases, xenophobia.[3] In response to the growing flow of African migrants, the EU and the Spanish government began to take measures to seal the southern border. Their initiatives included the construction of a wall around Ceuta (a city belonging to Spain located on the northern coast of Africa) in 1993 and the development of a "total exterior surveillance system" in 1999 (one of the gems of Spain's own military-industrial complex).[4] This system employs long-range radar, thermal imaging cameras, night-vision devices, helicopters, and patrol boats. Notwithstanding the official messages regarding the government's duty to assist migrants, certain events illuminate the main purpose of the personnel, equipment, and infrastructure deployed along the border. It should suffice to recall the disgraceful episode that took place at Ceuta's Tarajal Beach on February 6, 2014, when Spanish border-control agents used rubber bullets and smoke canisters against a group of people who were swimming in a desperate attempt to reach the Spanish shore. Fifteen migrants drowned. Explanations regarding the rationale for these actions and the political accountability associated with them were vague at best, despite the public outcry that followed, and the agents involved were exonerated.

Some literary and artistic works offer poignant views on the debates (or lack thereof) about African–European relations and movements as well as

on the role and impact of the national and European agencies that seek to regulate them, sometimes at the cost of compromising the Union's humanitarian principles and demographic sustainability. In Spanish culture, Juan Goytisolo's oeuvre is probably the best-known example of the rich possibilities and important insights derived from an informed literary approach to these issues. Goytisolo's writing has illuminated many aspects of the social and cultural reality of the Mediterranean region since it was first published in the 1950s, and he continued to expose the lights and shadows of the Europe–North Africa relationship well into the twenty-first century through fiction and essays that are never complacent with a "home" tradition. His reflections are always alert to the present, yet solidly grounded in historical knowledge along the lines of Américo Castro's reading of Spanish history, one that emphasizes the importance of non-Christian elements in the development of Spanish and European identities. This interpretation undergirds Goytisolo's work about contemporary migrations between Africa and Europe, one of his most salient preoccupations. To highlight the deep roots and implications of the current Spanish involvement in Fortress Europe, Goytisolo reminds his readers of the medieval *Marca Hispánica* [Spanish March]. The March was a buffer zone in what is present-day Catalonia, established to prevent the Muslim forces that had entered the Peninsula in 711 from advancing beyond the Pyrenees. According to Goytisolo, Andalucía, Iberia's southernmost region, has become a new *Marca Hispánica*, a land where the Europeans are currently developing a new (yet deeply ingrained in the past) defensive mission because "los *moros* de la otra orilla seguirán encarnando la amenaza virtual de la temida invasión de los bárbaros" ("De la migración" 868) [the *Moors* from the other shore will continue to embody the virtual threat of the feared barbarian invasion].[5] The barrier function that the EU seems to have assigned southern Spain is particularly striking when one considers not only the region's history as the focal point of Muslim culture in Europe up to the early modern period, but also its economic and demographic developments since then, and how that history is used today for purposes such as tourism promotion.

Goytisolo's contributions are as crucial as they are well known among the Spanish intelligentsia, which nevertheless has not always received them positively, as his insights often reveal the extent to which European intellectuals fail to recognize or engage with traditions that seem alien to what they consider their own. Notably, Goytisolo (1931–2017) had a fundamental role in the ongoing revision of the beliefs concerning Spanish

culture's position between Europe and Africa. Some of his ideas, such as his warning that a new Spanish March was emerging, find echoes in the work of artist Valeriano López (b. Huéscar, Granada, 1963), who has explored from a very critical position the defensive role Fortress Europe proponents have assigned to his native Andalucía. From that region, López creates art in a context in which the fascination with al-Andalus' past splendor overlaps with the realities of xenophobia and rejection of Islam. Recent Muslim immigrants to Spain have encountered a social landscape shaped by an ambivalent perception of the country's relationship to Africa and its own Islamic past. The most recent colonial enterprises in Morocco and Equatorial Guinea, which lasted until the 1970s, served the Franco regime to (among other things) remind Spaniards of their position in world affairs: they were conquerors, imposers of high European ideals onto so-called primitive peoples. The cases of Ceuta and Melilla—the two major remaining Spanish colonial outposts in Northern Africa—and the 2002 armed confrontation with Morocco over the tiny island known as Tura, Laila, or Perejil (in Bereber, Arabic, and Spanish, respectively), an uninhabited rock situated a slingshot away from the African coast, are revelatory of the values that are still present in Spain's self-image. López has been a pioneer among those who have created overtly political art on these issues, with key pieces addressing the topic of current cross-Mediterranean migration, such as his video piece *Estrecho Adventure* [Strait Adventure, 1996] and other projects on the same subject, including *Europasión* [Europassion, 2000] and *Confabulación* [Confabulation, 2007].

López's creative trajectory has been wide-ranging: his initial artistic training was in textiles, after which he studied dance and drama with Pina Bausch and cinema in Cuba, where he witnessed the so-called Rafters' Crisis in August 1994, during which thousands of Cubans attempted to reach the United States in rickety, often improvised boats. (Their plight may have been a wake-up call for López about the intricacies of migration.) Upon his return to Spain, he participated in several collective and pedagogical art initiatives, always keeping an eye on the intense cross-cultural contacts at play in his surroundings. Through his highly idiosyncratic approach (which embraces the language of so-called lesser forms such as video games and folktales), López makes visible the depth and political reach of the ongoing migrations between Africa and Europe. His art feeds from an acute rereading of history, tradition, and symbols, underscoring that these are themselves historical constructs—as is any European "essence" that is based on them in order to sustain an exclusionary identity.

López's first individually produced piece, *Estrecho Adventure*, deals with the network of fantasies that feed the phenomenon of migration and the barriers erected in a region that has historically fostered intense exchange between Europe and Africa.[6] The work is divided in two clearly differentiated parts. The first, which runs for four minutes and forty seconds, is animated in the format of an imagined arcade video game in which Abdul, a young Moroccan—or, at a different level, the implicit player—must make his way into Europe. Once the video game is over, López surprises the viewer with a change in the piece's framework, ending with the second part, which is filmed in regular video (with amateur actors) and lasts a few seconds. Over the five levels of the game, Abdul faces increasing challenges in an effort to establish himself in Spain as a migrant worker, avoiding official controls from the beginning of his adventure. First he must get money from Western tourists in Morocco to finance the initial stages of his trip, and although he has to elude the local police to succeed, this opening level turns out to be the easiest one, as befits any video game. Things get more difficult on the following level, in which Abdul attempts to cross the Mediterranean piloting a raft. As navigators have done for millennia, he uses the stars in the firmament to guide himself on his voyage to the promised land of Europe. But stars also represent the institution that tries to prevent his reaching the shore and fulfilling his dream: those of the EU flag rise above the horizon ahead as Abdul skillfully pilots the boat across the Strait of Gibraltar, dodging bullets fired by the border patrols attacking the intruder from air and sea. At the same time, we hear a few bars of the prelude from *Te Deum* by seventeenth-century composer Marc-Antoine Charpentier. This piece (whose military and Christian overtones were originally very clear) was adopted as the European Broadcasting Union's theme music in the 1950s.[7] Since then, television viewers have associated the tune with the continent's unification process, as it precedes popular pancontinental shows such as the Eurovision song contest. The use of the EU flag and of Charpentier's melody are two examples of the appropriation and recycling of official symbols, one of López's preferred strategies. In the video, the seal and flag of Andalucía follow those of the EU in receiving this kind of treatment. As Abdul reaches the Spanish shore, the goal for the next portion of the game is to first make it through the border control and then obtain the necessary permits to reside and work in Spain. López takes the figure of Hercules (pictured in the seal of Andalucía) and presents him in an official form as an unimpressive vigilante in charge of monitoring the gate in a wall of brick and barbed wire that impedes Abdul's progress, and he

Figure 4.1. Valeriano López, still from *Estrecho Adventure* ("Level 3: Get Legal (Papers)"). 1996. Courtesy of the artist.

transforms Hercules's two mythical lions into guard dogs wearing spiked collars (fig. 4.1). Legend has it that Hercules inscribed the motto "Non plus ultra" [Not further beyond] over the two pillars that resulted when he separated Africa and Europe, and it is those words that López places over the fortified entrance to the Union.[8] However, these are not the exact words found on the actual Andalusian seal (which reads *Dominator Hercules Fundator* [Sovereign Hercules, Founder]) or the Spanish one (*Plus ultra* [Further beyond]). By restoring the adverb of negation, López recaptures the slogan's original dissuasive meaning. Yet, while in classical antiquity those words marked the limit of the sea that was known to navigators, here they serve as an admonition to those who attempt to access Europe from the south: you are not welcome here.

Other echoes of Europe's classical tradition are sardonically revisited in the video piece. Rather than confronting the feminized Hercules, who merely stands by the gate, Abdul must face Grimor, a supernaturally muscled border agent, in order to enter. The officer's name could be an amalgam of the mythical Crysor and his son, the giant Geryon, a native of what is currently Andalucía and "reputedly the strongest man alive"

(Graves 451) when Hercules fought him as part of the tenth of his labors. The visual effects of Abdul's fight with Grimor evoke *Street Fighter*, a Japanese video-game series by Capcom that became a global success after its 1987 release—notice also the paronomasia of *strait/street*.[9] However, contrary to what are (or used to be) the bland, generic soundtracks for this type of entertainment product destined for global consumption, in López's video the combat is accompanied by a very distinctive flamenco *palmeo* (hand clapping). At the sound of it, Abdul defeats Grimor with a masterful blow to the officer's testicles. It is important to underscore that López avoids presenting Abdul as a mere victim of Europe's rejection of or lack of solidarity with the poor of the South. The artist stresses that the arrival of those migrants involves different types of violence; first and foremost, the one Europeans use to deter the influx of people. But he also suggests that those who endure that violence will not remain passive and that the fortress they encounter will not be able to obliterate their agency. Accordingly, Abdul is portrayed in a way that may well be considered threatening. The hero's skill at mastering new contexts, and his physical strength and defiant attitude (emphasized by his ever-nude torso), facilitate the hypothetical gamer's wish to identify with him. This identification is further enabled by the option to choose the hero's nationality from a range of African countries, such as Ghana, Senegal, Mali, and Ivory Coast, whose migrants often use the Strait of Gibraltar as a passage into Europe.

Abdul's might is not so imperative for his success in the game's subsequent levels. Once in Europe, gaining acceptance depends more on his stamina and ability to adapt to the new context than on sheer physical strength. The environment he encounters turns out to be hostile for both natural and political reasons: he must survive sharp icicles falling from the sky as well as a tense, impoverished social milieu. Abdul walks by a long line of people waiting at the employment office, and some pedestrians literally march over him. He manages to avoid a group of hooligans chanting xenophobic slogans by hiding among a few homeless people who are warming themselves around a fire next to graffiti of a swastika and text that asserts, "MOROS FUERA" [Moors Keep Out]. His assimilation to the majority's appearance is only partial, as he changes his white pants for jeans but never covers his torso. In the final level of the game, Abdul's goal is to secure a job. He finds work in a greenhouse, where he fights insects with a poisonous spray and is hit by a huge fist wearing a gold bracelet. Eventually, he receives his award: a temporary work contract. As this document appears on screen, we hear some boys' excited voices. The cartoon/

video game abruptly disappears, and we shift to the second and last part of López's piece. In this much shorter sequence, no longer animated, the elated boys are revealed as the ones who have been controlling Abdul via an arcade machine in a Moroccan café. Camera in hand, a couple of tourists observe them fleetingly through a window. As the boys leave the café, two of them start following another tourist, calling for her attention in Spanish in an attempt to guide her to the local market and make some money.

By appropriating the video-game aesthetic, López dissolves the boundary between the ludic and the political. His proposal relates the EU's sophisticated, yet mostly futile, technology for Mediterranean border surveillance with the electronic entertainment forms that have become prevalent across the globe. It is also worth noting that already in the early 1990s, López was addressing the imaginary construction of space through digital technology, which has become increasingly relevant in our daily lives ever since. While apps such as Mapquest and Google Earth are now rather ordinary examples of such technology, from the initial sequence of *Estrecho Adventure* (which zooms in from an electronic map of an overpopulated northwestern Africa to the medina where Abdul is being harassed by the local police as he tries to get money from tourists), López also anticipated debates on more recent technologies that portray conflict scenarios as if they were video games, such as military drones.

Yet in *Estrecho Adventure* López did not open his work to the possibilities for interaction that a real video-game format can offer. When he created it in 1996, the Internet paradigm was still what is now called Web 1.0: most users could reach content but were unable to interact with it, much less participate in its production. *Estrecho Adventure* is a closed story that ends with Abdul's success, which is marked by the English word *CONGRATULATIONS* appearing on the screen and celebrated by the boys who have been playing the game. Years later, in an interview with Zemos98, López stated that the possibility for interaction, which became much more technically feasible not long after the piece's release, would not have added anything significant to his message.[10] Moreover, he remarked that the work's rigid format makes it even clearer that (within the fiction of the video) the game has been produced for Africans, but by Europeans. Having European audiences playing a game of *Estrecho Adventure* would entail a certain degree of falsification of a social and political reality in which it is very clear who the people actually at risk in the adventure of migrating into Europe are.

As art critic Mar Villaespesa points out, López is very aware of the dan-

ger that critical discourses run of being coopted by governments or even more sympathetic receptors. This may happen, for instance, when they are restricted to spaces that, even if they are prestigious, are very limited in their impact, as is the case with most contemporary art centers. López does not allow these limitations to stop him, however; instead, he continuously explores the cracks through which different audiences can reactivate his work. In the case of *Estrecho Adventure*, whose success could have made it a mere entertainment product or a fossilized museum piece, López brought it to different shows over the years, albeit with a twist: at each screening, the film plays out of the sight of European audiences (with the screen facing where they cannot reach), while a group portrait of Moroccan children is placed where "they" can watch it directly. Moreover, López's piece suggests that the crossing of the strait, and more generally of the Mediterranean and other natural and political borders, is a phenomenon that is very present in the imaginary of North African youth, who share with young people in wealthier parts of the world a knack for video-gaming but have much stronger reasons than they to empathize with Abdul, whose challenges mirror many of those faced by migrants around the world. Moreover, arcade games, in contrast with more traditional forms of play, are inseparable from money: one needs to "insert coin" to play a game or, in Spanish, a *partida*, a word whose polysemy is also mined by López. Migrants such as Abdul also must pay to ensure their "partida," the initial step to leaving a place and starting a voyage. And state budgets parcel out different "partidas" (allocations) to try to stop them at the gates.

After *Estrecho Adventure*, López has continued to create groundbreaking art that denounces the contradictions between official European policies that regulate borders and the Union's stated principles of humanitarianism. In 2000, he authored an interactive CD-ROM titled *Pasaporte intervenido. Basado en un hecho virtual* [Seized passport. Based on a virtual event]. The project includes *Europasión*, a brief video piece in which the EU flag's circle of twelve five-pointed yellow stars mutates into a barbed-wire crown of thorns resting on a blue pillow embroidered with the European symbol in golden silk, linking the Passion of Jesus Christ to the suffering of those trying to migrate into Europe. As they attempt to enter the region to improve or save their lives, they encounter Europe's "passion" for erecting ever more impenetrable borders. While the Union has been very effective at eliminating barriers within Europe, no similar effort has been made to foster a more humane approach to the situations created by its hardened border controls. The inclusion of an icon of Christian mercy also points to

the double-edged role of Europe's Christian legacy vis-à-vis the issues of migration and acceptance of cultural and religious difference. As we saw in Chapter 1, already in the early 1940s María Zambrano was writing about two possibilities inherent in Europe's conflicting visions of Christianity: one derived from the conception of an omnipotent, severe God, and another that comes from the notion of a merciful, protecting deity. While the former leads to a worldview that encourages excluding and attacking the Other, the latter urges inclusion. In Zambrano's view, Europe embraced the former.[11] Of course, this diagnosis should not be seen as an insurmountable tragedy; the work of artists such as Valeriano López demonstrates that an awareness of tradition's ambiguous role may lead to a better understanding of Fortress Europe and the intertwined politics of mobility and identity that govern it.

López further explored the topic of Europe's common heritage as an element that can be used as an instrument of exclusion in another video piece, *Confabulación*, produced in 2007 as an ironic celebration of *Estrecho Adventure*'s tenth anniversary. *Confabulación* offers a renewed look at the persistent European contradictions regarding its growing population of African origin, poignantly making visible the lengths to which Fortress Europe is willing to go to safeguard the essences that allegedly sustain the continent's identity. One of the video's most obvious intertexts is the most famous version of the folktale *The Pied Piper of Hamelin*, by the Brothers Grimm, in which the authorities of Hamelin commission a musician to get rid of a plague of rats. He does the job by enchanting the rodents with a magical melody, but the city does not pay him his due. The piper retaliates by taking away the town's children using the same melodious method.

In a linguistic move with an etymological density typical of López's titles, the Brothers Grimm *fable* becomes a *confabulation*. Both words come from the Latin *fabula*, meaning discourse, story, or narration. López's piece shares some of the canonical traits of the fable, such as brevity, didactic intention, and a moral. Interestingly, in the English language, a "confabulation" refers to a rather innocuous chat. But in Spanish, "confabular" is "to reach an agreement to carry out a plan, generally of an illicit nature": that is, to conspire. In this work, López responds to some worrying developments related to migration dynamics and containment policies that have been discussed previously in these pages. Paradoxically, paralleling the development of Fortress Europe to prevent (mostly young) migrants from accessing the continent, European governments were taking measures to

promote native population growth, as birth rates in most were too low to ensure the countries' future viability. In the summer of the year that López created *Confabulación*, at the height of Spain's economic boom, Socialist Prime Minister Rodríguez Zapatero announced that the government would give families 2,500 euros for every new child. The combination of increasingly strict immigration controls and subsidies for locals' fertility—which had no noticeable effect on birth rates and were soon canceled as a result of austerity measures—could be seen as a form of prejudice against foreigners in keeping with the "immunitary paradigm" (as conceptualized by Esposito) that the EU implicitly endorses. As human-rights scholar Javier de Lucas argues, the Union has, in practice, institutionalized xenophobia, de facto turning immigration laws into a state of exception (111).

The story of López's film is set in his native city, Granada, whose dense past is particularly relevant to the issues of mobility and diversity, as it was the seat of the last surviving Muslim kingdom in Spain until the Catholic monarchs Isabel and Ferdinand conquered it in 1492, giving a decisive boost to the Christian cleansing of their realms. Atop a hill overlooking the city, a flutist in a tuxedo (and also wearing a top hat) begins the main theme of the final movement of Ludwig van Beethoven's Ninth Symphony. The haunting music attracts children of African descent, who follow the

Figure 4.2. Valeriano López, still from *Confabulación*. 2007.
Courtesy of the artist.

flutist down the hill, dancing and chanting in Berber and Arabic while he repeatedly plays the melody's opening phrase, which is suddenly drowned out by a recording of the famous "Ode to Joy" chorus and the symphony's frenetic finale (fig. 4.2). The flutist leads the children toward what looks like a Berber tent, ornate with lavish draperies; with a bow, he invites them in, but once they are all inside, the flutist quickly removes the draperies, revealing the true nature of the place: it is a police van. While the children, unaware of what is happening, continue to dance and play inside the van, the flutist closes the doors and signals the driver to take off. As the vehicle leaves, the music stops, and we can hear the children again—but now what we hear is just a muffled cry and some banging on the inside of the van's doors.

The sounds in López's video are especially relevant for understanding the piece, as they point to the economy of social prestige and belonging at play in the context of those parts of Europe where migrations from Africa and contact with Islam have been—and remain—historically significant. The music, from Beethoven's Ninth, is the EU anthem, selected to symbolize the unity, diversity, and solidarity of its member nations. "An die Freude," the original Schiller poem on which the symphony's final movement is based, celebrates fraternity—albeit not a totally unconditional one, which may explain one reason why the organization took only the melody, and not the lyrics, as its symbol. The "bond between all beings" that the text acclaims is underscored by Beethoven's choral treatment, yet with an ironic bent.[12] Similarly, López's satire denounces the frequent constriction of such fraternity in contemporary Europe by ethnic, religious, and national prejudice. The soundtrack also has national implications. The children's speech acts as a counterpoint to the original German lyrics' high status in Spain, a nation still dreaming about its Europeanness, thus offering a linguistic reminder of Spain's orientalized or, for some, less-than-European past. Speaking the dialect of Arabic common in Morocco, the children intone another solidarity chant, the only intelligible thing they say in the video, as they follow the flutist through the streets. The rallying cry "bir-ruh, bid-dam" [with the soul, with the blood] is often shouted during protests throughout the Arab-speaking world, usually followed by the protest slogan. In any case, while these details add to the richness of López's work, the visual language of his video pieces makes any knowledge of the languages spoken in them virtually unnecessary; *Confabulación* is no exception.

López emphasizes the city itself, and most especially its walls, as a visual icon that embodies his criticism of Fortress Europe. The film is set in an old section of Granada where urban decay is particularly visible. Some walls have collapsed or are ruined, while others are covered in graffiti—just the sort of place where one would expect to see a rat or two amid the garbage. Yet instead of rats, it is children who show up to follow the flutist. While the image of a plague that must be contained is explicitly introduced in the opening scene of *Estrecho Adventure* (with the blurry depictions of a large number of Africans congregating in the north of the continent as they prepare to attempt to reach Europe), in *Confabulación* the children's appearance is unanticipated, and they move in an anarchic way, emerging even from the cracks in the walls in response to the melody's spell. As with a rat infestation, their presence in the city is treated in the video as a public-health issue: in consonance with the dominant immunitary paradigm, the kids are a plague to be dealt with by the authorities. This paradigm has been operational in the area since the dawn of modernity, when attempts to cleanse the former kingdom of Granada of Muslim traces led to the conflicts that culminated in the wars of the Alpujarras (1568–1571). In the city of Granada, Christian efforts toward that end were also made manifest in several urban rituals, such as the Corpus Christi festivities, directly sponsored by Ferdinand and Isabella, who offered funds so that the city's inhabitants could hold celebrations in which "ha de ser tal e tan grande la alegría . . . que parezcais locos" (qtd. in Cuesta 234 n15) [the joy must be such, and so great . . . that you seem crazy]; religious street extravaganzas in the seventeenth century; and the annual celebration known as "Día de la Toma" [Conquest Day], a local holiday that is still held to commemorate, with a mass and a procession, the Christian takeover of the town.[13] The joyful musical parade down the streets of the Albaicín quarter that appears in López's piece ironizes that long history of religious exaltation and Catholic appropriation of his city's urban spaces. Those same walls that hid the children become a trap; the town's medieval streets narrow to a funnel that channels them toward their perdition.[14] However, the most prominent walls shown are those of the Alhambra, which look especially imposing from the bottom-up perspective used. By emphasizing the monument's original function as a fortress, López contradicts the perception of it that holds sway nowadays, as a lavish palace surrounded by sensuous gardens. He implicitly disputes the paradisiacal image of the Spanish Middle Ages as a time of tolerance, as well as its use as an antecedent for present-day

multiculturalism. López undermines this idyllic view, presenting it as a discursive fiction, a fable, or a *confabulación* [a conspiracy] that reminds us of some of the less edifying chapters of Spanish history, such as the expulsion of the *moriscos*, carried out between 1609 and 1614, an ethnic cleansing effort that Cervantes dramatizes in *Don Quixote* (Part 2, 54–63). The shots of the Alhambra allow the viewer to place the film's location with precision and frame the action within a very significant historical setting, one that is much more complex than what current political and touristic discourses, in erasing its most conflictive aspects, make of it. The image of the fortress presiding over the children's evacuation connects the exclusionary policies of present-day Europe with the state decisions that have determined the construction of the prevailing ethnic and religious value system since early modern times. The function of the Alhambra in the video piece is that of a problematic monument—or of a monumental problem: it appears not as an ornament in the background, but as a reminder of past tensions between different communities and as an admonition (from the Latin *monere*, to warn, which is also the root of "monument") about those that still shape social life in Europe.

Valeriano López tackles a social imaginary in which cultural, religious, and ethnic differences are still seen as a threat by many in Europe. Mobility into and within the continent exacerbates this perception. The primary political response to the challenge posed by diversity in motion has been to try to contain it by erecting a series of barriers, both physical and bureaucratic. But the walls of Fortress Europe are full of cracks, and many of those trying to make it into the continent succeed. Moreover, the economic and demographic viability of the societies these walls are supposed to defend depends to an enormous degree on their ability to manage mobility and absorb migrants, as supporters of more welcoming policies argue. López's work invites reconsidering this issue as a phenomenon that has been part of the European context for a long time and that now presents new forms which leaders and citizens must assimilate. As philosopher Judith Butler writes, "whether and how we respond to the suffering of others, how we formulate moral criticisms, how we articulate political analyses, depends upon a certain field of perceptible reality having already been established" (64). Valeriano López's art questions a portion of that reality constructed around an idea of Europe as a citadel threatened by outsiders either besieging it or already within its walls. His video pieces aim to modify that established image by making the contradictions in the EU's policies toward migrants apparent through a visual language that can be

easily apprehended. Its simplicity, however, is sustained by a rich work on the history of the conflicts that have historically accompanied mobility and interactions in Europe's South.

At the Marketplace: Mercedes Cebrián's *Mercado Común*

Although migrations into the EU have been the most challenging aspect of mobility in the region since the 1990s, as Valeriano López's work demonstrates, other issues related to freedom of movement that often go unnoticed have also captured the imagination of contemporary Spanish authors. One of these is Mercedes Cebrián (b. Madrid, 1971), whose second book, the poetry collection *Mercado Común* [Common Market, 2006], deals with some of the implications for Europeans of living and traveling within a seemingly borderless space based on an integrated economic region. Initiatives linked to this apparent fluidity, such as the EU's Erasmus Program for educational exchange, have received widespread attention, especially among people who may have enjoyed them directly while growing up in an increasingly interconnected and prosperous Europe, like Cebrián herself. Yet not everything about the so-called "borderless" Europe is as bright as institutional campaigns show. Cebrián's poems explore how, as we saw in the preceding pages, mobility choices (or the lack thereof) can reveal much about old and emerging barriers as well as about the identities that they define or confine—in this case, among those citizens who would most clearly benefit from continental unity. Additionally, *Mercado Común* underscores the effects produced by the contradiction between the EU's claims to solidarity (among its member states, their citizens, and the rest of the world) and the actual arrangements it favors, which are guided by the principles of neoliberalism and a constrictive notion of citizenship that still relies on exclusionary national identities (Braidotti 79). Cebrián's poetry suggests that this space of much-touted freedom of movement breeds individualism and social exclusion rather than interpersonal contact, exchange, and empathy. In the book, these emotions are managed from an individual's point of view, advocating poetry as particularly apt for articulating the dialectical relationship between subjectivity and social conditions. Along these lines, Cebrián's work offers an intimate view of how southern European citizens' self image is transformed as a result of their nations' membership in the EU and the free movement of people, capital, and goods it promotes.[15]

Mercado Común explores with an ironic tone the less visible conflicts

that arise in a society in which a market mentality conditions even personal relationships. The collection's title deserves some comment, starting with its spelling. Unlike in English, the capitalization of common nouns in a Spanish title is highly unusual. Cebrián's choice to do so in *Mercado Común* emphasizes how the book plays off the Common (or Single) Market, one of the terms most frequently employed for the space of free movement of goods and capital that was created by the Treaty of Rome (1957), which stands as the EU's most direct precedent. The Common Market is also the subject of thousands of works that, though they may have similar titles, are anything but poetic in their approach to the topic, which has generated its own cottage industry of social-sciences scholarship. At the same time, Cebrián's title engages the classic allegory of the world as a market, echoed in Pedro Calderón de la Barca's *auto sacramental* titled *El gran mercado del mundo*: that of society as a vast market in which values, beliefs, and even individuals are seen as merchandise.

A positive view of the role of the free market since the beginning of the continental integration process claims that this model, in constant tension with the state, allows "a logic to operate that diffuses power, modifies institutions, generates new values, and sustains itself. . . . The market process is slowly, even grudgingly, giving rise to a different kind of civilization in Europe and in the world generally," according to John Gillingham (*European Integration* xii–xiii). Gillingham argues that, in a moment characterized by a diminished sense of nationhood, this societal model based on the ideas of liberal economist Friedrich von Hayek and his followers is the only true driver of European unification. Others, however, denounce the growing predominance in that process of purely chrematistic interests, which governments increasingly refuse—or are unable—to control, creating a world where other principles hold little sway. As Peter Gowan puts it with a somewhat contrived pun, the European project was "Hayekjacked" in the 1980s (51). Before that, the EU (and its predecessors) could be seen as a manifestation of a "social market capitalism"[16] or "capitalism with a soul," which differentiated it from models such as those defended by advocates, like Milton Friedman, of laissez-faire economic policies. The image of the Common European Market as a pro-equality entity, officially concerned about social justice, was the product of its original objective: to build a lasting peace by generating increased economic interdependence among its member states. Those states "rescued" themselves from collapse thanks to that integration (according to historian Alan Milward's famous account); it remains to be seen to what extent their citizens, especially those not

directly engaged in the financial and bureaucratic establishments, have benefited from it. In contrast to the images of face-to-face transactions and common interests that a traditional market evokes, neoliberal structures advance the dehumanizing aspects of marketing: the citizen's role is reduced to that of consumer, while identity is treated as just another commodity. In what has become the predominant model, personal relationships are often conceived as interactions with personal gain or loss as their goal. The only limitation to the mutual conversion of those involved in them as mere means to an end would be that of keeping up appearances. As Michael J. Sandel argues, our society has mutated from one that has a market economy into one that *is* a market. "Today," Sandel writes, "the logic of buying and selling no longer applies to material goods alone but increasingly governs the whole of life" (6). Freedom of movement may be guaranteed for flows of capital, but it has become much less meaningful for those individuals who can enjoy it. Faced with this landscape, those speaking in Cebrián's book vindicate their own spaces on a private scale and attempt to move against the grain carved by the market. Mobility is presented as a means of resistance on a minor scale through a search for forms of social cohesion that are not necessarily mediated by money.

The opening poem in the volume is simply identified with the epigraph "a," the first in a series that ends with "h." Thus, the series echoes the subdivisions of an administrative report or memo, a filing system typically alien to a book of poetry. But its form functions as a reinforcement of the message offered from the very first lines, which allude to the homogenization of social life and the exclusion of those who resist it or are rejected for not fitting in with its bourgeois schemes:

> Aquí están los adultos de la Unión
> Europea. Aquí también su manera discreta
> de expulsar de sus vidas
> a los otros adultos
> —afortunadamente en todos sus armarios
> hay una gabardina
> azul marino o beige.
>
> Si logro agazaparme en este recoveco
> no me alcanzará ninguna directiva
> comunitaria. No me alcanzarán tampoco
> los proyectos. En este portafolios llevo

el mío: no lo voy a emprender, sólo quiero mostraros
su muerte, verjurada en la pulpa
de su propio papel. (11)

[Here are the adults of the European
Union. Here too, their discreet way
of expelling from their lives
other adults
—fortunately in all their closets
hangs a trench coat,
navy or beige.

If I manage to crouch in this nook
no EU directive
will reach me. Nor will
any project. In this portfolio I carry
my own: not to embark with—I only wish to show all of you
its death, laid in the pulp
of its own paper.]

The first sentence's ambivalence, which could refer either to the European politicians and technocrats or to all the citizens of the Union, gestures to those responsible for the fact that privileged Europeans too often act against the principles of equality and solidarity. The fallacy of the "unity" they sustain is exposed from the start by an enjambment that separates the two terms of the official name and the relevance given to "expel," the most powerful verb included in the book's opening piece. Theirs are undoubtedly selfish attitudes, which are nevertheless carried out in a "discreet way," all the while fostering an image of moral superiority. The trench coat, a garment ever present in high-ranking administrative circles, signals the uniformity imposed on the bureaucratic environment depicted in the poem. The lyrical subject tries to hide from the mass of regulations that justifies the existence of the enormous bureaucratic apparatus which, rather than facilitating coexistence, is a Kafkaesque structure upon which Fortress Europe has been built—the Union is a space that attempts to shield its wealth from any who try to access a portion of it from the outside.

Life projects that deviate from the guidelines set by the elites in charge of regulating the "common market" appear to be unfeasible. In the third stanza, the poetic voice ironically appropriates elements of bureaucratic

jargon, demanding seemingly trivial measures from citizens, such as the "recycling" of their hopes once they have been effectively quelled. The view of the lyric subject alternates between criticism of the massive, impersonal institutions that attempt to direct citizens' existence, including an appeal to solidarity, and the pragmatic complicity that guarantees her survival. It is the voice of someone operating within the system, but who is also lucid enough to detect its flaws and point them out with irony. The poem ends with another hypothetical appeal midway between sarcasm and the demand for re-humanization:

> En una sala de juntas no necesitaría
> alzar la voz. A través del micrófono
> os diría
>
> Cuidad vuestros ordenadores portátiles
> y regad las pantallas de vuestros rododendros.
>
> Pues claro que abrirán
> muy pronto
> sucursales de esta realidad. (13)
>
> [In a boardroom I wouldn't need
> to raise my voice. Into the microphone
> I would say to all of you
>
> Care for your laptops
> and water the screens of your rhododendrons.
>
> Of course they will open
> very soon
> new branches of this reality.]

The subsequent poems continue to explore some of the stated preoccupations with mobility, with a cryptic yet highly evocative language and a perspective that oscillates from a social to an individual one: Poem "b" deals with transatlantic migration from Europe to the Americas and the impact of evolving communication technologies on that experience around the turn of the nineteenth to twentieth century; "c" relates the role of the joints in facilitating the human body's movement to the links that emerge

between persons on the go and those who are rooted; "d" ponders the fortuitousness of the sense of place and of belonging to a specific city; and so on. Although they all contribute uniquely to Cebrián's project, I will conduct a close reading of two other pieces in the book that, with significant artistic achievement, illustrate points that are particularly relevant for our topic. The first part of the collection, which shares its title with the volume, ends with a poem that implicitly establishes a dialogue with some of the Europhile motives and attitudes analyzed in Chapter 3. Under the label of "culturalism," they characterized a good part of the *novísimo* and *post-novísimo* tendencies prevalent in Spanish literature (especially poetry) during the 1960s and 1970s. Under the silent epigraph of the letter "h," Cebrián delivers a piece in which sound, and particularly so-called classical music, gives way to the social reflections underlying her poetry.

> Oremos por el Barroco Europeo (que levanten la mano
> sus copropietarios), oremos por nuestros pasaportes
> a todas luces mejores que los vuestros. Oremos
> por lo bueno, para que mejore todavía
> más. Aprendí que lo bueno se situaba
> arriba, lo malo más abajo: Viena encima
> de algo, por ejemplo. Conozco al menos seis
> realidades más temibles que ésta. Se curvan todas ellas
> hacia abajo, hacia lo posterior
> del pasaporte.
>
> > *mira, ese grupo de ancianos ha*
> > *vivido de cerca el desembarco*
>
> Aquí estamos a salvo, en nuestro territorio
> la fuga es solamente una forma
> musical. Cuando comience
> nos refugiaremos
> en el interior de una orquesta sinfónica.
> Oraremos entonces por Salzburgo
> y por el Clasicismo, por la casita
> de Wolfgang Amadeus, por su cama
> minúscula y por el clavecín
> donde compuso la Pequeña
> Serenata Nocturna.

Todo está pavorosamente bien
afinado
aquí. Casi todos somos
excelentes chelistas, nuestras misas
de réquiem son vertiginosas. Que levanten
la mano los propietarios
de Jean Philippe Rameau, los dueños
de Corelli, los beneficiarios
de la obra de Bach.

ahora Alemania nos trata con educación

Oremos para que algo sueco o noruego
nos ocurra, se pose sobre el suelo y haga
brotar una segunda voz.
El sonido, al igual que la carne, es necesario
saber de dónde viene. Oremos
por nuestros países, para que respiren
siempre hacia lo más
alto, para que lo que escupan
nunca parezca sangre. (29–30)

[Let us pray for the European Baroque (will the co-owners
please raise their hands), let us pray for our passports,
far better than yours. Let us pray
for everything good, may it be even
better. I learned that everything good was above,
the bad down below: Vienna on top
of something, for example. I know at least six
realities more fearsome than this one. All of them
curve down, toward the back pages
of the passport.

look, that group of elders experienced
the landing firsthand

Here we are safe; in our territory
the fugue is only a musical

form. When it starts
we'll retreat
inside a symphonic orchestra.
Then we'll pray for Salzburg
and for Classicism, for Wolfgang Amadeus's
small house, for his tiny
bed, and for the harpsichord
where he composed a Little
Night Music.

Everything is frighteningly
in tune
here. Almost everyone is
an excellent cellist, our requiem
masses are dizzying. Will the proprietors
of Jean Philippe Rameau, the owners
of Corelli, the beneficiaries
of Bach's work all please
raise their hands.

now Germany treats us with esteem

Let us pray that something Swedish or Norwegian
might happen to us, might alight upon the ground and give rise to
a second voice.
With sound, as with meat, it's important
to know where it comes from. Let us pray
for our countries—may they always breathe
toward the highest, so that their spit
never looks like blood.]

The poem speaks to the aspirations of southern Europeans, their persistent yet buried feelings of inferiority in comparison to other Western citizens, and the way these anxieties are overcome only by marginalizing other groups. From the start of the poem, Cebrián establishes an opposition between "us," the citizens of wealthy Europe, and those assigned an inferior status for coming from less privileged regions of the world. In order to reaffirm a sense of belonging in the community of "proprietors," it seems necessary that the newcomers demonstrate superiority over other groups—

be *above* (i.e., to the north of) them—and so, just as the poetic speaker was taught, "everything good is on top, the bad down below." Assuming this stance requires a kind of willful blindness to the suffering of the fellow southerner who nevertheless remains uncomfortably close, prisoner to unsettling dreams of "fleeing" to Europe, a place where the term *fuga* now conjures, first and foremost, a form of music primarily cultivated during the baroque period, although it is also etymologically connected to escaping. In the poem, xenophobia and xenophilia are two sides of the same obsession with origin ("With sound, as with meat, it's important / to know the origin"): both hatred for the other and refinement of taste are linked to discrimination, though in dimensions that are theoretically remote. Reverence for highbrow culture becomes a façade that must be constructed not only to signal distinction—figuratively driving north, "in the highest"—but also to hide the exclusion evident in the disassociation from the South. Similarly, we can observe a fixation on determining "ownership" of an intangible artistic legacy that is so often presented as a *universal* heritage. The poem ultimately denounces both the political use of art and its popularization and commodification in an economy of prestige.

The second of the "Poemas de la desconfianza" [Poems of mistrust], belonging to the section titled "España limita" [Spain borders], describes a bizarre situation: the outlandish adoption, or rather abduction, of a child from Luxembourg by Spanish parents. The mistrust mentioned in the title suggests the reaction to the new role and image that many Spaniards exhibited after the recovery of national pride, a process associated with the establishment of democracy following Francisco Franco's death and the country's "inclusion" in Europe. When Juan José Morodo asked him in an interview about his work as the head of the Spanish government, former President Felipe González affirmed in 2008, "De lo que más satisfecho estoy es de que durante esa etapa los españoles se reconciliaron con su pasaporte; es decir, con su identidad. La gente se sentía a gusto en su propia piel. Pero temo que eso no queda para siempre, y que hay que cuidarlo permanentemente" ("La descentralización explica el dinamismo de España," Cinco Días, June 20, 2008) [What I am most satisfied about is that during that period the Spanish people reconciled themselves to their passport—that is, to their identity. People felt comfortable in their own skin. But I'm afraid it won't last forever, that it's something that must be cared for permanently]. Cebrián's poem questions precisely this trap, implicit in the schema that equates nationality and identity, a pitfall that is stressed further when feelings of inferiority or chauvinism are added to the formula.

Ahora sí. Ahora estamos listos
para adoptar a un niño de ocho años
nacido en Luxemburgo, ahora
podemos cometer una adopción inmensa,
no lejana al secuestro. Pese a sus forcejeos
le haremos comprobar nuestra carencia obscena
en forma de Monegros, en forma
de unas Hurdes filmadas por Buñuel (uno de nuestros
cineastas de mayor proyección).

Le vamos a obligar
a hacer la Comunión con actitud piadosa,
    con su correspondiente cámara de fotos
    de carrete obsoleto
—la fiesta posterior tendrá lugar
bajo un sol implacable.

Vamos a iluminarle la cara a Centroeuropa
con nuestra luz atroz, y así en lo sucesivo
quizá no haya vergüenza
en nuestras propias caras
de pan. Llévate una hogaza de pan
a Luxemburgo, niño. (49–50)

[OK, now. Now we're ready
to adopt an eight-year-old boy
born in Luxembourg, now
we can perpetrate an enormous adoption,
not unlike kidnapping. Even when he struggles,
we'll make him confirm our obscene deficiency
in the form of Monegros, in the form
of some Hurdes filmed by Buñuel (one of our best-
known filmmakers).

We'll make him
take communion with a pious attitude,
    using a fitting photo camera

and an obsolete roll of film
—the party afterward will take place
under an unrelenting sun.

We're going to illuminate Central Europe's face
with our atrocious light, and so, in the hereinafter,
maybe there won't be shame
on our own bread
faces. Take a loaf of bread
to Luxembourg, child.]

The reiteration of "now" in the poem's first three lines points to a previous period when the conjectured action would have been incoherent from a social perspective: economic and political circumstances did not allow Spain to be seen as on par with richer, more developed nations such as Luxembourg. Obviously, the purpose behind an adoption is usually to enable the child to grow up in an environment where his or her emotional and material needs can be met; what the poem ironically suggests is that the Luxembourgish child will be made a participant in an "obscene deficiency," symbolized by the badlands of Monegros and the Hurdes, a region whose extreme poverty Luis Buñuel documented (not without large doses of sarcasm) in his 1933 film *Las Hurdes. Tierra sin pan* [Las Hurdes: Land without bread]. With the image of modernity and abundance that, combined with the low birth rates characteristic of highly industrialized countries, served as a framework for an unprecedented explosion of international adoptions in Spain, Cebrián confronts the rural, Catholic, petit bourgeois world still present in the country, in spite of the new makeup meant to hide "our own bread / faces." Food may no longer be scarce, but traits revealing rural or humble roots are still a source of insecurity for Spaniards who are ambivalent about their own collective achievements and those of eminent figures like Buñuel himself (who, by the way, had a talent for denouncing the provincial character of his countrymen). At the same time, beliefs that vindicate yesterday's world and its values continue to thrive, associated with manifestations of jingoism and resistance to change that seek to singularize the country against the perceived threat of identity loss inherent in Europeanization and globalization. Finally, Cebrián ironically revisits old calls for the "Hispanization" of Europe, whose most famous advocate was Miguel de Unamuno: the child is to return to his country of origin, "bread under arm," echoing the promise of prosperity popularly assigned in Spain

to newborns.[17] In this case, the child brings to the North an emphatic loaf—the metaphor of folkloric, essential richness, which Spain may use to reeducate Europe spiritually after having long been despised by its neighbors.

Mobility and the Critique of Heritage: Jordi Puntí's *Maletes Perdudes*

As institutional and economy-oriented attempts to forge something akin to a European identity are received with growing skepticism and even unequivocal rejection, tradition has emerged (in different guises) as one of the major discourses invoked to make distinctions about what is to be considered properly European.[18] These initiatives, however, are likewise met with wariness, as arguments based on origins, lineage, and heredity have been instrumental in Europe's long history of repression of difference. Nevertheless, in the process of constructing alternative European identities, rejecting references to heritage or tradition as being unavoidably essentialist and exclusionary may itself prove too limiting an approach. Minor stories on inheritance (namely those that explore issues of filiation) can open cracks in the grand narratives intended to establish Europeanness and our understanding of it. Such a stance may involve an estrangement of the sense of the familiar—one's own customary environment—and of the family. This process can be facilitated by travel, as a number of remarkable works of fiction reveal, and may have a significant impact on the conceptualization of Europe at a critical juncture in the region's history.

Some of Europe's most celebrated narratives explore questions about the relevance of origins in the construction of identity. Often enough, in an effort to generate a certain image of Europeanness as a set of values rooted in a shared heritage, the characters and authors of these stories serve as icons of those values even as they interrogate them. Yet these fictions offer more complications than solutions to the issues that underscore the sense of belonging to a place and having a lineage, including the validity of using these discourses for political exploitation. Interestingly, in many of these tales the search for—or invention of—one's genealogy is set within the framework of a journey. One might think of the Odyssey, with Ulysses's voyages and Telemachus's own adventures as he seeks his father, or of *Don Quixote*, in which the pilgrimage undertaken by Cervantes's heroes is linked to a problematization of notions of identity and essence. These and many other stories in which heredity and displacement are articu-

lated—such as the myth of the Phoenician princess Europa, or picaresque narratives—have made crucial contributions to the centuries-old debates about European identity.

Recent works continue to underscore the critical productivity of the connections that can be made between inheritance and movement. Jacques Derrida thought of the process of European identity formation as one that is completely open, using generational as well as travel metaphors to reflect on it:

> We are younger than ever, we Europeans, since a certain Europe does not yet exist. Has it ever existed? And yet we are like these young people who get up, at dawn, already old and tired. We are already exhausted. This *axiom of finitude* is a swarm or storm of questions. From what state of exhaustion must these young- old Europeans who we are set out again, re-embark [*re-partir*]? Must they re-begin? Or must they depart from Europe, separate themselves from an old Europe? Or else depart again, set out toward a Europe that does not yet exist? Or else re-embark in order to return to a Europe of origins that would then need to be restored, rediscovered, or reconstituted, during a great celebration of "reunion" [*retrouvailles*]. (*The Other Heading* 7–8; emphasis in the original)

Derrida's questions—with their inquiry into origins, movement, and encounters—resonate in Jordi Puntí's 2010 novel *Maletes perdudes* [Lost luggage]. Puntí's work tells the story of Gabriel Delacruz, a trucker who impregnates four women in four different European countries while working for a Barcelona-based international moving company in the late 1960s and early 1970s, only to vanish mysteriously soon after. Gabriel's life is reconstructed by his four sons: the German Christof, the French Christophe, the British Christopher, and the Spanish Cristòfol. When the four men are in their thirties, they accidentally discover their mutual existence and form an active brotherhood to look for their missing father. In my reading, the novel allegorically suggests that a European identity cannot be built from political discourse or philosophical debate alone. In *Maletes perdudes*, the construction of a common European imaginary mostly depends on shared cultural references and personal exchanges facilitated by the increasingly dynamic flows among the inhabitants of the EU, rather than on any official policy or invocations of particular historical events. Puntí's fiction reveals the ubiquity of the search for a common European identity that continues to be founded on an obsession with origins and an insistence on the impos-

sible perpetuation of heritage. Puntí's novel gently satirizes catchphrases such as "Unity in diversity," "Brotherhood among the peoples of Europe," and "European cultural identity" that are all too easily adopted in the political discourse. These slogans are often used to cloak the primarily economic interests guiding the unification process, which had been largely coopted by neoliberal interests by the time Gabriel's sons reached adulthood. Ultimately, the text questions both the notion that "normality" is derived from a shared origin and the consequent ethnocentric understandings of identity, conceptions used to justify the exclusionary policies of Fortress Europe.

Along those lines, the novel challenges provincializing trends apparent in Catalonia, where much of the cultural production of the last few decades has looked primarily inward to interpret national identity. Choosing instead to engage in the more internationalist inclinations of one of the great classics of Catalan literature, fifteenth-century *Tirant lo Blanch* by Joanot Martorell, Puntí proposes a cosmopolitan approach that underlines the multifarious links connecting that part of Europe to a broader context. It is thus appropriate to count Jordi Puntí among those artists and intellectuals who have, in the words of Ginette Verstraete, "concentrated on Europe as a space for critical intervention: as a geographical territory; historical arena; debilitating myth; racialized social sphere; and invented identity; but also as a critical device; a mode of thinking and imagining beyond borders; a space for translation, transferal, and reiteration; and a field traversed by different peoples and cultures" (122). Their work stands out as a plural and stimulating alternative to the agendas of institutional actors who, from above, propose a much more limited idea of Europe: one that serves a set of interests that is often quite far removed from those that would benefit the majority of the continent's citizens and many more who are looking into the region from the outside, as Salah Hassan, Iftikhar Dadi, Ana Ribeiro, and others have shown with their contributions to the debate from a variety of marginal positions.

In discussing the possibility of a common European identity as one of the elements that may help the continent face its current and future challenges, politicians and commentators often turn "to a Europe of origins that would then need to be restored," to use Derrida's phrase quoted above. This is not as paradoxical as it may initially seem, as a reevaluation of recent history is at the root of many approaches to the notion of European identity. Claus Leggewie has rightly stated that "anyone who wishes to give a European society a political identity will rate the discussion and recognition of disputed memories just as highly as treaties, a common currency and open

borders" (2). Narratives regarding the Second World War and its aftermath have emerged as the main elements under discussion in attempts to forge a shared European memory and shape a continental sense of identity, as discussed in Chapter 3. The debates on memory are very much alive, and Europeans are far from having reached an agreement about what should be commemorated and how. Thus, it is also possible to find many instances in which the past is used not as a warning against exclusionary politics but rather as an instrument for defining who can be properly called European, with all the implications that such a position entails. The instrumentalization of Europe's Christian tradition, to mention just one clear example, is not a strategy unique to far-right agendas. Of course, these uses of history for the configuration of European identity are performed both at the different national levels and at the continental one, usually in highly contentious debates (see Seguí; Sánchez La Chica and Masip Hidalgo; Todorov). In general, these discussions have less to do with the past than with fears and hopes for the near future.

Puntí problematizes the links between origins and identity at play in the European unification process. Structurally, he does so by describing the complexities involved in researching the story of the unique family engendered by Gabriel sometime around the iconic year 1968, another date whose significance for contemporary Europe's configuration is fiercely debated. The story is narrated through the brothers' different voices, to which other narrators are added, such as Gabriel's colleague Petroli and the "fifth brother," Christof's puppet Cristoffini. This rich polyphony underlines the novel's pluralist position on issues of origin, filiation, and affiliation, which comprise one of the core themes of the novel. Edward Said wrote about "the turn from filiation to affiliation" not only as a way of dealing with the relationships existing among texts of different periods, but also among characters, both fictional and real. Said was referring to "the transition from a failed idea or possibility of filiation to a kind of compensatory order that, whether it is a party, an institution, a culture, a set of beliefs, or even a world-vision, provides men and women with a new form of relationship, which I have been calling affiliation but which is also a new system" (*World* 19). In Puntí's novel we find a number of failed filiations that are compensated with forms of affiliation. Gabriel's sons undertake a quest to explore their filiation (their shared albeit initially unknown ancestry), but what becomes most important as the action of the novel moves along is the affiliation that their joint endeavor to find their father creates among the four brothers.

Filiation appears in the novel in two extreme forms: either through excess (as in the case of Gabriel, whose seed is so productively disseminated) or through defect. Paternal absence and the obstacles to parenthood are prominent in Puntí's text. The absent father Gabriel himself, and his best friend and coworker, Serafí Bundó, are both orphans who were raised in the same institution. Gabriel arrives at the Casa de la Caritat, an orphanage run by nuns, in 1945 as "un nen de la Guerra" (37) [a war child] when he is almost four. The year chosen could be intentionally misleading: he became an orphan as a result of the Spanish Civil War, which ended in 1939, not World War II, which was already over when he was admitted to the institution. The date links Spain's tragic history with that of the rest of Europe and points to the catastrophes brought about by antagonistic nationalisms there, the inflexion point that would later determine the path toward continental cooperation and unification. Delacruz, the last name he is given by the nuns, is a clear reference to the Christian heritage into which he is institutionally incorporated, even though he will later become nonreligious, and faith-related issues are absent from the rest of the book, as one might expect from a novel that deals with largely secular contemporary Western Europe. (Similar Christian overtones resonate in the names Christopher and Gabriel). As for Serafí Bundó, when he is a young adult he discovers, also by chance, that his father was a Republican soldier who was imprisoned and killed right after Spain's civil war. Later, Serafí dies childless in a tragic event that takes place while he is attempting to form a family with Carolina, a.k.a. Muriel, a Spanish prostitute with whom he has fallen in love after meeting her in a French roadside brothel. Petroli, the third member of the moving crew, meets another Spanish woman in Hamburg in 1972, and the two of them live together for many years without ever having children. Also worth mentioning are two other stories of childlessness: that of Anna Miralpeix, which is secondary to the plot, and that of Fernando Soldevila and Maribel (Maria Isabel) Rogent's marriage, which is essential to the novel's conclusion. In the former, the three moving company employees are entrusted with a seventeen-year-old girl who is being sent by her upper-class Barcelona family to London for an abortion. In the latter, which constitutes the core of the novel's ending, we learn that Fernando and Isabel (who have the same names as Spain's Catholic Monarchs, as Gabriel himself notices) adopted the seven-year-old Gabriel shortly after losing their own child, named Cristóbal. They gave Gabriel the deceased boy's name, but, unsurprisingly, this attempted substitution failed, and the child was sent back to the orphanage.

While it is rarely the topic of much discussion in the texts themselves, characters' childlessness seems to be the norm rather than the exception in Western fiction. Novelist Milan Kundera has written insightfully on this topic. For him, "this infertility is not due to a conscious purpose of the novelists; it is the spirit of the art of the novel (or its subconscious) that spurns procreation" (38). Kundera claims that, to a large extent, when the novel was born as a genre alongside modernity, it established, and later continued to depend on, the notion of a subject's individuality. Thus, offspring would be largely alien to the novel, as progeny signifies "something utterly concrete and earthly into which the individual blends, agrees to blend, consents to be lost in: family, prosperity, tribe, nation" (39).

Contrary to Kundera's reflections, in Puntí's novel it is precisely Gabriel's dissemination into four children that allows for a plurality of voices to construct the individuality of their absent father. Both Gabriel's peculiar family and his own identity as the novel presents it to the reader are products of transnational exchanges, while relationships that do not transcend nationality are unable to successfully engender children. Moreover, in *Maletes perdudes*, couples from the same country who have children seem doomed to disappear: such is the case with Gabriel's and Serafí's parents, mentioned above, and with Rita (the mother of Catalan Cristòfol), another only child whose parents die in an airplane crash. The exception to this childlessness in the novel is, of course, Gabriel. He, who is of uncertain origin himself, becomes the founder of a successful lineage when he sires children with women of four different nationalities. Gabriel's extraordinary ability for fathering—if not fatherhood—and his markedly foreign provenance parodically link him with "originating figures" such as Abraham and Aeneas (Guénoun 39). The European mothers of his children do include a Catalan one, Rita. But she is the last woman he impregnates, and at that point it could be said that by virtue of all those years of European travels and exchanges, Gabriel personifies a diminished Spanishness, in the sense that his worldview has been necessarily altered by protracted exposure to other national realities.

Thus, the novel suggests that international and intercultural couplings are more productive than inbreeding, and that communities that embrace pluralism have a better chance of success than those in which monologism rules. The ties that unite Gabriel's sons are not the usual ones for children from so-called traditional families. But together—notwithstanding their differences, or because of them—the four are more effective in their quest and eventually in their father's salvation when they discover that he is in

danger. What makes them a "band of brothers," then? Fundamentally, two facts: one is their common ancestry, the initial cause for what would become their mutual acquaintance—in other words, their filiation, something they have not chosen. But more important is their affiliation: the quest they undertake voluntarily, their covenant or alliance, a self-imposed mission to find out as much as they can about Gabriel and ultimately to find him.

The occasions on which the four brothers first meet, those reunions or—to use Derrida's term—reencounters in which they share their own scant memories of Gabriel and the memories others have of him (mostly, but not exclusively, those of their mothers), are neither a vindication of origins nor a celebration of nostalgia. Their brotherhood stems not from a sense of obligation toward their common filiation but from a voluntary affiliation; what keeps the four men gathering about once a month is the dynamism of the search they have decided to pursue. The quest that keeps them united has a ludic dimension that moves the action forward and, at another level, remediates the lonely boyhoods they lived as only children. But it also speaks of a Europe whose identity, rather than being recovered or discovered, is constantly under construction. It is, as Edmund Husserl would put it, an "infinite sphere of tasks": an unending project that is carried out by traveling, by doing, by devoting effort to a self-conscious work of collaboration, remembrance, and analysis, not simply by reaffirming itself as being determined by lineage. As Derrida asserts, "*What is proper to a culture is to not be identical to itself*" (*Other Heading* 90; emphasis in the original).

One of the forms that diversity takes in the novel is that of a peculiar polyglossia, a linguistic economy that is always being negotiated and seems to be unstable but nonetheless functional. Though the vast majority of the text is in Catalan, Puntí (himself a translator and a polyglot) is careful to hint at the linguistically heterogeneous nature of many of the characters' encounters. He does so by sparingly including brief differential markers as part of the brothers' speech, consisting of not more than a few words in a row in English, French, or German; thus, readability is never compromised for the sake of verisimilitude in this regard. The cultural and social politics of Spain's postwar period—the context in which Gabriel's childhood takes place—condition the Spanish–Catalan diglossia that is reflected in some of the novel's dialogues. Probably more significant, however, is how Puntí deals with language use in the parts of the story that take place outside of Catalonia or involve foreign characters. One of Gabriel's roles in the three-member truck crew is that of a mediator with those who cannot speak

Catalan or Spanish—that is, most of the people they encounter beyond the Pyrenees. His self-invented European idiolect—again an "impure" but effective solution—serves him just enough that he can also communicate with his scattered family. The following generation has an easier time at those exchanges: Gabriel's sons, who have been raised in four different native languages, converse profusely in a perfected version of that "aiguabarreig lingüístic. . . . Ve a ser una mena d'herència, perquè es veu que ell parlava totes les llengües i no en parlava cap" (18) [linguistic confluence. . . . It's a kind of inheritance, because he seemed to be able to speak all languages, when in fact he couldn't speak any of them].

Though their father and respective mothers were raised in milieus in which national boundaries within Europe were a tangible reality, the four brothers have grown up on a very different continent. The frequency and ease of communications among Europe's younger citizens has moved some to speak of a continental "Erasmus generation," in reference to the university student exchange program developed under the auspices of the EU. This reality has affected not only spatial communication (e.g., transport, as we shall discuss later) but also cultural exchanges. The four Christophers share a common imaginary that is related not so much to grand narratives about Europe as to its cultural production, especially of the popular kind. Moreover, the brothers exhibit what could be called a refined hermeneutic awareness: not only are they competent at interpreting conventional linguistic signs (to the point that one of them makes a living as a translator), but they are also competent at deciphering other types of texts, such as the myriad objects that have been randomly stolen by the moving crew over the years. When the brothers find this heterogeneous collection in Gabriel's abandoned apartment, they take its elements as clues about Gabriel's past and present, relating them to a shared heritage. In contrast with their father's spectral presence, this peculiar heirloom gives corporality to the quest for and the celebration of their origins. This celebration is not monumentalized—as nationalistic discourse would usually present a reification of memory—but is instead, significantly, dispossessed of any grandiose connotations, so much so that it becomes intimate.

This turn from filiation to affiliation in the novel parallels the European turn from nationalism to cosmopolitanism that is the framework for the story. For some observers whom we might call "globalists," the nation is a self-enclosed category that is doomed to extinction. Cosmopolitanists such as David Held, however, contend that nations do still matter, although most states have found it challenging to adapt to the changing nature of

trans-border relationships. This new social and political environment determines the forging of identities with cosmopolitan traits. According to Held, cultural cosmopolitanism requires a series of conditions. The first in his triad is "recognition of the increasing interconnectedness of political communities in diverse domains," the second is "development of an understanding of overlapping 'collective fortunes' that require collective solutions," and the third is "celebration of difference, diversity and hybridity" (41-42). These three conditions can easily be related to the apparently dysfunctional but very cosmopolitan family of Gabriel Delacruz, and to the way that family came into existence within the context of a nascent EU.

These traits of cosmopolitanism serve as a reminder of the fact that cultural identity is not necessarily tied to lineage, nor does it depend exclusively on origin. As Derrida wrote in *The Other Heading*, "a culture never has a single origin. Monogenealogy would always be a mystification in the history of culture" (10–11). In the case of that very unstable concept known as "European identity," a different semantic field has prevailed among those who have tried to think of the project of a united Europe beyond economic interests, to make of it something more than a vast market. Ulrich Beck and Edgar Grande have noted that the metaphor that has been most successfully related to a European identity is that of movement, of flow. Thus, European identity is seen as "identity *in* movement, as identity *of* movement. . . . The vocabulary and metaphors in which this *flowing* identity is expressed are derived from 'journeying', 'travelling' and the 'obstacles' to these: 'roads', 'ways', 'paths'. . . . [O]ne finds oneself 'on the road towards the European Union'" (Beck and Grande 103). The metaphor of movement is also often associated with references to origins, as Jorge Semprún and Dominique de Villepin—to mention two well-known figures with political as well as cultural relevance—do when they state that the construction of a new idea of Europe requires "d'assumer nos identités et nos racines pour enrichir notre voyage" (8) [assuming our identities and our roots so as to enrich our journey].[19]

Maletes perdudes allegorizes the connection between travel and European identity formation. For a considerable part of Puntí's novel, Gabriel Delacruz spends his time on the roads of the continent, and it would be appropriate to include it in the canon of Spanish road narratives (which Jorge Pérez has studied suggestively). Gabriel's children also travel a great deal, as they live in different parts of Europe and meet every five weeks or so to discuss their progress on the quest. They also share their names with the most renowned European traveler of all time, Christopher Columbus.

Little is said, however, of their journeys; the characters simply show up together in Paris, London, Frankfurt, or Barcelona. Their travels are typical of a period in which these have become ordinary movements, to such an extent that they are barely mentioned even in what is largely a travel narrative. Technology and politics are both determinant factors in that radical change in mobility: inexpensive flights and the ease of border-crossing within the so-called Schengen area (the territories party to the convention that abolishes internal border controls among the majority of European nations) allow the Christophers to move effortlessly from one country to the next, a movement that is not presented as the privilege of a group of elite travelers. The Europe portrayed in the novel is one of common people: workers, immigrants, prostitutes, students, and so on; the Christophers themselves are a puppeteer, the owner of a music store, a researcher, and a translator.

The fluidity that characterizes the brothers' reunions contrasts with the clumsy movements of Gabriel and his colleagues some three decades earlier. Gabriel, Bundó, and Petroli have to deal with a number of impediments—technological and climatic, but also, and fundamentally, political—to travel around Europe with their truck, not coincidentally a Pegaso Europa 1065 model.[20] The routes that they take are always predetermined, as are their destinations. The difficulties that they regularly encounter culminate in the accident that ends Bundó's life. These obstacles are surmounted by the new generation of European citizens, of which the four brothers are a synecdoche. All the roads are open for them, and the political borders can no longer contain their search for their origins.

Filiation, affiliation, and movement converge in the sexual encounters between Gabriel and the different European women he impregnates. Petroli tells the Christophers about the image he and his companions once had of the Europe they traveled while transporting the furniture of diplomats and other high-income people moving abroad from Spain. In the early 1960s, Petroli says, "començava a circular una imatge d'Europa moderna i paradisíaca. Vèiem els països nòrdics i de l'Europa central com una civilització més avançada. Aviat tots seriem Alfredo Landa—el coneixeu, no?—bavejant davant el biquini de ratlles d'una estrangera, rossa i desimbolta" (103) [an image of a modern, idyllic Europe started to circulate. We saw the countries of northern and central Europe as a more advanced civilization. Soon enough we'd all be Alfredo Landa—you know about him, right?—drooling at the sight of a blonde and poised foreign woman wearing a striped bikini]. Reference to the erotic dimension of that paradisiacal

image of Europe is not a passing triviality. The tourists who were starting to arrive in Spain in large numbers in the late 1950s embodied the liberal customs proscribed under Franco. Many narratives produced since then have explored the anxiety that European women vacationing in Spain produced in some Spanish men, as we saw in Chapter 2. These Spaniards have been caricaturized as sexually frustrated, middle-aged petit bourgeois men who approach foreign females with varying degrees of success. *Maletes perdudes* engages in a dialogue with these Euro-sex *topoi* of 1960s and 1970s Spanish culture. However, in Puntí's novel, written during a radically different period in Spanish self-fashioning and apperception of Europe, it is a Catalan trucker who "conquers" Europe sexually. In contrast with the stereotype depicted in the narratives of the late Francoist period, Gabriel defies the orthodox traits of hegemonic masculinity among working-class European men around the middle of the twentieth century. His European lovers perceive him as uncommonly tender, a trait that contrasts with the primitive aura that they initially attribute to him. At the same time, his British girlfriend sees the trucker as a hot-blooded, physically attractive southerner; she reverses the gender model of this sort of orientalizing gaze, which has traditionally been that of a male musing on the body of the exotic female object of his desire. This objectification of Gabriel also resonates in the relative lack of agency that he exhibits throughout the novel. In his relationships with women, it is they who take the initiative: those who have children with Gabriel—and also Giuditta, the Italian circus artist who becomes his partner later on—prove to be significantly more resourceful characters than he is. They also end up being their children's only supporters and caregivers after the short period during which the Catalan trucker is little more than a sporadic visitor to the infants.

The emphasis on the strength and autonomy of the female characters in the novel needs to be understood within the changing social context portrayed by Puntí. The generation of the Christophers' mothers presents a radical break with previous models of femininity and gender roles in Europe. Thus, it is verisimilar that the four of them would be single, educated working mothers and that each of them would have only one child. The social changes that allowed for this transformation in the role of women are encapsulated in European memory in the events of May 1968 in Paris, which, as Judt points out, "entered popular mythology almost immediately as an object of nostalgia, a stylized struggle in which the forces of Life and Energy and Freedom were ranged against the numbing, gray dullness of the men of the past" (412). That year, La Ibérica moving company's Pegaso

Europa 1065 makes its way into the French capital to complete another job. The city is home to Mireille, a revolutionary college student who happens to be fleeing through the streets of the Latin Quarter to elude the police after a protest when the Spanish movers block her way with an armoire they are unloading in front of its owner's new residence. Gabriel encourages her to hide inside the piece of furniture, and she is able to throw the *gendarme* off her trail. Mireille's activism and political consciousness contrast with Gabriel's generally passive attitude. Even in his romantic engagements, he fascinates his lovers without taking much of an initiative. The Christophers, however, exhibit a more proactive stance, and it is thanks to their collaborative efforts that they eventually find and rescue him.

In contrast to Gabriel's passivity, his children embody a new, dynamic Europe that comes into being through action, not contemplation. The novel's climax speaks of the power of their unlikely association, which becomes a slapstick "European Union" that brings together each member's strengths to defeat the sordid characters who have kidnapped Gabriel: a retired police officer, Miguélez, nostalgic for Franco, and his accomplice, Feijoo. Both are determined to force Gabriel to use his extraordinary card-playing skills (or, more accurately, his cheating) to clean out a businessman on their behalf, after he did the same to them and, in the traditionalist language used by the two bullies, "dishonored" them. The persistent traces of the stale, isolationist Spain of the dictatorship are parodied in the scene that takes place in an illegal gambling den hidden away in a dodgy bar on Barcelona's Sicilia Street. On the night of the game, the band of brothers bursts in, self-consciously performing a scene worthy of an action movie spoof. Their diversity proves a fundamental asset for their act, as the convincing use of different languages in combination with the surprise effect of their arrival and their extravagant appearance triggers the emotional response they are looking for in their opponents. Christof's shouted commands in German, for instance, provoke "reminiscències nazis" [Nazi reminiscences] that are considered by the brother narrating the episode to be "inevitables, espantoses i molt útils: situaven les nostres victimes en un referent de terror" (421) [unavoidable, horrific, and very useful: they placed our victims in a referent of fear]. The brothers pretend to kidnap Gabriel in the name of a transnational mafia of sorts code-named Bundó, after the trucker's late dearest friend.

This rescue operation masquerading as another abduction precipitates the novel toward its conclusion, and thematically it may also be related to two of Europe's foundational stories. One is the mythical rape of Eu-

ropa, a Phoenician princess who was taken by Zeus disguised as a bull.[21] Upon finding out about Europa's abduction, her father, King Agenor, sent her brothers on a mission to find her, which meant the beginning of many labors and journeys for them. Once again, we find the articulation of problematic narratives of filiation and mobility. Commenting on the significance of this myth, Rodolphe Gasché has pointed out that

> "Europe" also names the tearing away from a fatherland and the transport and exposition to what is other, strange, and not of oneself. What the name *Europe* refers to is thus not primarily the proper name of a land but a name for a movement of separation and tearing (oneself) away in which everything proper has always already been left behind. It is thus an extension prior to all confinement within oneself, thus constituting an exposure to the foreign, the strange, the indeterminate. (11)

Although the novel ends with a celebration of reunions, of reencounters, Gabriel's life story is one of separation. Whether accidental or voluntary, the circumstances of his own orphanhood, his failed adoption, his bereavement upon Bundó's death, and his constant departures and eventual abandonment of his children determine his biography. These estrangements and the efforts by the Christophers to counter them in order to construct a valid narrative are all connected to an advancement of (self-)knowledge and to an exploration of identities.

Another of the foundational stories that reverberate in the extravagant tale of the brothers' rescue of their father is a historical reality that is much closer in time than the ancient myth of Europa: the defeat of European fascisms, the rescue of liberal democracies, and the ensuing rise of the alternative political project of international cooperation that was to become the EU. For generations of Spaniards, as for citizens of other nations in the south and east of Europe who grew up in the aftermath of the twentieth century's great wars that shattered the continent, "becoming European" was more a dream than a plan. From 1957 on, the evolving EEC gave programmatic form to their fantasy. All these narratives—the myth behind the origin of the continent's name, the victory over fascism, and the Europeanization of Spain—resonate in the apparently farcical reencounter between Gabriel Delacruz and his sons. But Puntí counters the weight of history and the possible complacency in nostalgia by reinforcing the playful action to the extreme during the rescue scene.

Throughout the novel, the four brothers tell their stories, discovering

what unites them. First, of course, is the unknown father they all share, who takes on mythic dimensions before being revealed as a mere survivor. But the Christophers also share cultural references, a common continental space, and a vague notion of that space's recent history. In part, they do not feel the need to ascertain their Europeanness because they participate in it with "habitualidad inercial" [inertial habit], Guillén's term to describe how Europeans understand their own adscription to the continent's common culture (421). Yet, in contrast with this unawareness, the brothers also share a clear purpose, a principle of action guided by the desire to find their roots and incorporate this knowledge into their future, and this process makes their Europeanness a much more perceptible reality. For months, the search for Gabriel becomes the driving force in their lives. Initially, the inquiry into the traces of his spectral presence is mostly about completing their own identities. Eventually, they realize that their quest is an endless process, one that involves the advancement of knowledge of the self as well as of the other, and the active pursuit of solidarity among siblings who must construct their brotherhood in order to feel that it exists, as their common origin is largely irrelevant. Their pursuit is an "infinite adventure," much like the terms in which Zygmunt Bauman has framed the movement toward Europe's construction: "Europe is not something you discover; Europe is a mission—something to be made, created, built. And it takes a lot of ingenuity, sense of purpose and hard labor to accomplish that mission. Perhaps a labor that never ends, a challenge always still to be met in full, a prospect forever outstanding" (2).

Maletes perdudes suggests that a European identity cannot be built exclusively from a single market or currency, political discourse, or philosophical debate; the emergence of a common European imaginary will also depend on specific and shared cultural references as well as on exchanges and projects resulting from the increasingly dynamic flows among the Union's inhabitants. The profiles this identity may take are still being negotiated, and most probably the debates over it will never cease. Currently, the discussions on the issue involve important tensions and paradoxes. While the rhetoric of European institutions celebrates multiculturalism and diversity, at the heart of their member states' actual policies remains the idea of Europe as fortress, besieged by external threats and internal outsiders—those who cannot claim the "proper" heritage. As Beck and Grande point out, "the demands for the new 'purity of the European' by which Europe's others are constructed and excluded is encouraged not least by official European policy" (186), while Fatima El-Tayeb concludes

that "within this narrative, European racial and religious diversity is less a reality than a threat to the continent's very essence" (xvii). Puntí's work addresses this surreptitious essentialism by revealing the futility of a contemplative search for a common European identity that continues to be founded on an obsession with constructed, imaginary origins and an insistence on their impossible perpetuation. Without dismissing the weight of heritage, his proposal highlights the identity-making forces of potentiality (that is, what one could become or do), mobility, and exchanges. But fluidities and affiliation, alas, are reserved for those who are within Europe and have a claim to the "right" lineage. Europe may still have to rescue itself from its own history of exclusivist filiations and encourage those who are in movement to affiliate themselves with the best project it can offer: one of openness, unimpeded flows, and inclusive spaces.

5

The Great Recession and the Surge of Euroskepticism

A Pigs' Tale

Wolves in the European Woods

One century ago, Miguel de Unamuno warned of the risks of a hypothetical reconfiguration of Europe united under Germany's control. He wrote his essay "La organización de Europa" [The organization of Europe] in March 1915, the same month that German zeppelins bombed Paris for the first time. In the piece, while making sure to note his mastery of several European languages—thereby emphasizing his oft-denied cosmopolitan side—Unamuno explicitly counts himself and his fellow Spaniards among the Europeans who are on the verge of being Germanized. This process would entail subduing the continent by force and rearranging it in accordance with the systematic principles of some of Germany's thinkers, whom Unamuno considers to be essential in the nation's push to expand its territory. The Spanish author goes on to reflect on several of their books, ultimately deeming them the scholarly equivalents of forty-two-caliber bombs—yet quite laughable as well. If that country of warriors and heavyweight writers got its way, Unamuno says with unmistakable irony, Europe would become "un verdadero paraíso terrenal" [a true paradise on Earth]. Within that German Europe, each nation would have a specific role dictated from Berlin; Spain's would be to grow oranges and tomatoes for the masters of the continent. The problem with that plan, in Unamuno's opinion, is twofold. On the one hand, most of the peoples of Europe are not yet ready for Germanic order—and Spain is definitely included among those impossible to organize. On the other hand, even though German-led progress may well be the route to efficiency in every realm, the sheer boredom it would produce could be even more lethal than its masterfully engineered bombs.

The specter of Germanization has haunted Europeans since the nineteenth century, when that nation-state was created. While some intellectuals, politicians, and ordinary citizens across the continent have contemplated the possibility of a Germanized Europe with admiration, most have imagined it with apprehension (to put it mildly). In that regard, things are not too different today. Unamuno's tongue-in-cheek commentary still retains broad resonance in the cultural and political atmosphere that emerged as a consequence of the Great Recession that shook Europe after 2007. With the onset of that crisis, anxieties were updated in protests about Berlin's authority in setting EU policies and its adherence to strict economic measures (widely known as "austerity") that had a severe impact on the citizens of the southern nations.

Yet, unlike in the moment when Unamuno wrote his essay, over the last few years prominent German authors have voiced their own serious concerns regarding their country's central role in the recent hardships that Europe has encountered. Sociologist Ulrich Beck warns that a German-led EU that prioritizes economic orthodoxy over the welfare of its citizens may cause the ruin (a term we will come back to later) of the whole enterprise (*German Europe*). For Jürgen Habermas, probably the most widely respected German thinker of the last half century, there are two main reasons for the weakening of the European unification project. In his 2011 essay "Ein Pakt für oder gegen Europa?" [A pact for or against Europe?] Habermas blames, first, the shortsightedness of Europe's current political leadership, especially worrisome in Germany, whose governments, following the reunification, have abandoned their post–World War II cosmopolitanism and turned toward a nationalist approach with an agenda that often conflicts with the general interest of the EU. Second, Habermas points to the failure of the press, which seems unable or unwilling to act autonomously from the political elites, with whom it forms instead a single "politisch-medialen Klasse" (136) [political-mediatic class]. This results in the media's inability to counter the absence of Europeanist vision among the political leaders. Therefore, Habermas asserts, we might do well to search for new initiatives in civil society, whose perspectives have in the past led to breakthroughs capable of overcoming political deadlocks and producing significant advancement in matters of public interest. In his opinion, however, the existing atmosphere of political lack of direction and media negligence produces civil society's dissatisfaction or disenchantment, which translates into a generalized frustration with the idea of Europe.

The most dramatic effects of the pan-European social and economic

upheaval that began to appear after 2007 were felt in Greece, where the combination of record-high public debt and massive unemployment was mismanaged by the local government and not improved by the German-led EU's austerity measures. The situation became so dire that by 2015, Greece seriously contemplated exiting the Eurozone (the so-called *Grexit*) as the only way to halt the country's rapid decline. Feelings of solidarity (or lack thereof) with Greece, along with virulent anti-Germany rhetoric used by some in the less constructive moments of the debate, resonated among diverse groups of nationalists and populists in other countries, mostly in southern Europe. The drama may have been set in Greece, but its main theme was definitely about Europe. As deficiencies in the EU's structure became more visible than ever, the fundamental vision of the European unification project was eclipsed by the menace of a return to clashing nationalisms.[1]

As is the case with all European matters, this one could not be confined to a single nation. A catastrophic scenario similar to Greece's was feared in Spain, a country that was having a very rude awakening from a period of extraordinary growth. Fueled by the new conditions created by the introduction of the euro, at the turn of the century the country's economy had grown at such a pace that there was talk of a "Spanish miracle," with unprecedented consumption and visible signs of prosperity that would eventually prove deceptive. This opulence was epitomized by the fact that more houses were built during that decade in Spain than in Germany, France, and Italy put together. In fact, when Italy's GDP per capita was overtaken by Spain's toward the end of 2007, Spanish Prime Minister José Luis Rodríguez Zapatero proudly publicized the data as an undeniable indication of the nation's success at overcoming its long-standing inadequacies in relation to Europe. After centuries of lagging behind, he claimed, Spain could finally count itself among Europe's leading powers. "We'll soon overtake France and Germany," Zapatero added. A few days later, he presented German Chancellor Angela Merkel with an award for "her contributions to the construction of Europe." He also mentioned "Germany's solidarity with Spain" as a fundamental factor in his country's development.[2] Surveys indicated Spaniards' enthusiasm about the EU.

And then, in 2008, Spain's European dream unexpectedly ended. All those new houses, whose prices had surged, found no buyers, and many of those who had gone deeply in debt to purchase them could no longer make the payments, consequently losing their homes—and sometimes even their lives.[3] Credit dried up. Unemployment rose to record levels, second in the

EU only to those suffered by the Greeks. The Spanish Constitution was hurriedly modified to include a clause that strictly limited public deficits, thus purportedly reinforcing "el compromiso de España con la Unión Europea" [Spain's commitment to the European Union].[4] Conservative Prime Minister Mariano Rajoy admitted not long after his 2011 election win that he had little or no control over the country's affairs; the *New York Times* called him "not really a free actor," as he depended on "German approval" ("Spanish Protests, German Prescriptions," October 1, 2012). Banks were rescued with public money, while austerity measures dictated by the EU (but largely formulated by Merkel's government) and dutifully followed by national cabinets caused the despair and outrage of millions, especially in southern Europe. Echoing that discontent, the leaders of Spain's traditionally pro-European Socialist Party stated that "la UE representa hoy más una pesadilla que un sueño para España" ("Rubalcaba," *El País*, February 16, 2013) [nowadays in Spain, the EU represents more a nightmare than a dream]. That was indeed the case for an increasing number of Spaniards—as well as for many others in countries such as Greece, Portugal, and Italy—whose former Europeanist enthusiasm was rapidly turning into disillusionment, skepticism, or even anger as a consequence of the devastating crisis and its unimaginative management by the EU.[5] Generalized discontent occasionally turned into fury, which was expressed through protests that included, for example, the public trial and guillotining of effigies representing Merkel, Rajoy, and the president of the Catalan government, Artur Mas, in the streets of Barcelona on May 15, 2012.[6]

The crisis went beyond the financial realm, transforming Europe's social, political, and cultural landscape. Its effects had a powerful impact on citizens' perceptions of the European ideal and the institutions that have come to embody it, which suffered from the lowest popular support levels in their history.[7] A 2012 political cartoon by Andrés Rábago, who goes by "El Roto," one of Spain's most prominent political artists, captured some aspects of the prevailing sentiment surrounding the debates about the European project at that time (fig. 5.1). His drawing, which appeared in *El País* on January 23, 2012, shows an anonymous character in a bare, rationalistic space. He approaches the EU flag with uncertain intent. From the way he is holding the flag, we do not know whether he means to kiss it or to tear it; he could be examining the emblem, or cleaning himself with it to show his contempt for what it represents. "Finally, [there is] a feeling shared by all of Europe: Euroskepticism," he states. The dream of a communal enterprise that will proceed in constructing a unified, postnational Europe, symbol-



Figure 5.1. Andrés Rábago, *El Roto*, cartoon, "Al fin un sentimiento común a toda Europa: El euroescepticismo" (Finally, [there is] a feeling shared by all of Europe: Euroskepticism). *El País*, January 23, 2012. Courtesy of the artist.

ized by the colored flag, is overtaken by the realization that centrifugal forces reversing the course of that movement have gained momentum. The dark shadow on one side of the flag threatens to expand and obscure the bright yellow stars representing the circular, egalitarian constellation of member states that compose the EU. El Roto's piece successfully captures the sense that the elusive pan-European public sphere, whose inexistence has so often been decried by the EU's advocates, was finally emerging. Its

birth, though, came not out of the allure of the European project, but as the result of a deep, shared suspicion of Europe and its institutions, which were perceived as going against national interests. The measures drafted in the EU offices in Brussels to deal with the crisis were seen as attacks on national sovereignty not only in the countries that were suffering most acutely, such as Greece or Spain, but also throughout the Union. As José Ignacio Torreblanca and Mark Leonard noticed, as a result of how the crisis was managed, "to an increasing number of citizens in Southern European countries, the EU looks like the International Monetary Fund (IMF) did in Latin America: a golden straitjacket that is squeezing the space for national politics and emptying their national democracies of content. . . . Meanwhile, in Northern European countries, the EU is increasingly seen to have failed to control the policies of the southern rim. The creditors have a sense of victimhood that mirrors that of the debtors." The North-South cleavage was one of the key manifestations of a Euroskepticism that was rising with unprecedented strength and scope.

As regional divisions appeared, a number of factors (including the stances taken by key media outlets) influenced the way Europeans from different nations saw not only the EU but also themselves and other Union members: old stereotypes were reinforced; new ones emerged. Changing images of self and other had the greatest impact on the countries identified as "peripheral," an adjective normally—and tellingly—used for those in the continent's southern areas. Journalists around the globe who reported on the socioeconomic difficulties of southern Europe enthusiastically embraced a sneering denomination for those nations: PIGS. The acronym was recorded for the first time in an article published by the *Wall Street Journal* on November 6, 1996. Its author, Thomas Kamm, wrote that southern European nations were "given derogatory nicknames like the Club Med or Southern Comfort countries . . . an improvement over an acronym they used to go by: PIGS—short for Portugal, Italy, Greece and Spain" ("Snobbery: The Latest Hitch in Unifying Europe. Northerners Sniff as 'Club Med' South Clamors to Join New Currency"). The term remained mostly dormant until the advent of the Euro crisis; from 2008 on, its usage surged. Notwithstanding the many differences among the four countries, a number of influential financial media deemed the term a valid one for grouping Portugal, Italy, Greece, and Spain as nations that had "failed" to complete an ever-elusive process of modernization (a.k.a. Europeanization) whose ideal model was embodied primarily by Germany. The economic vulnerabilities of these countries became especially apparent in the wake of the Great

Recession, when their banks' undercapitalization, their record-high levels of unemployment, and the prohibitive amounts of interest they had to pay for their sovereign debt seriously destabilized the euro in the area and, as a result, the unification project. The wide use of the derisive term *PIGS* was no small factor. As Samuel Brazys and Niamh Hardiman argue, "the use of acronyms as heuristics has potentially far-reaching consequences in the financial markets" (23), since the simplistic picture they convey plays a functional role in decision-making processes. In the case of *PIGS*, the behavior of the markets and the policies designed for them were shaped at least in part by the adverse effects reflected in—and generated by—the use of that nomenclature. The cost to the countries tainted by the label was indeed significant.[8]

How social realities (or their specters) are named does matter; ultimately, it can determine the lives of many people, as the analysis of the *PIGS* denomination shows. Yet, although their effect is clearly traceable in economic data, it is within the cultural realm that those naming codes are negotiated, established, and contested. While many noticed and protested the infamous term,[9] a few artists went further and explored its meaning within the broader implications of the recent conflicting perspectives on Europe, offering works that can cultivate a reevaluation of the symbolic practices underlying these views and the role of those who generate and disseminate them (the political-mediatic class, as Habermas calls it).

Looking South: Carlos Spottorno's *The Pigs*

One of those artists is Carlos Spottorno, a Spanish photographer born in Budapest in 1971 and raised in Rome, Paris, and Madrid. After receiving classical training in fine arts, Spottorno developed an extensive international career that was recognized with important awards (such as the 2003 and 2015 World Press Photo) and noted in both specialized and mainstream media outlets, including *Time*, *Le Monde*, *El País*, and the *Financial Times*. His experiences in different European countries and his work for the press have endowed him with a rich perspective from which he tackles issues of misrepresentation and the tensions it generates. His project *The Pigs* (2013) denounces the prejudice that increasingly divides Europe between a "proper" North and a "faulty" South, as well as the attachment to the past that precludes change in the latter. It also raises questions about the functions of the EU and the direction in which the organization is going.

The central part of *The Pigs* is a photography book (winner of the pres-

tigious Kassel Photobook Award) whose appearance almost identically replicates the layout of the British weekly the *Economist*, using very similar dimensions, paper, and typography. This format makes the book cheaper than most photography books; the initial four thousand copies sold for roughly the same price as the magazine issues do. But accessibility is not the main reason for the format choice. Rather, Spottorno's appropriation seeks to address the editorial policy of the publication that, already in 1852, Karl Marx had described in *The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte* as "the European organ of the aristocracy of finance" (118). The *Economist* would probably be the quintessential example of those media outlets whose positions are in general barely distinguishable from those held by the mainstream conservative political class. Along these lines, the London-based weekly is one of a number of outlets whose reporting on the European South since 2007 has focused on the negative facets of its reality. As early as June 7, 2008, for instance, an article titled "Leaders: Ten Years On, Beware a Porcine Plot; The European Central Bank" observed that "some countries—Austria, Finland, the Netherlands, to some extent even Germany—duly implemented reforms to make their economies more flexible and more competitive. But others, including France and, especially, the Mediterranean quartet of Portugal, Italy, Greece and Spain (sometimes described as the PIGS), have not done so."[10] That the publication (whose articles are never signed by a specific reporter) considered *PIGS* to be a term that "described" the four countries—rather than, say, "vituperated," "satirized," or "rebuked"—is a telling sign of its editorial stance regarding the dire situation those nations were beginning to face. That approach was never rectified. A dehumanizing rhetoric that unapologetically presents *poor* people or countries as *pork* people or countries is not merely offensive; more important, it paves the way to justifications for managing, controlling, or dominating them with the instruments of hegemonic economic rationality.

For his photobook, Spottorno substitutes *The Pigs* for the title of the British periodical and imposes his own visual interpretation on the usual political and financial articles. His work engages the discourse that presents Portugal, Italy, Greece, and Spain as the locus of a series of ingrained vices and defects that are at the root of their recent plight, resulting in an image of southern Europe that is, in Spottorno's own words, "both true and incomplete" (1). Inefficient commerce, outmoded transportation, atavistic religiosity, irrational housing and urban policies, chaotic bureaucracy, attachment to authoritarian rule, low productivity, unsafe work practices,

and the resulting combination of ugliness, untidiness, and filthiness are some of the focal issues the book illustrates through more than sixty color photographs. Although the collection is structured so that it gives the same presence to each country (in successions of four-color, two-page spreads of photographs for each one, ordered sequentially in accordance with the infamous acronym: Portugal, Italy, Greece, Spain), most of the images that Spottorno has chosen intentionally annul the diversity that exists within and among the four nations. Therefore, it is often impossible to place the scene depicted in one country or another. Their idiosyncrasy is sacrificed as a way of calling attention to the media's sweeping generalizations on the basis of the stereotypes that sustain the region's cohesion. The photographs show a derelict territory unified by its seemingly irreversible decline from the cradle of Western civilization to a space that seems relevant for the media only as an embodiment of what is problematic within the EU: the failure of social democracy, the growing inequality among its citizens, the mismanagement of the common good. Part of what is most striking about Spottorno's work is that it reveals sights that many would have thought were long banished from those countries. Hypermodern, affluent Western Europe can hardly be recognized in these pictures of scarcity and decay. We may call the resulting amalgam a *porcine image* of southern Europe, as it is a limited, derogatory view based on the PIGS abbreviation.

The artist is well aware that critics tend to fault documentary photography projects for lack of historical depth. While the best examples of the genre are considered effective at portraying the consequences of processes, the photographer's lens can rarely capture all the causalities and complexities involved. As Susie Linfield argues, "though photographs can do much to expose a crisis, they can do little to explain it—and sometimes they lead viewers astray. . . . [W]e, the viewers, must look outside the frame to understand the complex realities out of which these photographs grew" (50–51). It is Spottorno's aspiration in *The Pigs* to overcome this limitation, or at least to guide viewers so that his project in itself suffices as much as possible to underscore some of the context that can give it significant meaning—perhaps curbing its semantic richness, yet still making its political intent more poignant. To this end, he frames his visual work in the peculiar format already described and incorporates paratexts (also inspired by the *Economist*'s sections) that place his project within a particular historical narrative. One of these is his written piece replacing the *Economist*'s editorial page, in which he refers to the long decline of the once prominent Greece, Italy, Portugal, and Spain as the common factor that binds those nations

together. In a few rapid strokes, Spottorno summarizes the processes that transformed them from being "the architects, . . . the stem cells from which the idea of Europe developed" into "old, cynical and individualistic countries . . . accustomed to both authoritarian and corrupt governments." It may be argued that with his swift historical account Spottorno falls into—or consciously adopts—the same type of gross generalization he criticizes. What is more, he invokes a sort of regionalism that could be understood as implicitly positing the nations of the South ("our countries," as he calls them twice) against their northern neighbors, the EU administrators, or the international financial elites. Although one may consider this segment as in the same ironic vein as the rest of the project, a short paragraph inserted at the end shatters that convention. In a highlighted textbox, Spottorno's goal is briefly spelled out in the first person: "I have attempted," he writes, "to translate into images the articles we read in the financial press."

The cartoon that follows the op-ed, another characteristic feature of the "original" *Economist*, underscores Spottorno's message. The drawing, by Ata, shows three men in black suits, caricatures of the representatives sent by the International Monetary Fund, the European Commission, and the European Central Bank—the oft-vilified *troika*—to check on the implementation of the policies dictated by those institutions. With severe expressions, the bureaucrats analyze and take notes on a littered corner on the shore of a characteristic Mediterranean enclave. They are so focused on the filth that they ignore the rest of the landscape; the donkey's bridles and blinkers they wear emphasize their alienation from the beauty that surrounds them. The headgear also inserts them into the narrative they have helped create: they are depicted as stubborn, inflexible mules who can see only the pigs' vices, never their virtues.

Notwithstanding the author's stated intentions, *The Pigs* does not merely entail a vindication of the European South in response to the neoliberal media's overarching denigration. First, it should be noted that the European divide is not sustained exclusively on a geographical basis. Growing social and economic disparities are undeniable realities not only in the southern countries but also in other regions of Europe. Just as the South has many exclusive places and its own population of elites and salariats (to use Guy Standing's terminology) who would not recognize themselves in Spottorno depiction, the North of Europe has its own precariat and underclass whose living conditions closely resemble those represented in the book. Privileged Europe, North and South, is a world of black-and-white sophistication that Spottorno portrays in his equally ironic project *Wealth Man-*

agement, produced in 2015 in the format of a luxurious brochure for WTF Bank, a fictitious financial institution. The back cover of *The Pigs* features a preview of that subsequent project: an ad for WTF Bank featuring a red Ferrari and the lines, "You don't need money. All you need is credit." The bank's slogan, "Live beyond your means," is equally telling of the author's satirical approach to the global elites whose financial maneuvering (which prominently included subprime loaning) was among the root causes of the worst economic downturn since the Great Depression.

Spottorno's pictures are also unsettling for viewers sympathetic toward the South. While some of the photographs do challenge "porcine" prejudice, others clearly document the undeniable degradation of living conditions for the citizens of Portugal, Spain, Italy, and Greece, whom the camera does not free of the responsibility for their countries' condition. To a large extent, the outsider's gaze could force them to confront the present reality that many prefer to ignore. As Jacques Derrida remarks in his reflections on hospitality, the foreigner is, "first of all, the one who puts the first question" and thus "puts me in question" ("Foreigner Question" 3). The photographer himself who arrives unannounced to produce his documentary, the viewer of the photobook who questions the project itself, the amateur photographers who contemplate the ruins on the cover: they all pose questions that may be difficult for the PIGS communities to answer, or even to ponder. Thus, a few of the pictures point to the decline of their habitats (urban, suburban, and rural); others, to the pockets of popular attachment to illiberal practices; others still, to citizens' lack of social engagement.

By largely focusing on that decay, *The Pigs* is able to transcend its surface critique of some media outlets' (mis)representation in order to illustrate more broadly the ruin of the European dream, which ended for many citizens of the South before it was ever fulfilled. The central theme of ruination connects *The Pigs* with a large number of contemporary works that investigate the power of images of decay, and with a long-established artistic exploration whose emergence is closely related to the southern European predicament.[11] One could claim that the twenty-first century began with the representations of the collapse of the World Trade Center on September 11, 2001. But although aesthetic interest in ruination may have reached a peak following that event, its origins can be traced back to the Renaissance, when ruins were used as background elements in numerous paintings. It was in the eighteenth century that the topic first got major attention. The 1755 Lisbon earthquake and subsequent tsunami caused the deaths of tens of thousands. Most perished in Portugal's capital, which was virtu-

Figure 5.2. Carlos Spottorno, *The Pigs*. Cover. 2013. Courtesy of the artist.

ally destroyed, but there were also numerous victims across the rest of the Iberian Peninsula. The tremor haunted the imagination of many Europeans and had a lasting impact on the continent's politics and culture. For some, the disaster was associated with the decline of the Iberian empires and proved greatly influential on Edmund Burke's and Immanuel Kant's theorization of the category of the sublime. Both the political reading of the quake (which Spottorno mentions in his introductory text) and its aesthetic translation into the topic of ruins resonate in *The Pigs*.

In the book's cover photo (fig. 5.2), two tourists look at the ruins of an ancient building, a classical temple that immediately evokes the Mediterranean region. Ruins like these in Agrigento, Sicily, have been essential in the modern construction of Europe's self-image, as they are iconic of the Hellenic and Roman heritage usually invoked in solemn statements on the foundations of the continent's cultural unity. Classical ruins also featured prominently in the Grand Tour that educated the tastes of northern European elites in the early modern period. Yet, unlike most of its artistic precedents, which usually stress the deteriorated building itself, Spottorno's cover image emphasizes the act of seeing and the apparent divide produced between the viewers and the ruinous but prestigious object of their contemplation. Separating the tourists from the remains of the temple is a metallic fence that is itself in an imminent state of ruin. This is a poignant detail—the photograph's Barthesian *punctum*, if you wish—that carries the viewer to the post-2007 ruins of southern Europe, which lack the aura of the ancient ones but sustain another way of conceiving Europe's ever-evolving identity—a modern European identity that, as Roberto Dainotto points out, began as a result of the North of the continent constructing the South as its own "sufficient and indispensable *internal* Other: Europe, but also the negative part of it" (4). The controversy over porcine Europe shows that this internal difference, conceptualized in the eighteenth century, is still fed with distance, partial knowledge, and prejudice.

Spottorno portrays the ruins of a past so recent that it is still contemporaneous with those who witnessed the construction of the decaying landscapes in the photographs. At the same time, the photos anticipate a future that tumbles back to the history of scarcity that Greece, Italy, Portugal, and Spain endured for so much of the last century. In other words, Spottorno depicts a region that seems alien to the sort of development facilitated by membership in the EU. As if those nations had never been a part of the continent's major economic and political community, the pristine highways and the high-speed trains that have come to symbolize EU investment are

nowhere to be found in the book. Instead, examples of less-than-ideal, obsolete transportation (derelict cars, horses walking down city streets) shock the viewer as images of a project whose momentum has stalled. Spottorno may also be suggesting what a dystopic post-EU landscape would look like—one that may already be materializing in places such as Greece, perhaps a metonymy for the challenges the unification project will face in the near future. In one of the collection's most telling photographs, a middle-aged man tiredly walks along a rundown street somewhere in Portugal (fig. 5.3). Head down, he will turn his back to what lies around the corner that he is about to pass. There, above some garbage and an overflowing trashcan, we see the remains of a peculiar form of political graffiti. Made of typical Portuguese tile, it reads, "SANTA EUROPA DA ESPERANÇA" [Holy Europe of Hope]. Much of the ceramic is broken or has fallen. A hand-painted EU flag appears frozen in its unfurled fluttering next to the vestiges of what once were dozens of tiles painted with the symbol of the common currency. The condition of the inscription parallels that of the derelict building that displays it. Both can be taken to express the vision of its makers and neighbors about a EU that is failing them. For a majority of people in Portugal, as in the rest of southern Europe, the unification project had for decades become a new faith in which they put their hopes for a better future. When the utopian project that galvanized the transformation of their societies was largely reduced to the dogma of neoliberalism following the introduction of the euro, and the ensuing economic downturn tested continental solidarity, the dream of cohesion among the nations of Europe was shattered. The Union was divided in two: lender countries on one side, debtors on the other. This financial dichotomy has a moral correlate of which the porcine rhetoric is a clear symptom.

As a response both to those who portray southern Europeans as "pigs" and to the citizens of the region who tend to ignore or cynically accept their lot, Spottorno vindicates the value of community building. A number of his photographs show the consequences of a weaker civil society (relative to other countries), which the author explicitly decries in the photobook's opening text. In most of the pictures, lonely characters populate the ruined landscapes, apparently insensible to their deterioration. Even in the crowded market scenes, each individual seems detached from the rest, oblivious to his or her fellow citizens' fate. In one of those pictures, the shoppers and sellers at a very informal street market go on with their business as usual while a half-naked man, probably homeless, does his own thing inside a derelict dumpster (fig. 5.4). From a large colorful mural, one

Figure 5.3. Carlos Spottorno, *The Pigs*. Untitled photograph. 2013. Courtesy of the artist.

giant robot-like soldier figure surveils the street. In another photograph, we see a chaotic marketplace at the foot of the Acropolis in Athens (fig. 5.5). The citadel revered as the birthplace of democracy and Europe lies in ruins, relegated to the background, while the improvised market in the foreground is hectic with activity, although with no apparent order. Men from all walks of life rush around in different directions, talk on cell phones, carry piles of objects, exchange goods. It's every man for himself, also in a literal sense: not a single woman can be found. The merchandise scattered on the ground includes, most visibly, a few encyclopedia volumes. The image is an apt metaphor for the dystopian situation many see emerging across Europe: the consequence of a project seeking to create an inclusive political body capable of ensuring peace among its nations and protecting their citizens' welfare transforming into a Hayek-inspired free-trade zone with minimal government regulation. The model known as "European social capitalism," which would strive to balance the pernicious effects of free markets with a strong system of government-managed solidarity, has been in decline since the 1990s.[12] Instead, the "New Europeanism," endorsed by Margaret Thatcher and her followers, has gained ground and is now the law of the land. As a consequence, Europeans increasingly see themselves at the mercy of deregulated markets, a system defended by the neoliberal media of which the *Economist* is a prime example.

Figure 5.4. Carlos Spottorno, *The Pigs*. Untitled photograph. 2013. Courtesy of the artist.

One can infer that Spottorno's view of the EU's direction is rather bleak. But his project goes beyond a negative critique to offer a modest proposal. On the website *www.thepigs.eu*, he invites sympathetic viewers to "join the Pigs Community" by submitting their own photographs, which he selects and then posts on the web. In the name given to this initiative—Pigs Community—there is an echo, perhaps nostalgic, of the "European Community" that preceded the current Union and was an object of stronger attachment among southern Europeans in the 1980s than is the case in the 2010s. This website can be seen as an attempt to raise consciousness about the existence of the *PIGS* nomenclature and some of its implications, and also about the peculiarities that have prompted its usage in the media. By opening that virtual communitarian space, Spottorno invites people to reclaim the PIGS acronym from the media. On the site, the term becomes the password for entry to a world of shared interests, with an eye toward self-awareness and self-assessment that could be the first step toward imagining an alternative agenda for the social regeneration of the region and, ultimately, of the European project. Habermas would be pleased with this proof of the existence, at least potentially, of an engaged European civil society.

The photographs Spottorno includes both on the website and in his

Figure 5.5. Carlos Spottorno, *The Pigs*. Untitled photograph. 2013. Courtesy of the artist.

photobook are a distillation of a sort of reporting from which that porcine image of Europe's South is implied but never explicitly stated. He uncovers the message promulgated by the *Economist* and other neoliberal media outlets, as if lifting a veil of hypocrisy. The photographer usurps the role of the magazine editor, revealing the crude, caricature-like image of everyday southern Europeans that the publication helps perpetuate. He also exposes the media's self-imposed limitations, avoiding certain imagery of social degradation that could undermine the basis of the economic policies they openly endorse. Many of the photographs can be seen as symbols of the relentless destruction of the welfare state that has taken place with the EU institutions' acquiescence at least during the last decade.

In this way, the format that Spottorno exploits makes its media critique, one of the most powerful elements of the project, explicit. *The Pigs* also deals with a related discourse, one that has had a significant influence on the canon of Spanish photography. For many years, coinciding with the recognition of photography as an art form in the second half of the past century, the type of photographic work with artistic aspirations that prevailed in Spain consisted mostly of black-and-white reportages that dealt with the impoverished, traditionalist, and backward Spain that followed the civil war. The oeuvres of distinctive Spanish photographers such as Francesc Català-Roca (1922–1998) and Ramón Masats (b. 1931), whose most

recognizable work peaked in the mid-century, and that of Cristina García Rodero (b. 1949), who started in the 1980s, show great similarities despite the time that separates their primes and the changes that the country underwent in the interim.[13] Foreign professionals who devoted whole photobooks to Spain, such as the Swiss Michael Wolgensinger (1913–1990), or the Austrian-American Inge Morath (1923–2002), also made use of that imagery. After all, a starving population and a society in transition between a rural economy and an industrial, urban one were indeed prominent in Spain until the 1960s. But the persistence of that approach and the image of the country that it continued to project even after Spain experienced the social, political, and economic transformations of the last third of the twentieth century is, for photography critic and historian Rosa Olivares, "a clear example of how photography goes beyond reality: the representation has outlived what is represented" (7). This simplification of the nation's complex recent history (and, eventually, its partial distortion) became largely synonymous with Spanish photography. This model was fortified by the canonization that important exhibitions and official awards brought along with them. According to Olivares, the main reason this conception of Spain endures is that many years after the postwar period it was still "profitable" to depict Spain as being poor and unsophisticated (17). Olivares is right, at least in part. Yet it is also true that Spain may not have changed all that much, as Carlos Spottorno shows by establishing an ironic dialogue with this tradition. By reframing this topical perspective, he exposes it as an anachronism, a dated convention that is only marginally representative of a much more complex reality. At the same time, he reveals this imagery of decline as something not intrinsically or uniquely Spanish—in a way, it is something shared with Spain's Iberian and Mediterranean neighbors, which are all pictured in this book under the same powerful, midday light. There is a Europe of modern development and big money, as Spottorno's photobook *Wealth Management* shows, but there is also another Europe that has not enjoyed the same privileges, and whose existence is not merely a remnant of the past.

Swine on the March: Santiago Sierra's *Pigs Devouring Peninsulas*

The reality of these two Europes is intimately, even causally, related. Every ideal needs its reverse, a principle that artist Santiago Sierra (b. Madrid, 1966) often addresses. Sierra is best known for his incisive work on the ways

economics affects human relationships at all levels. In connection with this concern, his art addresses issues such as media bias, civic conformism, and the absurdity and exploitative nature of many forms of labor. In a few of his most discussed performance pieces, Sierra hired people to spend hours carrying out pointless or alienating tasks, such as staying inside cardboard boxes ("Three People Paid to Lay Still Inside Three Boxes During a Party," Havana, November 2000) or writing out the same five-word sentence for hours ("El trabajo es la Dictadura" [Labor is the Dictatorship], Madrid, January 2013). These and other actions generate unsettling questions on some of the basic assumptions that sustain capitalist societies, among them the idea that labor is a dignifying, productive activity. From the early twenty-first century, Sierra's work has garnered broad international attention. As Dirk Luckow and Daniel Schreiber point out, "There is hardly another European artist whose works divide more minds, hardly another oeuvre that provokes more contradiction" (7). Since Sierra is one of just a handful of contemporary Spanish artists with global stature, institutions there have hailed him as an outstanding representative of the country's creativity. Yet, he refuses to serve any government or to advance the interests of a nation and has consistently shunned the State of Culture, which in 2010 attempted to award him Spain's National Prize for Visual Arts. In a move unprecedented in the history of the award, he rejected the accolade—and the thirty thousand euros that came with it. Sierra's letter of refusal to the Ministry of Culture declared that the prize puts the awardee's prestige to work for the benefit of the government.

Sierra's critique of economic relations also probes them on an international scale. His influential take on the EU crisis is evident in some of the topics that Spottorno explores in his photography, even if the sense of Sierra's contribution is more elusive. In a trilogy entitled *Pigs Devouring Peninsulas*, which once more addresses porcine views of continental politics, Sierra touches on the clashes between the European North and the South. The trilogy consists of the installation-performances "Pigs Devouring the Hellenic Peninsula," "Pigs Devouring the Italic Peninsula" (fig. 5.6), and "Pigs Devouring the Iberian Peninsula" (fig. 5.7 and fig. 5.8), presented separately between August 2012 and January 2013: the first in Hamburg (Germany) and the other two in Lucca and Milan (Italy), respectively. Each performance featured an oversized three-dimensional map of one of the three peninsulas, which appeared rather as islands or, in the case of Greece, an archipelago: detached from the continent, isolated, and framed by an ephemeral wall about three feet tall. The maps were made

Figure 5.6. Santiago Sierra, photograph of the installation *Pigs Devouring the Italian Peninsula*. Iglesia di San Matteo, Lucca, Italy. September 2012. Courtesy of the Santiago Sierra Studio.

Figure 5.7. Santiago Sierra, photograph of the installation *Pigs Devouring the Iberian Peninsula*. Lambretto Art Project, Milan, Italy. January 2013. Courtesy of the Santiago Sierra Studio.

Figure 5.8. Santiago Sierra, photograph of the installation *Pigs Devouring the Iberian Peninsula*. Lambretto Art Project, Milan, Italy. January 2013. Courtesy of the Santiago Sierra Studio.

of an edible sandy paste set directly on the floor or on sheets of black plastic. Inside the fenced area there was also a container filled with water. A high-pitched, almost inaudible electronic soundtrack by Clinton Watkins contributed to creating an oneiric atmosphere.

A team of hogs (six in Hamburg and Milan, five in Lucca) entered the corralled area from the cartographical north of each region depicted. One of the animals had a camera harnessed on its back. As soon as the pigs reached the map, they started to eat it. The hogs encountered no resistance; they rambled the area peacefully, occasionally licking one another, lying down, urinating or defecating on the map. The water they drank and spilled contributed to the growing mess. After they pigged out for a few minutes, the carefully arranged geographical contours were barely recognizable. The site had become a proper pigsty. With the areas sullied, the pigs rested, well fed. One would say that they looked entirely satisfied.

Experienced on-site, the three pieces stirred all five senses, not only the visual: the mingled odors of the maps' edible substance and pig excrement; the sounds the hogs produced and Watkins's subtly unnerving soundtrack; the almost tangible flavors and textures elicited by the spectacle of the

plump swine on the march. When considered along with the leading role that Sierra gives to the animals, this sensuous experience underscores the irrational factors at work in issues like the one the event addresses: the recent degradation of Portugal, Italy, Greece, and Spain, the so-called PIGS. Sierra's trilogy suggests that the economic and political decisions that led to the ruin of Europe's South were not the exclusive result of rational operations. No matter how logically argued they may have seemed, both the choices that provoked the crisis and the measures taken to deal with it were influenced by prejudice and emotions, from hope and desire to greed and jingoism. Emotions form the core of the tensions between northern and southern nations.

Either amused or repelled, many of the viewers in Italy identified the animals with the EU technocrats who guided the economic policies pushed from Brussels. In Germany, some took offense at what they saw as an insult to their government and people, as if the pigs represented them. Yet, obviously, an animal does not hold citizenship, nor does it quite belong to, or represent, a nation—or does it? Few would choose the earthly pig for such an elevated mission, which seems better suited to eagles of various types. In fact, Sierra's project is anything but jingoistic; he does not care to attack or stand by any nation-state. He is a native of southern Europe, where he currently lives, yet he also has strong ties in Germany, where he received postgraduate training under the guidance of Franz Erhard Walther, his mentor and friend. More important, it should be noted that the titles in the trilogy refer to peninsulas, which are physical—not political—geographical divisions. Instead of defending Portugal, Italy, Greece, and Spain or criticizing the role of specific institutions, Sierra denounces the abuses on, and degradation of, three regions and their inhabitants, a process substantially shaped by the policies of specific national and transnational governmental and economic agents. Their respective degrees of accountability, however, remain opaque.[14]

Despite the pig trope's ambiguity, Sierra's posture is unequivocally belligerent—except that its target is shrewdly obscured. Such vagueness matches the anonymity of the forces that drove the European crisis and makes the critique more broadly encompassing. This is a necessity, given that those responsible for the plight of so many from southern Europe and other regions of the continent (Ireland is another paradigmatic case) were numerous and cannot be identified easily. Citizens who participated in the ruin of their own societies, speculators around the globe, the economists who designed the austerity policies, and the politicians who implemented

them were among those blamed. The throngs protesting economic deprivation and political cynicism in the central squares of Athens (Syntagma), Madrid (Sol), and Lisbon (Rossio) and the followers of the Five Stars Movement in Italy, among others, demanded to know who was ultimately responsible for the crisis that had ravaged their countries. In the same spirit, some spectators of Sierra's trilogy assigned an identity to the pigs based on their own understanding of the events that shook the EU after 2007. There was one absence, however, that could be equally significant. While the animals' actions and their consequences were visible, Sierra concealed the shepherd who opened the gates into the constructed peninsulas and let in the teams of hogs. This unseen presence parallels the market's "invisible hand," a metaphor coined by Adam Smith that is commonly understood as the primary principle sustaining the neoliberal economy.

The spectators may have wondered whose hands were controlling the sounder of swine, but there could be few doubts about the fate that ultimately awaited the pigs; if there were any, Sierra's *Epilogue of the Trilogy of Pigs Devouring Peninsulas* put them to rest. The event, held at the archeological park of Pumapungo (Ecuador) in October 2015, was centered around the communitarian roasting of a mature pig. The animal, traversed with iron bars, was slowly cooked on a makeshift bonfire walled by a tin fence that resembled those used to frame the edible maps. About two dozen people feasted on the meat and drank beer and tequila in a celebratory atmosphere. Sierra documented the gathering in a series of photographs that portray both the attendees and the crisp-skinned, roasted pig carcass, complete from head to tail. In this case, there was no reason to efface the beneficiaries of a joyful ritual that nourished the community's hearts and bodies. The sacrifice satisfied a basic need for food and sociability, essential to humans since the dawn of time, as the history-freighted location seemed to emphasize. The destruction of the peninsulas was the result of a less honest, more elusive logic. The interests that guided it could not be so easily discerned, but the ruin they caused provoked the dismay of many.

Santiago Sierra's porcine installation-performances play out the undreaming of the union and solidarity process that intellectuals, artists, and political leaders had envisioned for Europe. In a 2005 interview with Mario Rossi, Sierra commented that the allure of Spain's seemingly firmly established European identity had diminished for those seeking art from a distinct place: "Desde hace algunos años España está en Europa y ya no tiene mucha gracia" ("El arte" 95) [For some years now, Spain is in Europe, and it has lost much of its appeal]. The crisis that erupted a couple of years

later destroyed that perception of uniformity and signaled the reemergence of old divisions within the continent. Countries like Greece, Italy, Portugal, and Spain, where many had worked for decades to reaffirm their belonging to the modern Europe allegedly best represented by their northern neighbors, were again seen as economically and politically estranged from it. Sierra's trilogy points to the relationships of political and economic power that condition Europeans' lives today. To put it in Ortega y Gasset's famous terms, the topical Spain reflected in postwar photography or evoked in porcine imagery was still a problem whose "solution" was Europe. Not anymore—or not along the same lines. Aside from the dramatic decline in living conditions for a great number of citizens, the post-2007 crisis also meant the disintegration of the goal that had guided Spain's advancement for more than a century: full acceptance and participation in an integrated continent. It remains to be seen whether that illusion can be recovered from the rubble it has left behind.

EPILOGUE

A Plea for Creative Euroskepticism

Toward the end of a career largely devoted to reflecting on how we write about the past, Hayden White noted that history is "primarily a story of the clash of ideas, values and dreams (rather than of bodies and machines only)" (ix). The history of European integration is a good example of that notion. It was mostly the ideas, values, and dreams of a few leaders that sustained that vast political experiment for decades, which was at least partially responsible for the region's long period of peace and prosperity following World War II. Yet attempts to make those ideals a reality too often resulted in a mass of regulations that hardly reflected the hopes and aspirations of ordinary citizens.

Since 2007, the dreams of the EU's founders have turned into nightmares for many Europeans. Rightly or wrongly, millions of citizens throughout the continent blamed the organization for some of their principal concerns, from the dwindling of the welfare state to the inadequate management of migration. The post-2007 crises tested the resilience of European integration like never before, prompting responses that went in two main directions. Some of the critics aimed to reform and improve the Union, invoking the need for "more Europe"; others sought its disappearance, or at least to shrink the project back to little more than a free-trade zone—thus, they wished for "less Europe." The Brexit vote of June 2016 was a clear sign of this position's popular strength.

For those already in the EU, integration had lost all trace of the utopian flair it might have had; others aspiring to join (e.g., Ukrainian democrats or Syrian refuge seekers) had good reasons to stop dreaming of an open, mutually supportive Europe. Nevertheless, popular discontent with the EU had an additional, more positive outcome: it gave the institution a more concrete presence in the daily lives of the majority. It is undeniable that,

although the EU had been a decisive actor on the continental stage for years, its influence was seldom recognized. In the case of Spain, but also in that of other member nations, the EU had never been the subject of much debate prior to the recent crises, even during the period when accession was being negotiated.

Engaging what was perceived as a bureaucratic giant largely dedicated to the regulation of arcane matters was, understandably enough, not a priority for most people, including artists and authors who spend their time reflecting on the nature and meaning of what is common to all. Although for decades the EU had an increasing impact on the lives of Europeans, few found it appealing or interesting enough to pay it significant attention. There was little epic, and less poetry, to be found in what was seen as a largely elite, mostly economic and administrative enterprise—in other words, a mostly uninspiring Union.

It took the EU's losing its mystique for it to gain the relevance it should have had in the public eye. Now that it is in the limelight, perhaps another European Union can be fostered: one that is more democratic, more plural, and less unequal—and thus more attractive and sustainable in the long term. If the Union is to survive, it will do so in better shape if it is closely watched and debated in depth and regularly by many—and not just when things do not seem to be working out, either for a specific member or for the group as a whole. Such goals require cultivating awareness about its role and its initiatives. To make that possible, it is necessary to pay attention to contributions that differ from those of traditional political actors.

Making the European project more engaging requires taking into account a dimension that is often overlooked: that of emotions. As Chantal Mouffe contends, "the rationalism and individualism dominant in liberal theory do not allow one to understand the crucial role played in politics by what I have called 'passions': the affective dimension which is mobilized in the creation of political identities" (137). This key aspect has been largely absent from the construction of the EU; unfortunately, only extreme-right populists have successfully exploited it, and mostly to advocate for versions of "Fortress Europe." The imaginative and critical perspectives that the arts and humanities provide can prove very useful in revamping the European integration project along more inclusive lines.

The most stimulating of these artistic and intellectual contributions are not limited to a mere celebration of the accomplishments of Europe, the EU, or its nation members, which is the sort of cultural manifestation that tends to be favored institutionally. Indeed, the art and literature that

contest and interrogate those achievements offer an optimal sphere for debates on the Union's precedents, its existing form, and new possibilities for the future. Some of these initiatives already exist, and occasionally enjoy official support. Yet they are minimally funded in comparison with other spheres of action, or they are seen as an ornamental element rather than as a pillar of the Union. Pascal Gielen is right when he states that "the European Union's lack of structural attention, investment, education and research in the matter of culture is one of the main reasons for the slump it is currently experiencing" (10). Gielen's own work is a good example of the kind of critical, forward-looking proposals that the humanities can contribute to these discussions.

As we have seen in the last chapters of this book, independent artists and intellectuals are producing work that engages the integration project in ways that mobilize affects as well as reason. They contribute to a vital critique and do not employ the jargon that usually dominates debates within and on the EU. Questioning and reassessing the Union in creative terms is fundamental for the future of the transnational organization as it struggles to connect with its people. The contributions of artists and intellectuals help ordinary citizens visualize how the EU affects their daily lives, can move them to participate more actively in political processes such as the elections to the European Parliament (often perceived as irrelevant), and can even lead them to envision unexplored responses to current political and societal challenges. The plurality of perspectives that these voices bring forth is one of the few hopes left for imagining ways to renew the promise of a union of the European nations. At a moment when the project is in its deepest crisis, perhaps only a healthy dose of creative Euroskepticism can save the EU.

NOTES

INTRODUCTION

1. A portion of the Conservatives led by Margaret Thatcher (who used the term in a consequential address delivered in 1988 at the College of Europe in Bruges, Belgium) also grew increasingly discontented with the European process, which they deemed incompatible with British sovereignty. For more on the history of British positions on Europeanism since the 1940s, see Anthony Foster, "Anti-Europeans, Anti-Marketeers and Euroskeptics."
2. Müller, a historian and political scientist, does not explicitly count artists and "creative" writers among the "in-between figures" he enumerates. However, it seems plausible that he would include them among the "second-hand dealers in ideas" whom he lists within the category (the phrase is Friedrich von Hayek's). Müller is quick to add that, "[d]escribing them in this way was no sign of contempt: Hayek thought they were often much more important than many original producers of ideas" (*Contesting* 3).
3. Rousseau's *Projet de Paix perpétuelle* (1756) has been translated into English as *A Lasting Peace through the Federation of Europe*. It was initially conceived as a commentary on the Abbé de Saint-Pierre's *Projet pour rendre la paix perpétuelle en Europe* (1713), whose influence can also be traced in Kant's *Zum ewigen Frieden. Ein philosophischer Entwurf* [*Perpetual Peace: A Philosophical Sketch*], from 1795. In Spain, Gaspar M. de Jovellanos echoed these thinkers' ideas in his *Memoria sobre educación pública* [Treatise on public education], written in 1801, which advocated for a European federation as the first step toward a global one whose final goal was lasting and generalized human happiness. (Unless noted, all translations throughout the book are mine.)
4. "Nous tentons une grande expérience, la réalisation d'un rêve qui a hanté les peuples d'Europe depuis dix siècles: créer entre eux une organisation mettant un terme à la guerre et garantissant une paix éternelle" [We are attempting a great experiment, the fulfillment of a dream that has haunted the peoples of Europe for ten centuries: creating among them an organization that would put an end to war and ensure eternal peace]. Schuman's address at the founding

meeting of the Council of Europe in Strasbourg on May 5, 1949, lays out some of the terms that would recur in the debates about the unification project in the following decades: the "fulfillment of a dream," the problematic definition and limits of Europe, and the divide between those who perceive a "European spirit" and the doubters who do not.

5. Two of the essential books in English that have shaped the mainstream view about this process remain Alan S. Milward's *The European Rescue of the Nation-State* and John Gillingham's *European Integration, 1950–2003*. Bo Stråth and Hagen Schulz-Forberg offer an alternative view. In *The Political History of European Integration*, they highlight the negative social impact of the continent's economic integration since the 1980s.
6. For Zingales, who holds a named professorship of finance at the University of Chicago, Schuman's dream "sembra trasformarsi in un incubo. Quella stessa Unione creata per favorire lo spirito europeo sta diventando una prigione, che fomenta l'odio etnico e i peggiori stereotipi" (9) [seems to be turning into a nightmare. The very Union created to foster the European spirit is becoming a prison that incites ethnic hatred and the worst stereotypes]. In his opinion, "l'Europa così com'è non solo non è sostenibile, ma danneggia particolarmente il Sud del continente" (11) [as it is, Europe is not only unsustainable; it is particularly harmful to the continent's South]. For his part, Molina Foix wrote in Spain's most influential newspaper, the center-left daily *El País*, "Antes de que la Unión Europea dejara de ser un sueño para convertirse en pesadilla de muchos, nosotros la queríamos. . . . La Europa mercantil nos ahoga a la mayoría. La Europa jurisprudente nos vigila de un modo que sería aceptable si de esa vigilancia surgiera la salvación general, y no el ordenancismo dictado por los *happy few* de un funcionariado hueco y costoso. La Europa del igualitario bienestar económico se disipa cada día más, si exceptuamos a los afortunados germanos. . . . Yo no creo que ese artefacto engendrado con la mejor voluntad y la mayor esperanza actúe contra nosotros. Simplemente: no actúa, y, cuando lo hace, entreteniéndose en legalismos muchas veces irrelevantes" ("Europa, el paquidermo," March 16, 2013) [Before the European Union ceased to be a dream and became a nightmare for many, we used to love it. . . . [[Now]], mercantile Europe is choking most of us to death. Jurisprudence Europe watches over us in a way that would only be acceptable if that surveillance would lead to general salvation, and not myriad rules dictated by the happy few: a hollow and costly group of public employees. The Europe of egalitarian welfare is becoming increasingly diluted, with the exception of the fortunate Germans. . . . I do not believe that that artifact—created with the best of intentions and the greatest of hopes—acts against us. It is simply that it does not act, and when it does, it lingers in oft-irrelevant legalisms].
7. Paul Taggart and Aleks Szczerbiak call this position "soft Euroskepticism," which is to be found "*where there is NOT a principled objection to European*

integration or EU membership but where concerns on one (or a number) of policy areas lead to the expression of qualified opposition to the EU, or where there is a sense that 'national interest' is currently at odds with the EU's trajectory" (7; their emphasis).

8. Cesáreo Rodríguez-Aguilera offers a compelling analysis and taxonomy of Euroskeptic political parties across Europe in his *Euroescepticismo, Eurofobia y Eurocriticismo*.
9. The European Economic Community (EEC) did not officially become the European Community (EC) until the Maastricht Treaty of 1992. The EC was absorbed into the EU in 2009. In most texts destined for a general readership, the Union has adopted "EU" as a blanket term covering both the pre- and post-2009 versions of the organization's name. Although, strictly speaking, it is historically inaccurate, I will follow this use for the sake of clarity.
10. For a useful transnational approach to the topic of Europeanization, see Martin Conway and Kiran Klaus Patel. Among the strengths of their coedited volume is the attention paid to the role of culture as driver of that process. It does not, however, devote any significant reflection to Spain, which Julio Crespo MacLennan's *España en Europa, 1945–2000* deals with efficiently in its coverage of the political history of Spain's relationship to Western Europe, its accession into the EEC, and its role within the EU up to the end of the century.
11. Carlos Closa and Antonio Barroso's essay "Consensus, Benign Neglect, and Specialized Knowledge: Spanish Intellectuals and Europe" is a good example of the preeminence of that version, which has been prevalent in Spain's intellectual and social historiography. The authors contend that Europe "occupied an almost totally uncontroversial position" among intellectuals, who "did not show much interest in debating it" (203). Other received notions that the essay simply reiterates are that 1898 witnessed "the loss of Spain's last colonial possessions" (204)—when in fact Equatorial Guinea would not gain independence until 1968, and Spain's colonial presence in Northern Africa would last even longer—and that the Franco regime "erased any discussion about the place of the country in Europe" (205). The authors do offer a valuable summary of academic approaches to the more technical aspects of the issue (mostly by jurists and political scientists), but they quickly dismiss virtually all other contributions to the debate.
12. The piece is sometimes referred to as *I Love Europa* because it pictures this slogan, a combination of the famous "I [heart] NY" and the name of the Europa circus (one of the few surviving companies in Spain) taken from one of its publicity posters, above a bizarre trio: a female trapeze artist astride a giraffe which is sitting on a charging buffalo. Printed on the three figures, in capital letters, are the words "sexo," "racismo," and "capitalismo" [sex, racism, capitalism]. Deploying camp aesthetics with virtuosity, Gadea alludes to the myth of princess Europa's abduction by Zeus in the form of a bull and creates

a subtext informed by a number of social issues, from the spectacularization of politics to the role of women in Europeanization to Spain's enthusiasm about this process. The artist considered this work one of her best (Gadea 73).

13. One recent exception is Gayle Rogers's *Modernism and the New Spain*, an account of the relationships between British and Hispanic intellectual circles in the 1920s and 1930s. The ideas of Europe held by Ortega and others are central to Rogers's study, in which other major yet "peripheral" modernist authors such as T. S. Eliot, Virginia Woolf, James Joyce, Victoria Ocampo, and Federico García Lorca are read within a framework of active cosmopolitanism.
14. For a deep critique of this notion, see L. Elena Delgado's *La nación singular*.
15. Complementary accounts can be found in the books by José María Beneyto and Ricardo Martín de la Guardia.
16. Javier Solana, a Spanish socialist who has held the positions of Secretary General of NATO (1995–1999) and the EU's High Representative for Common Foreign and Security Policy (1999–2009), wrote as recently as 2013 that Europe is Spain's "great hope of modernization" ("una Europa unida sigue siendo, como lo ha sido durante décadas, nuestra gran esperanza de modernización") [a united Europe continues to be, as it has been for decades, our great hope of modernization] ("Europa y la modernización de España," *El País*, February 26, 2013).
17. For a detailed discussion of the topic that focuses on the work of nineteenth- and early twentieth-century writers such as Larra, Galdós, and Unamuno, see Jesús Torrecilla, *El tiempo y los márgenes*. In *Tragedia y razón*, José María Beneyto surveys the role of this concept in the writing of prominent Spanish essayists from last century.
18. See Richard L. Kagan, "Prescott's Paradigm: American Historical Scholarship and the Decline of Spain." Also, Mónica Burguera and Christopher Schmidt-Nowara, "Backwardness and Its Discontents." Following Ismael Saz, Burguera and Schmidt-Nowara prefer the more encompassing term "paradigm of backwardness."
19. For a multifaceted approach to the treatment that the war and the Holocaust have received in Spanish culture, see the volume coedited by Gómez López-Quiñones and Zepp.
20. It still survives today among white supremacists whose racist and xenophobic views, fortunately, have not found the social acceptance in Spain—at least not yet—that they have in other countries. Two examples: Greece, where the neo-Nazi party Golden Dawn came in third at the 2015 general election; and Austria, where Norbert Hofer, a presidential candidate "whose party was partly founded by Nazis with a record of antisemitism and an agenda of anti-Muslim bigotry" (Julia Ebner, "Austria defeated the far-right Norbert Hofer—Finally, some hope for Europe," *Guardian*, December 5, 2016) garnered 46 percent of votes in the 2016 election.

21. In their book *Eurafrica*, Peo Hansen and Stefan Jonsson place the European integration process since the 1920s in a geopolitical context that emphasizes the influence of colonialism and decolonization, an issue that is too often overlooked. Patrick Pasture also addresses the continuities between colonial practices and EU policies, as well as what he terms the "invention of 'Europe the fair'"(191), a discourse that has undoubtedly had an impact on Spain's generally idealized view of the entity.
22. For a compelling approach to the postcolonial relationship between the central African nation and Spain, see Michael Ugarte's *Africans in Europe*. Ugarte focuses on the works of several emigrants and exiles from Equatorial Guinea who have developed an overlooked yet intriguing literature, the most representative of which is Donato Ndongo.
23. For a more detailed discussion, see Martin-Márquez, especially 300–23.
24. "Islamic designs on Spain are a staple in the agenda of many radical Islamic organizations, including Osama bin Ladin's al Qaeda terrorist network; they are central to redeeming the tragedy of 'al-Andalus,' the Christian conquest of the Muslims' stronghold in southern Spain by the Spanish crown in 1492" (Encarnación 158).
25. "La injerencia de un aporte étnico distinto, como los árabes, con un ingrediente religioso como era el islámico, es evidente que daría al traste con el nuevo organismo incipiente [Europa]. España . . . , que estaba en la periferia de dicho organismo, tuvo que mantener una larga lucha de ocho siglos—la llamada Reconquista—mediante la cual defender la existencia del centro. Es evidente que la identidad cultural europea hubiera sido distinta si España no hubiese llevado a cabo aquella lucha. Un centro incipiente y débil hubiera cedido al acoso, de no haber tenido una periferia bien armada para la resistencia. En esa resistencia se forjó la cultura española, aportando al mismo tiempo los elementos intelectuales básicos para la construcción de Europa" (Abellán, "El significado" 31) [The intrusion of a different ethnic input, like the Arabs, with an Islamic religious ingredient, would obviously destroy the new, incipient organism [[Europe]]. Spain . . . , which was on the periphery of that organism, had to maintain an eight-century-long struggle—the so-called Reconquest—to defend the existence of the center. It is evident that European cultural identity would have been different had Spain not put up that fight. A weak and incipient center would have succumbed to the assault had it not had a periphery that was well armed for resistance. It is in that resistance that Spanish culture was forged, at the same time that it provided the basic intellectual elements for the construction of Europe]. Notice that these words can be related to a paradigm of immunization; more about its implications for the relationship between Europe and its others is found in Chapter 4 of this book.

CHAPTER 1

1. The year 1906 is also when Spain reaffirmed its position within Europe's colonial enterprise in Africa. The Conference of Algeciras divided Morocco into two protectorates, one in the south and another in the north, to be administered respectively by France and Spain. As Brad Epps remarks in his essential article "Between Europe and Africa," a few lesser-known intellectuals at the turn of the century saw "the African colonies as vital, potentially reinvigorating parts of Spain" (106). Epps goes on to show that Unamuno was far less optimistic about the outcome of the Spanish presence in Morocco; time would prove him right. No less compelling is Epps's reading (in the same article) of the letters of Joan Maragall, who vows to pursue the independence of a totally European Catalonia from the "African" Spain whose "hero" is Unamuno. Observers of Spanish affairs will notice that in times of societal crises, key debates reemerge around strikingly similar notions.
2. In *La modernidad como crisis*, Gonzalo Navajas understands differently Unamuno's position on the center-periphery issue. For Navajas, "la Europa convencional se reduce para Unamuno a la Europa Central (Francia y Alemania) y el resto son aledaños prescindibles" (58) [according to Unamuno, conventional Europe is limited to Central Europe (France and Germany), and the rest are annexes that can be dispensed with].
3. For a detailed account of this period of Unamuno's life, see Rabaté and Rabaté 439–553.
4. Her interest was certainly not unprecedented. Outside of Spain, since the 1920s, "Unamuno es visto casi siempre como un icono de españolidad y resulta, por otra parte, innegable la incidencia de su exilio en la percepción reiterada de su figura como estandarte de la libertad espiritual frente a una dictadura entendida más de una vez como reviviscencia de la España negra" (Cabo Aseguinolaza 211) [Unamuno is almost always seen as an icon of Spanishness; it is impossible to deny the impact of his exile on the recurrent perception of his figure as a banner of spiritual freedom opposed to a dictatorship that is viewed as another manifestation of the most retrograde Spain].
5. One could say that she had managed "to seize hold of a memory as it flashes up at a moment of danger," as Walter Benjamin suggests in his "Theses on the Philosophy of History" (255). There are similarities among their reflections on Europe, which Benjamin sketched only months before Zambrano wrote hers from an American exile that the German author could not reach. Both are considered messianic, fragmentary thinkers, imbued with a nonconfessional theology—though clearly influenced by the vocabulary of Christianity and Judaism—and interested in restoring the links between the human and the sacred (Bundgård, *Más allá* 26).

6. A facsimile of the letter can be read in the University of Girona Library's digital archives: *dugifonsespecials.udg.edu/bitstream/handle/10256.2/7243/ID1_5670_TC.pdf?sequence=1*
7. The influence of Unamuno, one of Aub's favorite authors, is again apparent: Cainism, or extreme antagonism between two brothers, was one of Don Miguel's signature themes.
8. Hungarian-born author Arthur Koestler, who had also witnessed the Spanish Civil War, was an internee in both locations, an experience he memorialized in *Scum of the Earth*.

CHAPTER 2

1. The Instituto was originally an organ of the Falange and was later placed under the aegis of the government, specifically at the service of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs (see Delgado Gómez-Escalonilla 428).
2. The statute of the Council of Europe is now considered the inaugural document of the European Treaty series. The complete text can be read on the Council of Europe website: *coe.int*.
3. A similar image inspired the title of *Punta Europa*, a review created in Madrid in 1956 as a nostalgic stronghold of antiliberal ideas that some of the most recalcitrant Spanish reactionaries saw as starting to lose ground. With fascism's usual anachronism and contempt for rationality, its promoters intended to rejuvenate traditionalism by restoring the Catholic, patriarchal, and militaristic values that propelled the coup of July 18, 1936. In the founding editorial, published in January, 1956, Spain is again presented as the spiritual guide and guardian of the continent: "Si Europa falla en un rincón, se despierta en otro. Ese otro rincón en nuestro tiempo, donde el alma de Occidente puede estar más vigilante, vuelve a ser España, punta de Europa" [Europe may fail in one corner, but it awakens in another. In our time, that other corner, where the soul of the West can be more vigilant, is again Spain, Europe's heading]. The complete text is available at *filosofia.org/hem/dep/pun/ta001005.htm*. This fixation on the topos of the heading of Europe would become much more productive in Jacques Derrida's *The Other Heading*, where the French thinker discusses its significance through the interpellation of *le point* (a place or position) and *la pointe* (a head, end, or headland).
4. "Si tuviera alguna vez que elegir entre la patria y la discreción, no habría de dudar y seguiría las solicitaciones de ésta. Mi liberalismo lo exige: me importa más Europa que España, y España sólo me importa si integra espiritualmente Europa. Soy, en cambio, patriota, porque mis nervios españoles, con toda su herencia sentimental, son el único medio que me ha sido dado para llegar a ser europeo. . . . Y es preciso que al cabo deje de colgar España, en el mapa moral del mismo modo que en el geográfico, como una piltrafa de Europa. Si con este sobrepatriotismo puedo ser llamado patriota, lo soy" (Ortega,

"La conservación" 152–53) [If I ever had to choose between homeland and discretion, I would not hesitate and would heed the demands of the latter. My liberalism requires it: Europe matters to me more than Spain does, and Spain does so only if it integrates Europe spiritually. Yet I am a patriot all the same, as my Spanish nerves, with their entire se-ntimental heritage, are the only means I have for becoming European. . . . And Spain must eventually cease to hang from Europe like a worthless scrap on moral and geographical maps. If with this over-patriotism I can be called a patriot, I am indeed one]. Notice Ortega's wish to harmonize his fascination for Europe with his national calling, as well as his anxiety over Spain's spatial and intellectual marginality vis-à-vis the North, which is for him a personal burden.

5. Ortega also used the arguments over Europe to publicly position himself against other prominent senior figures such as the painter Ignacio Zuloaga (1870–1945), whose work became the subject of a few of his finest essays. In one of them, from 1916, Ortega writes, "Sabido es que Zuloaga se ha declarado enemigo de la doctrina europeizadora que en formas y tonos diferentes defendemos algunos. Por tanto, es Zuloaga nuestro enemigo" ("La estética" 121) [It is known that Zuloaga has declared himself an enemy of the Europeanizing doctrine that some of us defend in different ways and tones. Therefore, Zuloaga is our enemy]. However, these haughtily proclaimed intellectual antagonisms were not incompatible with mutual admiration and even close friendship, as was the case with Zuloaga, whom Ortega visited frequently. Four years after the publication of those words, Zuloaga painted the best portrait made of the philosopher; later on, he also included Ortega in a group portrait entitled *Mis amigos* [My friends].
6. For different (and sometimes contradictory) assessments of Ortega's postwar activities in Spain, see José Luis Abellán's *Ortega y Gasset y los orígenes de la transición democrática*, Gregorio Morán's *El maestro en el erial*, and Jordi Gracia's *José Ortega y Gasset*.
7. The distinguished exile Victoria Kent (a former member of the Spanish Republic's parliament and editor of the New York–based periodical *Ibérica*) rightly disputed those assertions in the *Times* a few days later ("Ortega's Political Views," November 28, 1955).
8. For a fascinating account of the meeting's history and consequences, see Jordi Amat's *La primavera de Múnich*.
9. I analyze the European anxieties present in other poems by Colinas and other authors of the period in "Europa en el imaginario poético."
10. Spain saw the consolidation of organized feminism just weeks after the dictator's passing with the celebration of the "I Jornadas para la Liberación de la Mujer" [First Conference for the Liberation of Women] in December 1975 (Galceran 94–97). The movement held a vital role during the following years: as Ramón Buckley argued in his seminal book *La doble transición*, while

the great majority of male intellectuals barely discussed the democratization process in any depth, feminist authors became its most acute and critical interpreters.

11. The leftist protests had a counterpart in the marginal attempts at an extreme right-wing counterrevolution that historian Xavier Casals has called "White May" and explained in his book *Neonazis en España*. As Casals explains, in 1966, the CEDADE (Círculo Español de Amigos de Europa) [Spanish Circle of Friends of Europe] was founded in Barcelona as a Wagner appreciation society. Formed by neo-Nazi youth disenchanted with the Franco regime's rejection of Hitlerian fascism, the group was initially focused on cultural issues and supported by Falangists, military officials, intellectuals such as Ernesto Giménez Caballero and Juan Eduardo Cirlot, the family of Rudolf Hess (whose freedom the CEDADE actively advocated), and Wagner's descendants, including Winifred, the composer's daughter-in-law who was also a close friend of Adolf Hitler. In 1969, the CEDADE organized the X Congress of the New European Order in Barcelona (an international racist organization). In *The Politics of Revenge*, Paul Preston explains the rise of Spanish neo-Nazi groups in the 1960s as a response to growing unrest among students and workers. The revival of fascist ideals passed for reverence of a united and exclusionary Europe.
12. For a critical review of the space that women and feminist approaches occupy within the EU's policies and institutions, see Hilary Footitt's book, especially its second chapter, "Women in the European Union." The Treaty of Rome can be found at *eur-lex.europa.eu*

CHAPTER 3

1. Representative contributions along these lines are Delgado's *La nación singular*, Fernández-Savater's articles published in different venues and archived on rebelion.org, and the volume edited by Martínez, *CT o la Cultura de la Transición*. Rancière's *Dissensus* and *The Politics of Aesthetics* are at the heart of a good portion of that debate. Antonio Méndez-Rubio's "Dancing with Destruction" is an example of how this framework can explain specific cultural trends (in his essay, those of popular music). Carlos Taibo's *España, un gran país* presents a similar diagnosis via an approach that owes more to the social sciences than to humanistic discussions. Though his work lacks the theoretical background that informs the others, Gregorio Morán, in his book *El cura y los mandarines*, offers a very detailed and often polemical narrative of the complex amalgam of interests that have associated the state and the cultural sphere in Spain since the 1960s. Early observers of the direction that Spanish culture was taking in the 1980s were essayists Rafael Sánchez Ferlosio (see his "La cultura, ese invento del Gobierno," from 1984) and Eduardo Subirats. In 1995 Subirats pointed out that at the time "los nuevos productos culturales

se diseñaban obedientes a un principio de economía política que descartaba cualquier disonancia o conflicto" (44) [new cultural products were designed in obedience to a principle of political economy that dismissed all dissonance and conflict], which he related to the shallow Europhilia that reigned then (149).

2. The referendum on Spain's remaining in NATO took place on March 12, 1986. The vote was preceded by a great amount of discussion, which had a decisive influence on the outcome. The result, which favored the continuation of the country's participation in the military alliance, contradicted most opinion polls.
3. Other concrete concessions preceded Franco's death. They included lifting the blockade on Gibraltar in 1969 (to gain the United Kingdom's support), a major issue in the Spanish nationalist discourse. But the main sacrifices were economic. As Kerstin Hamann explains, "even when the failed French and Greek leftist economic policies illustrated to PSOE leaders that European integration was also about market adjustment and not always reconcilable with traditionally redistributive economic policies, the prospect of democratic stability and long-term economic benefits weighed heavier than the potential economic and political costs" (52).
4. By contrast, this same period (the early 1980s) saw the heated debate over Spain's participation in NATO, which culminated in the 1986 referendum referenced in note 2. In Portugal and Greece, both of which had also experienced authoritarian regimes, EC membership was a contentious topic among the main political parties (Álvarez-Miranda Navarro).
5. Much of Spain's administrative network for the arts was modeled after the French example, which Marc Fumaroli sharply analyzes in *L'État culturel*.
6. Spain's 1978 Constitution can be accessed in several languages at *www.congreso.es/consti/constitucion/indice/index.htm*
7. A sign of the status it has achieved is the recent publication as part of Cátedra's Letras Hispánicas series of several pieces that Boadella wrote for the group. The book by Simon Breden contains the best English-language study of the company.
8. Like Boadella, Miró had confronted the military's curtailment of freedom of expression still at work in the late 1970s for her film *El crimen de Cuenca* [The crime of Cuenca] (see Martín-Estudillo, "The Culture of Democratic Spain" 143).
9. The act was the first major modification of the Treaty of Rome of 1957. It set the basis for greater cooperation between member states, especially on matters regarding the harmonization of European trade rules with the goal of creating a single market. It went into force in July 1987.
10. Vázquez Montalbán was remarkably consistent on this issue through the

decades. See his op-ed pieces in *El País*: "Europa" (June 12, 1986), "Referendos" (September 7, 1992), and "Mafias" (August 8, 2000).

11. The reference to "deforming mirrors" alludes to Ramón M. del Valle-Inclán's poetics of *esperpento*, which critiqued reality by deforming it with the "convex mirror" of his theater. In his well-known *esperpento* play *Luces de Bohemia* (1920/1924), Spain is characterized as "una deformación grotesca de la civilización europea" [a grotesque deformation of European civilization].
12. The polemics about the memory of the Second Republic, the civil war, and the Franco regime (especially its repressive practices) can be evaluated within this same cultural process. Scholarship on the topic grew exponentially during the first decade of this century. Essential contributions include the work of Paloma Aguilar Fernández, Sebastiaan Faber, Antonio Gómez López-Quiñones, Jo Labanyi, and Ulrich Winter, among others.
13. Judt concludes that the Holocaust was not "usable" (his word) in the "compensatory myth-making" that each participating nation devised in the immediate postwar period (809).
14. Other important scholarly contributions on the matter can be found in *A European Memory? Contested Histories and Politics of Remembrance*, a volume coedited by Małgorzata Pakier and Bo Stråth. See especially the chapters by Jan-Werner Müller, Klas-Göran Karlsson, and Cecilia Felicia Stokholm Banke.
15. I have dealt with the last two authors' works in "Death's Twilight Kingdom" and "Muñoz Molina, Sebald," respectively.
16. On the discourse of "European goodness," see the article by Böröcz as well as the book by Hansen and Jonsson, who historicize "assertions of the EU's exceptional status as a benevolent global actor" (xix).

CHAPTER 4

1. The complete declaration can be accessed at the webpage of the Union for the Mediterranean, the organization that was launched to continue the process initiated in Barcelona: *ufmsecretariat.org*
2. A philosophically informed treatment of (in his acute phrasing) "EUrope" and its "discourses of securitization and humanitarianism" can be found in Nick Vaughan-William's timely book.
3. Although this type of data is notoriously difficult to gather, The Migrants' Files, a joint effort by several European media outlets, nongovernmental organizations, and research centers, is exemplary in its rigorous approach to the phenomenon of European migration. Unfortunately, after having been recognized with important awards for its denunciation of "the human and financial cost of fifteen years of Fortress Europe," it was discontinued in June 2016 due to lack of funds (*themigrantsfiles.com*).
4. For an analysis of the case of Ceuta, see Parvati Nair's "Europe's 'Last' Wall."
5. In contrast, on the occasion of Spain's incorporation to the EEC just a few

years earlier, the region's president, José Rodríguez de la Borbolla, spoke of Andalucía as "esta vieja y venerable puerta de Europa . . . Sur abierto siempre" (130–31) [this old and venerable gate of Europe . . . a South that is always open].

6. *Estrecho Adventure* received many awards, including first prizes at the Navarra and L'Alternativa (Barcelona) festivals, and has been screened at numerous festivals, among them those in Tetouan (Morocco) and Kelibia (Tunis). It has also been broadcast on several television channels, in Spain and internationally.
7. Charpentier wrote it in D major, which he considered to be suitably "warlike." *Te Deum*, H. 146, vocal score, preface by Helga Schauerte-Maubouet, translated by Steve Taylor. Kassel: Bärenreiter Verlag, 2004.
8. This view precedes Roman mythology. As Natalia Ribas-Mateos notes in her study of EU Mediterranean borders, the Andalucian city of Cádiz, located in the southernmost tip of the Iberian Peninsula, was called "the fortified door" by the Phoenicians (38).
9. Likewise, the African view at the beginning of the piece, described above, is clearly influenced by *Commando* (Tokuro Fujiwara, 1985), while the raft scene owes a debt to *Out Run* (Yu Suzuki, 1986). I am grateful to video-game scholar Pablo Rodríguez Balbontín for pointing out those forerunners.
10. The full interview can be accessed at *www.zemos98.org/IMG/article_PDF_article_300.pdf*.
11. The discourse of the Catholic Church continues to reflect this dichotomy nowadays, as could be observed in the reactions of its officials to the arrival of Syrian refugees in 2015. While Pope Francis asked European Christians to open their doors, Cardinal Antonio Cañizares, Archbishop of Valencia, saw them as an "invasión . . . el caballo de Troya dentro de las sociedades europeas" [an invasion . . . the Trojan horse inside European societies]. "¿Cómo quedará Europa dentro de unos años con la que viene ahora? No se puede jugar con la historia ni con la identidad de los pueblos" [How will Europe turn out with what is coming in now? One cannot play games with history or with people's identity], warned the prelate ("Cañizares acusa a los refugiados de ser el 'caballo de Troya' de Europa," *El País*, October 15, 2015).
12. Slavoj Žižek proposes a reading of the last movement of the Ninth Symphony, underscoring the significance of the section known as the "Turkish March" in terms of the EU's reluctance to admit Turkey (70–75). His insights about Schiller's lines "Und wer's nie gekonnt, der stehle weinend sich aus diesem Bund" [Those who cannot rejoice, let them abandon this gathering in tears] could also be applied to the predicament of others who are excluded from the Union.
13. López devoted another of his video pieces, titled *Salvem la Diada de la Toma* [Save Conquest Day, in Catalan] to that controversial holiday. This brief work captures several moments of the celebration, in which the public cheers a

military parade, shouting for Andalucía, Granada, monarchy, and Spanish unity—and against immigration. Next, we hear a homily by the Archbishop of Granada, who reflects on the holiday's origins and on the nation's unity as a "moral good." All of it is real-life footage, which López subtitles in Catalan—thereby calling into doubt the alleged nonexistence of Spanish nationalism, which conservatives fail to acknowledge, as it is assumed to be a "natural" status quo, as opposed to the "unnatural," "artificial," or "destructive" nationalisms of other communities.

14. The artist approaches the intersection of ethnicity and urban configuration as a call for attention to another form of exclusion present in many European towns with a dense history and long-neglected inner-city districts. Aside from the danger that ethnic difference poses to the internal homogeneity desired by some, the visibility of certain population groups threatens the tourism and real-estate industries, which depend largely on the idealization and exploitation of the city's past, a model of urban economic development based on speculation. The city's heritage is de-problematized and dealt with superficially for economic benefit and could thus be affected by the presence of low-income minorities and elderly people, among others. The gentrification of historical centers often entails further marginalization of the poor and the foreign.
15. Cebrián has also explored these issues in a novel, *El genuino sabor* [The true flavor, 2014], but it is in her poetry that her critique best shows the poignancy of the issues at stake.
16. For a discussion of the role of this notion in the European integration process, see Durand 24–27.
17. Referring to the popular Spanish saying that children are born "con un pan bajo el brazo" [with a loaf of bread under their arm].
18. On December 14, 1973, the nine Foreign Ministers of the European Communities drafted a pioneer "Document on the European Identity." For them, the first step to defining such an identity involved "reviewing the common heritage." The complete text can be accessed at *www.cvce.eu/content/publication/1999/1/1/02798dc9-9c69-4b7d-b2c9-f03a8db7da32/publishable_en.pdf*.
19. I quote and translate from the French original, as the Spanish version translates the plural "identités" and "racines" in the singular forms.
20. For a reading of the nuances and transgression in Puntí's use of the mythical winged horse Pegasus, see Bagunyà (8).
21. Lesser-known versions of the story, those of Herodotus and Saint Jerome, claim that the girl was abducted by Cretan men traveling in a boat with a bull insignia (see Rougemont 36). Coincidentally, the bull has been recently coopted as a symbol by proponents of a conservative notion of Spanish identity, for reasons that have not much to do with the Greek myth.

CHAPTER 5

1. The economic origins of the latest manifestations of the intra-European division between "center" and "periphery" are discussed in the volumes edited by Durand and Lapavitsas, and in the conversation between James Cohen and Sami Naïr that forms the core of Naïr's book *El desengaño europeo*. All of them tackle the matter from a leftist perspective; for a different one, see the co-authored book by Baimbridge and Whynam and John R. Gillingham's *The EU: An Obituary*. An approach centered more on issues of governance than economic ones is found in José Ignacio Torreblanca's sharp *¿Quién gobierna en Europa?*
2. See "Zapatero stuzzica Prodi dopo il sorpasso," *Corriere della Sera*, December 18, 2007 and "Sin la solidaridad de Alemania, España hoy no sería la misma," *Nueva Economía Fórum*, January 31, 2008, respectively. Indeed, Germany's favorable position toward Spain was decisive as the latter negotiated its accession to the EEC, a process in which France posed the greatest obstacle. See Fernando Rodrigo and José I. Torreblanca, "Germany on My Mind?"
3. Spain's foreclosure law was considered "abusive" by the European Justice Court ("Un dictamen europeo considera abusiva la ley española de desahucios," *El País*, November 8, 2012). Its application has been linked to a large number of suicides since 2010. See, for instance, "Un padre de familia a punto de ser desahuciado se ahorca en plena calle," *La Vanguardia*, November 11, 2010; "Un hombre se suicida en Granada horas antes de ser desahuciado," *Público*, October 25, 2012; "Una mujer se suicida en Málaga tres días después de recibir la orden de desahucio," *El País*, December 14, 2012; "Una pareja de jubilados se suicida tras recibir el aviso de desahucio," *El Diario*, February 12, 2013.
4. See the full text of the constitutional modification at *www.congreso.es/consti/constitucion/reforma/segunda_reforma.htm*.
5. The Standard Eurobarometer poll of Spring 2013 indicated that 75 percent of Spaniards tended to "distrust" the EU (see page 98 of the Eurobarometer 79 report).
6. "15M: Merkel y Rajoy pasan por la 'guillotina' de los indignados," *La Vanguardia*, May 15, 2012. Other sources indicate that it was Caixabank's president Isidro Fainé, and not Mas, who "accompanied" Merkel and Rajoy. For more on the use of decapitation imagery in recent social protests in Spain, see Germán Labrador Méndez, "The Cannibal Wave."
7. As José Ignacio Torreblanca writes, "Spain is now, after Cyprus, the member state where the EU's image is most negative. Spaniards will not revolt against Europe but they are learning a lot about tough love" ("Europe Must Show Spain It Is the Answer." *Financial Times*, October 16, 2012).
8. The authors also analyze the inclusion of Ireland among the PIGS, noting that the acronym is then modified as PIIGS.
9. One of these was Antonio Muñoz Molina, who in an article commissioned by

the German weekly *Der Spiegel* remarked that "lo asombroso es que se haya roto hasta el tabú de la animalización de los otros. En Europa, después de 1945, solo en los Balcanes o en el País Vasco han quedado nacionalistas tan furiosos como para insultar con nombres de animales a los que consideraban sus enemigos. Aunque sea con siglas, la broma de llamar P.I.G.S. a unos países europeos no tiene ninguna gracia" [it is striking that even the taboo of animalizing the other has been broken. In Europe, after 1945, only in the Balkans or the Basque Country have there remained nationalists furious enough as to insult those whom they considered to be their enemies by using animal names. Even using an acronym, the joke of calling some European countries PIGS is not funny at all] ("Demasiada distancia," published as "Auf Distanz," *Der Spiegel*, no. 31, 2012, p. 52). Interestingly, the second sentence quoted above was deleted in the German version of the text, and a reference to Portugal, Italy, Greece, and Spain as "Hauptschuldnerländer" (main debtor countries) was added.

10. The metaphor was one that became long cherished by the *Economist*'s editors, as can be confirmed by reading "PIGS Can Fly: European Immigration," published more than five years later on November 16, 2013.
11. See Brian Dillon's *Ruin Lust: Artists' Fascination with Ruins, from Turner to the Present Day*, a brief essay printed on the occasion of an exhibit by the same title held at the Tate Gallery in 2014. Dillon also edited *Ruins*, a valuable volume on the topic for the Whitechapel Gallery's Documents of Contemporary Art series.
12. In "La Unión Europea y sus mitos," Carlos Taibo traces the beginning of this process to the monetary policies agreed on at the Maastricht Treaty of 1992.
13. It should be productive to contrast García Rodero's *Europa: El Sur*, an exhibit and photobook produced on the occasion of Madrid's designation as "European City of Culture" in 1992, and Spottorno's *The Pigs*.
14. Just a few months after the Milan event, Sierra shipped to Germany "40m^3 of Earth from the Iberian Peninsula." I entirely agree with Alexander Koch's interpretation of this project for the KOW gallery in Berlin: "The provenance of the material from the Spanish real-estate industry points to a shift of power in Europe's economic structure. Some regions, such as the Iberian Peninsula, find themselves devalued to the advantage of other regions or countries, especially Germany. New migration movements are set in motion, a phenomenon that the soil's journey retraces. The distressed countries of Southern Europe now prepare their assets for shipping; they put their human capital and public property on the market at a discount and hand over control of systemically relevant infrastructures to investors. Packaged in Big Bags [*sic*], the cheap containers of the shipping business, every cubic meter of Iberian soil represents the sell-out of someone's living environment and self-determination and indeed of national sovereignty."

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